It was, of course, agreed by proponents of devaluation that whilst this measure would provide a real boost to producers of export items, it would substantially increase the cost of imported items and in particular hit hardest at the poor. Economists may now argue that at the time of devaluation they could not possibly have anticipated this year's drought in Southern Africa but because drought is such a regular phenomenon in this part of the world it ought to be routinely factored in to all plans and decisions of this kind. Why wasn't it? Similar considerations ought now to apply to the Intelligence and Security Bill because the implications involved are certain to be both profound and widespread. It is merely common sense to suggest that everyone needs to understand what those implications are likely to be. How much will this new Agency cost over, say, a ten-year period? If no figures are provided, the Bill should never be approved. Can the country afford what is being envisaged which will presumably include some sort of mini Pentagon - the new Agency does, after all, have to be accommodated somewhere? Will the cost of the Agency soak up funds that might otherwise be spent on education, roads, health and social welfare measures? In what ways might the proposed legislation duplicate, or overlap, with what already exists? If existing legislation adequately covers certain clauses of the Bill, why is it necessary to double up? If the new Agency will not be accountable to Parliament for the funds it will annually approve - unlike the IEC or Ombudsman - how can MPs convince their constituent taxpayers that they are still fully responsible for all aspects of the national budget? As it is, the Bill has already passed its second reading in the National Assembly without anyone there demonstrating concern that it fails to describe how the huge funds involved will be controlled, by whom they will be controlled and to whom those involved will be accountable. The Bill goes into great detail when providing for the establishment and functions of a Directorate of Intelligence and Security, a Central Intelligence Committee, an Intelligence and Security Council and a Central Intelligence Community but is totally blank about the ways by which any of these bodies are to use funds and be accountable for them. The Bill states only in a badly worded clause that, 'a function of the Intelligence and Security Council will be to examine the expenditure, administration, complaints by, and oversee the legal framework of, the intelligence.' (30(b) In other words, there is to be no financial accountability and the supposedly responsible National Assembly has twice indicated that it is entirely happy that this should be so. But what about other questions? How will anyone in the National Assembly know that the Country, the State or the People are getting value for their investment? Or which of them is supposed to be the principal beneficiary? How will anyone know when the State within a State has become an Edgar Hoover type monster which is running amok? Can the provisions of this Bill be implemented without colliding with the terms of the Constitution? Will the High Court give judgement according to the rights enshrined in the Constitution or the rights denied when this Bill becomes law? Which gets precedence? Will the law favour the State or the individual? When it comes to the crunch, will the State end up with all the rights and the individual with none?
