The Congo River Alliance (AFC), officially established in December 2023 under the leadership of Corneille Nangaa, marks a troubling evolution in the DRC’s conflict.
This heterogeneous coalition unites the March 23 Movement (M23), widely regarded as a military proxy of Kigali, according to UN reports the political movement Action for the Dignity of the Congo and its People (ADCP), and the armed group Twirwaneho from South Kivu. By merging these disparate factions, the AFC has transformed an ethnically-driven rebellion into a systemic threat to regional stability.
North and South Kivu, the epicentres of this crisis, present a deadly paradox: their subsoil holds 60% to 80% of the world’s coltan reserves a mineral critical for both military and civilian technologies while their populations remain trapped in chronic insecurity. The M23, the AFC’s military arm, controls a lucrative coltan trade estimated at $800 ,000 per month, according to the United Nations, financing both its military operations and parallel economic circuits in neighbouring Rwanda. This war economy, combined with the identity-based grievances of Congolese Tutsis, has become the catalyst for an escalation that now extends beyond Congolese borders.
In addition, the AFC’s structure reveals a three-tiered destabilisation strategy, with each pillar reinforcing the other in an inexorable cycle. On the ground, its military wing – comprising the M23 and Twirwaneho – deploys a hybrid force that blends asymmetric warfare with cutting-edge technology. With over 2, 000 battle-hardened fighters, bolstered by Turkish reconnaissance drones and Israeli anti-tank missiles, they pose a direct threat not only to Kinshasa but also to regional capitals such as Kigali and Bujumbura.
Meanwhile, the ADCP, serving as the coalition’s political front, promotes what a sanitised discourse on “moralising public life,” which resonates beyond Congolese borders, appealing to both European Diasporas and diplomatic circles in search of “legitimate” interlocutors. This façade of legitimacy masks the coalition’s third pillar: an economic apparatus centred on controlling 12 key mining sites-including the coltan-rich concessions of Rubaya and Bisie -underpinned by opaque financial dealings with offshore investors based in the Gulf and Hong Kong. This interwoven network of local trafficking, offshore investments, and regional dependencies creates a self-sustaining system of war profiteering.
A looming regional collapse
Besides that, this triptych of warfare, propaganda, and a gray economy has become self-perpetuating; with each component feeding into others in a cycle that defies conventional responses. The US sanctions imposed on the AFC in July 2024 marking the first official recognition of its regional threat – have failed to curb its expansion. On the contrary, its entrenchment across five Congolese provinces and its reported ties with Central African warlords, suggests an ongoing effort to reshape Central Africa’s geopolitical landscape. Rwanda, though widely accused of sponsoring the M23, is no longer the only external actor involved and the DRC’s complex conflict is exacerbating tensions on a regional scale. Burundi, already politically fragile, risks descending into pre-election civil war due to the spillover from the Congolese crisis. Similarly, Uganda fears a resurgence of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in its northern mining regions, rich in gold and tin, due to their connections with the AFC. Meanwhile, Zambia and Angola – key financiers of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) see their mining investments at risk. The DRC conflict thus has far-reaching economic and security repercussions for the entire region, endangering both stability and development in neighbouring states.
Faced with this catastrophic scenario, regional security mechanisms such as the SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) appear overwhelmed. Their failure to contain the AFC, despite deploying 5, 000 South African, Malawi and Tanzanian troops, underscores the gravity of the challenge because this is no longer just a local rebellion but a sprawling network fuelled by the DRC’s institutional weaknesses, inter-state rivalries, and global demand for critical minerals. Ultimately, without a coordinated and radical response – including governance reforms, resource traceability, and disengagement of foreign sponsors – the Kivu provinces could become the Sarajevo of a regional conflagration with continental ramifications.
Regional actors and accountability:
A web of complicity and inactionWhile Rwanda and Uganda are frequently cited by international community as external sponsors of the M23, the broader regional landscape reveals a deeper web of complicity and strategic inaction. The Congolese government, despite its rhetoric of resistance, remains plagued by institutional weaknesses, corruption, and an overreliance on fragmented military responses. Kinshasa’s inability to impose effective governance in the east has turned the Kivus into an ungoverned space where armed groups, foreign militias, and illicit trade networks thrive.
Meanwhile, Burundi, whose security forces have reportedly clashed with AFC-linked factions, faces its own internal fractures ahead of upcoming elections, potentially turning the conflict into a domestic political tool. At the same time, Tanzania and South Africa, despite their military commitments under the SADC mission, lack a cohesive strategy to neutralise the insurgency, highlighting the shortcomings of regional security cooperation. Angola, a dominant player in the SADC, remains hesitant to escalate its involvement, prioritising economic stability over direct intervention. The absence of a unified regional approach has allowed M23 and its backers to exploit diplomatic rivalries, further entrenching instability.
In this context, peace initiatives are paralysed by deep-seated mistrust among stakeholders. The United Nations Security Council has adopted several resolutions, including Resolution 2666 (2022), which extended MONUSCO’s mandate until December 2023, and Resolution 2641 (2022), concerning arms procurement regulations in the DRC. Despite these efforts, the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes have failed to yield results, hindered by Rwanda’s refusal to cooperate and the diverging interests of regional actors. This situation highlights the complexity of regional dynamics and the challenge of establishing a sustainable peace.
Meanwhile, the escalating security crisis in Goma and North Kivu is no longer solely defined by the M23’s advances but is now part of a broader trend of transnational terrorism. The growing presence of the ADF, now affiliated with the Islamic State in Central Africa (ISCAP), represents a strategic shift in regional threats. Exploiting security gaps and the fragmentation of state authority, these terrorist groups use asymmetric tactics to expand their influence and sustain chronic instability. By targeting civilian infrastructure and engaging in indiscriminate violence, they have turned North Kivu into a hub for regional jihadism, fostering a hybrid form of terrorism that blends irregular warfare, criminal economies, and ideological radicalisation—with dire security implications for all of Central Africa. If no decisive action is taken, the Great Lakes region may spiral into further fragmentation. As the M23 extends its reach from Goma to Bujumbura, it does not just draw battle lines, it deepens the fractures in an already fragile regional order. In a landscape where borders are porous and alliances are fleeting, fragmentation is not a distant threat but an imminent reality. Today, unity is no longer an abstract ideal, it is an urgent necessity to prevent the total collapse of an entire region.
