Sparsely dotted along Africa’s political contours are isolated pockets of scorched terrains, deeply charred by the aftermath of fractured administrative transitions, where the crumbling of sitting regimes under the weight of public discontent and electoral defeat has frequently led to civil strife and autocratic backsliding.
From the fiery downfall of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe to the bloodied streets of post-election Uhuru Kenyatta’s Kenya, our continent has borne witness to the perils of power's friable hold, when leaders entranced by its heady rush, adamantly refuse to let go, the same way Donald Trump of the US vaingloriously attempted to do post the 2020 elections. However, like ambergris, our country, Botswana, stands as a rare and precious gem amid marine expanses of instability. When the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) lost a fiercely fought election in 2024, the transition was not one of rancour, savagery or violence, but of peaceful and respectful handover, undeniably smooth and remarkably dignified. The outgoing president, Mokgweetsi Masisi, neither manipulated the system nor exploited his relationship with the army. Neither did unwarranted self-absorbed ambition nor misguided incumbency obsession compel him to mobilise gullible fawning rubes; the uncultured and savage-hearted toadies forming a subset of his fanbase, to do the despicable.
Coldy indifferent to the slightest hint of political narcissism, and avowedly eschewing a self-entitlement mentality, Masisi conceded defeat, consciously circumventing the chronic urge for ill-directed drama, and gracefully passed the mantle to the incoming president, Duma Boko. True to form, as a nation, we have embedded the ideals of governance into every helix of our DNA, through an engaged civil society, moderately effective institutions, and most critically, a political culture that prizes respect for the people’s will above the brittle ego of the leader. In progressive constitutional democracies, the peaceful transfer of power cannot be reduced to an inconsequential ceremonial formality. It is the bedrock of stability, continuity, and progress. Yet, as Botswana’s recent political transition has revealed, the country’s legal framework appears woefully unprepared for the realities of a changing political landscape. The abrupt shift from President Mokgweetsi Masisi to President Duma Boko on November 1, 2024, underscores a systemic flaw in Botswana’s governance architecture; the absence of a structured, well-defined transition process. On October 31, 2024, Masisi was the sitting president of Botswana, singularly charged with the stewardship of the country, wielding absolute authority over the armed forces. By the next day, he had been humbled to the ranks of Everyday Joe, stripped of most of the lavish accoutrements of power. Conversely, clad in the resplendent insignia of alluring freshly earned power, Boko, within a single whirlwind-like 24-hour stretch, vaulted from the histrionics of an eminently loud political Joe Sixpack to the helm of the rarefied corridors of power. Ironically, neither man was adequately prepared for the downward or upward transition.
This abrupt shift left both leaders floundering. Masisi had no structured mechanism to hand over power, no roadmap to guide the transfer of responsibilities. Ostensibly thrust onto the sharp apex of the country’s governance pyramid, Boko found himself grappling with the Herculean task of assembling a competent team, running a government, and establishing governance priorities, while in some way deprived of the logistical or institutional support from his trusted advisors. On a relatively minor and perhaps benignly mirthful level, Masisi suddenly teetered on the edge of homelessness, ill-prepared to vacate the State House. And Boko’s assumption of office while residing in a haven more suited for those with no airs of grandeur, a no-frills bungalow glaringly ill-suited for occupation by a head of state, both from an aesthetic and presidential security perspective, poignantly illustrates the harrowing inadequacies of the current system. The unstructured handover of power revealed that the country’s legal framework is severely ill-equipped to navigate such a crucial shift. This deficiency cannot be relegated to a trivial administrative hiccup. It undermines the efficiency of governance and exposes the nation to easily mitigatable risks, both financial and operational. These identified vulnerabilities demand urgent reforms to the country’s laws. Such reforms will ensure a smoother, more predictable transition of power, one that aligns with global best practices and safeguards the nation’s democratic integrity. Democracies with well-defined transition processes ensure smooth handovers. Contrast what happened in Botswana with the norm in the United States, where the president-elect routinely enjoys a transition period of over two months between election victory and inauguration. Trump won the presidential election on November 5, 2024, but he only assumed office on January 20, 2025. This 11-week transition period was not wasted on revelling on the glory of his triumph, or frolicking across the manicured lawns and pristine beach of his luxurious Mar-a-Lago resort. On the one hand, Biden’s outgoing administration was hard at work, fostering an environment conducive to a smooth transition of power, with a view to ensuring that the new president hit the ground running. This allowed for policy briefings and the seamless transfer of classified information. On the other hand, before stepping into the Oval Office, Trump begun assembling his cabinet and handpicking key government officials, while simultaneously sharpening his focus on shaping the policy priorities that defined his presidency from day one. In the spirit of proactiveness, former US President John F. Kennedy once remarked, "The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining." From a transition perspective, such foresightedness avoids the pitfalls of hasty governance shift and ensures a glitch-free continuity of leadership.
