On Barata-Phathi, tact and strategy

| Friday April 16, 2010 00:00

Grand battles are won and lost on the basis of strategy. The better strategists win and the less strategic side largely loses. The battle for the soul of the BDP - or whatever remains of it - will be won by the most strategic side. Strategy and tact define victory, which encompass knowing when to and where to attack. The report over Edward Raletobana's meeting with President Khama says a lot about their strategy and tact.

 Raletobana was said to have met party president Ian Khama unbeknownst to his fellow Barata-Phathi in efforts to have President Khama open dialogue with Barata-Phathi.

'I felt that I could meet Khama as an individual and implore him to meet Barata-Phathi' and 'the fact that Barata-Phathi are threatening to leave the BDP to form a new party is a big issue and should not be ignored. Hence I felt there should be dialogue', he is quoted as having said.

Not only that, Ephraim Keoreng quotes him in Mmegi as having said he also approached Khama by himself because he had realised that some people in his faction 'have pride they cannot swallow', also saying 'We must agree to differ.'

He is also said to have argued that he had found it easy for him to approach Khama because he (Raletobana) was 'once his private secretary', that they are 'friends' and that 'It's just that sometimes we differ on certain things, but I will not sell my principles for a cabinet post. Ga ke a rekwa (I have not been bought).' Quite a mouthful in such a short text, one feels.

Maybe I am reading too much into nothing, but it is from this premise that one gets the feeling that the strategy is not well mapped. Is it not on the foundation of extension of freedom that the faction has coalesced? Of course, it is. It is also true that they have argued that one need not always seek permission from the leader to act.

Thus, I wonder how Barata-Phathi will view Raletobana's approach. Is it some kind of unilateralist and unsanctioned action, or just a part of the freedoms they seek to extend? It is a question the new party, if formed, will have to deal with. In any event, Raletobana has maintained his allegiance to the principles of the faction.

 But his dialoguing still raises questions, especially on their strategy. Karl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military theorist who was influenced by Niccolo Machiavelli, described strategy as the planning of a whole campaign and tactics as the planning of a single battle.

The towering figure in early military science was Alexander the Great, who destroyed the Persian Empire built by Cyrus the Great. He recognized the importance of maintaining reserves, pursuing the enemy, building up supplies (stockpiling), and making use of elaborate scouting (intelligence). He used strategy and tact. That is military science, granted.

 Applied to politics and the BDP factional battles, it therefore points out that Barata-Phathi ought to have a grand strategy - the ultimate, and then pursue all other aims towards it. The grand strategy ought to be well-defined. An example would be to form a new party or to reconcile with the BDP. Such strategy would then dictate the tone of the language to be used against the mother party.

Thus far, on this front, they fare badly; a combination of tough talk bordering on not caring what happens ties in with others, like Raletobana talking peace and at the same time issuing conditions for reconciliation.

Within the grand strategy would lie conditional strategies as in 'if they agree to our demands we will do this' and 'if they do not we will do that'. This all has to be done bearing in mind the nature of politics and what it requires.

First, it is a game of numbers. As part of the strategy, the faction should by now have a complete count of the MPs unconditionally in support of whatever decision it makes and of those who are not.

Also, it has to have a thorough grip of which constituencies are sympathetic and which are not.

'Whereas Seretse Khama's will was then beyond rebuke among the chiefs, the party leadership, senior civil servants and the Ga-MmaNgwato constituencies, it now emerges that the unconditional support that was accorded his son, Ian Khama, at the electoral crisis of 1998 has quickly dissipated into a cruel illusion, here appearing as an oasis, and there evaporating into a mirage. Seretse enjoyed something close to unqualified support.

Ian, at best, commands fragmented support in an alienated parliament and a suspicious cabinet.

Selfless civil servants feel intimidated and they are looking for the quickest and safest way out of a sinking ship,' a news piece in Mmegi argues.

Exciting as it is, Barata-Phathi may find themselves in the midst of an ambush. Thus the need for them to ascertain their support base, unless they are disgruntled individuals who do not care who comes along, but simply want to leave an uninhabitable home.

Are Ian Khama and the BDP's support base as fragmented and thin? It is a tempting conclusion, but one that needs caution. The ugly nature of a democracy is that reason alone is not what prevails; the majority, no matter how unreasonable always carries the day.

The constituency of football leagues and the around-the-fire-talks are important for President Khama.  Also, the visits to ordinary people's homes have galvanised his image as a saviour in their eyes.

Many intellectuals, especially the educated middle class, condemn such, but it's a tact pursued with the vigour that simply says a person knows what matters in politics. 

This does not make President Khama and the BDP unassailable. In the early 1960s the threat of nuclear war did not prevent many successful nationalist revolutions and Communist people's wars.

Rather the result was a greater stress on conventional weapons and on increased tactical and strategic flexibility, as well as an interest in the long history and practice of counterinsurgency.

Strategy and tact saw two superpowers losing wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Superior strategies and tactics allowed small nations to defeat great powers armed with the latest weaponry.

Barata-Phathi could do the same, for they are up against a strong party. Forget the frenzy about the BDP being weak and fragmented. Even more difficult, is that it is uncertain within their camp as to who would definitely leave and who would not. Optimists have put the number at 20 but the Raletobana doctrine suggests caution.

Whoever wrote that article in Mmegi titled 'The 'snap election' is not new and it can be stopped' had a touch of genius when they wrote 'can the Barata-Phathi and the sitting opposition pre-empt a snap election?  Yes.

By keeping the president guessing and communicating on the ground lines, internet and cell phones in such a manner as to give the DIS the impression that only an insignificant minority at the BDP will jump ship at the election, whenever it comes. 

Needless to say, that trick only works if the president finally starts to care about the numbers in his favour and those against.  Otherwise, he could simply say: Let them go, I have my own plans without them.'

This espouses a number of things: that the Barata-Phathi has been rather flamboyant and all over the place telling those who care to listen, what their plans are. It is a good move to keep people posted, but are their communication channels helping their course?

I imagine they would want to appeal to a broader constituency - currently the noise being made is among the same people and to the converted, which then echoes the same sentiments to make it appear as though they have extensive support. Their challenge is to go out and face the many who would say 'we are not going anywhere' and the moderates who would say 'we are not so sure if we should follow you'. If they can provide answers to the issues raised by those and persuade them to leave, then they are a force to reckon with.

The central committee has already told them it will not accede to their demands, so what are they waiting for?  Are they not sure what to do next or are they simply uneasy with their own decision? Is it hard for them to leave or is there a realistic chance that their many demands will be acceded to? All these require a roadmap. 

So far, the BDP strategy has not been well publicised. Not much has been said about life after Barata-Phathi or reconciliation with them, especially in public. Could this be a ploy to ambush them?

Silence is golden at times, but only silence with planning. Or will Barata-Phathi actually say their strategy and tact lie in making noise as a way of derailing the BDP as to their actual intentions? So as to keep the party and its informers guessing? Or maybe Raletobana's individual decision was a collective one as part of tact, afterall?  The bottom line is that they have to be strategic and the verdict shall come soon. As for me, I cannot wait for July as the congresses begin. Now people will start playing politics and it will be exciting!