For Botswana, an adequate constitutionally mandated transition period would have provided the necessary breathing room for both outgoing and incoming administrations to prepare satisfactorily. During this time, Masisi could have briefed Boko on pressing national issues, while the latter finalised key appointments and governance priorities. South Africa’s 1994 transition from the abhorrent apartheid regime to a democracy showcased meticulous planning, with Nelson Mandela’s team engaging outgoing officials to ensure institutional stability. After his vicious and almost blood-curdling debates with F. W. de Klerk, where the pair unremorsefully traded overtly unpalatable, barbed and dignity-sapping verbal thumps, Mandela humbly noted, "A good leader can engage in a debate frankly and thoroughly, knowing that at the end, he and the other side must be closer, and thus emerge stronger. You don’t have that idea when you are arrogant, superficial, and uninformed." Botswana’s democracy, lauded for its resilience, stands to gain immeasurably by emulating such foresight. Another blatant shortfall is the misalignment of contracts for intentionally selected senior technocrats and other political appointees with the presidential term. Upon Masisi’s exit, the new government found itself encumbered by financial obligations to civil-service-mantled political appointees whose contracts extended beyond his tenure. Not only does this unfortunate misalignment strain public finances, but it also represents a fundamental flaw in governance that impedes the incoming administration’s ability from expeditiously assembling its own team of primed for action trusted technical experts. In Ghana, this challenge has been deftly mitigated by aligning such contracts with the appointing president’s term, thereby allowing new governments the latitude to bring in fresh expertise without inheriting unnecessary financial burdens. As Ghana’s most preeminent and esteemed diplomat, Kofi Annan, wisely asserted, "To live is to choose. But to choose well, you must know who you are and what you stand for, where you want to go, and why you want to get there." Botswana’s reforms must reflect this clarity of purpose. Botswana’s political system is further hampered by the absence of a shadow cabinet, which deprived Boko’s team of the opportunity to monitor and fully prepare for governance while in opposition. In the United Kingdom, the shadow cabinet system allows the opposition to scrutinise the sitting government, develop alternative policies, and ensure readiness to govern. This practice not only strengthens democracy but also equips incoming administrations with the institutional knowledge required to get off to a flying start. It is crucial to amend Botswana’s electoral and parliamentary laws to formalise the creation of a shadow cabinet. Such a transformative step would have enabled Boko and his party to actively prepare for leadership.
This lapse was exemplified by that unforgettable nightmare of nightmares; the excruciatingly painful piecemeal appointment of cabinet ministers, which left the new administration’s machinery sputtering at a time when decisive governance was most needed. Had a formal shadow cabinet system been in place, Boko and his team would have been battle-ready for assumption of administrative leadership, thus fostering a more accountable governance framework. Additionally, protocols must be established to ensure that incoming presidents have immediate access to appropriate housing and security arrangements. Maintaining a readily occupiable and thoroughly swept secondary State residence for transitional use would resolve the embarrassing logistical and security dilemmas that plagued the 2024 handover. And as a matter of operational necessity, provisions must be made for a secure, functional and dignified tertiary residence for occupation by the sitting president in the event that their primary residence is compromised by unforeseen circumstances such as natural disasters or condemnable acts of terrorism. We need not reinvent the wheel, numerous tried-and-tested templates exist, providing us with effective models to emulate. Democracies within Africa, such as Kenya, have demonstrated the value of structured transitions.
Article 141 of Kenya’s Constitution mandates a swearing-in ceremony “on the first Tuesday following the fourteenth day after the date of the declaration of the result of the presidential election.” Enshrined in the Constitution, this period of at least one fortnight, though short and perhaps not fully efficacious, facilitates a more seamless transition. Counterpose this against Botswana’s rather simplistic 1966-ish outmoded constitutional provision for assumption of office by the President, which stipulates, “A person elected to the office of President under this section shall assume that office on the day upon which he is declared elected.” It had to take a regime change to cast light on this tiny but unimaginably weighty blind spot in our constitution. Muqtad al Sadr, an Iraqi politician, rightly mused, "Politics is serving the people, not chairs and positions.” A well-executed transition exemplifies this precept and accentuates the need for readiness. By borrowing a leaf from the US, South Africa, Ghana and Kenya, Botswana can fortify its democratic processes and adequately prepare incoming presidents to serve the people, “not chairs and positions.” Without decisive reform, Botswana risks eroding its hard-earned reputation as a citadel of democracy, generally envied by many nations within and without Africa. We cannot afford to flip-flop between a benchmark and its antipode. The chaos of an unstructured transition undermines public confidence, disrupts governance, and jeopardises policy and public service continuity. On the brighter side, a well-crafted transition framework transforms moments of political change into opportunities for renewal and progress. Botswana must act decisively to ensure its democratic evolution enables new administrators an opportunity to govern effectively from the outset, not merely to be swept away by the delirium of power, while stripped of the capacity to act on it. As the timeless adage warns, "failing to prepare is preparing to fail."
Botswana’s current transition model belongs to an era when political dominance by a single party seemed unassailable. The 2024 elections shattered what had been a persistent illusion, affirming that, going forward, we may always be one election away from regime change. To meet all new dawns with confidence, Botswana must embrace reform, transforming its democratic transition from a moment of vulnerability into a hallmark of strength. Herein lies the marrow of my contention; a smorgasbord of transition reforms should naturally mandate the following; a reasonable transition period between the election of the President and the assumption of office; the formation of a bipartisan transition team to oversee the transfer of power; the creation of a transition team to facilitate the exchange of information, resources, and responsibilities between the outgoing and incoming administrations; alignment of contracts for selected senior technocrat positions and political appointees with the term of the presidency; and codification of transition protocols, including provisions for security, logistics, and administrative support during the handover process. To be sure, all these are not illusory fantasies; they are possibilities awaiting only the touch of our will. As the saying goes, “A stitch in time saves nine.”
By learning from global best practices and implementing comprehensive legal reforms, we can ensure smoother, more efficient transitions of power, enhancing governance and reinforcing public confidence. Though we have trodden this pathway only once in the last 58 years, it is by no stretch of imagination a gnarled track. It is an enchanting picturesque arborway, which through its magical pull extends a silent, yet irresistible call to all relevant government structures to wander productively beneath its canopy’s shade, and decisively pull off that nifty baller move; launder our tarnished reputation by conscientiously plugging the striking gaps in the country’s political leadership transitions.
