General Galebotswe inherited a military with obsolete equipment

Richard Moleofe | Friday July 29, 2016 12:52

Beginning with Lt Gen Mompati Merafhe in 1977, he was equally faced with fewer challenges and opportunities. Looking at the trend of development at BDF, one would come to the conclusion that the challenges and opportunities have been growing with time as the organisation matures. For those who fought the Rhodesian War (Zimbabwe War of Liberation), they certainly would disagree with my views because they think the war was the apex of all problems in the defence force.

Fighting a war is not necessarily a standard barometer for determining challenges. Of course war is what every commander would want to avoid but we need to understand that the military exists to fight wars. If you come into contact with the founding officers of BDF, they would tell you that the organisation no longer has challenges. It depends on how they define challenges.

Gen Galebotswe’s main twin challenges have been personnel and equipment. Over the years the defence force has recruited very qualified people and has had an excellent training programme which has been largely aided by the United States government’s IMET (International Military Education and Training) programme.

This programme was so vast that almost all officers who were present in the 1990s were covered with the training. This translated to a well educated cadre of officers and men.

As time went on, the military environment became less attractive for both officers and men and many have opted out through resignations or by way of early retirement. Several gaps were opened by these vacancies and it has always become difficult to fill them because the new ones lack the experience needed. It is within their constitutional right to vote with their feet if they feel that the military no longer holds a significant future for them.

During Gen Galebotswe’s leadership, there were more lieutenants and corporals leaving for greener pasture in the private sector. The system of government on scarce skill accelerated the exodus because BDF was slow to implement. The problem was that some of these junior officers and NCOs were going to earn a lot more than their superiors, something never heard of in the BDF.

That aside, the BDF was laden with a lot of obsolete military equipment that dates as far back as the days of the first commander. I am here reminded of an article carried by The Sunday Standard a few weeks ago about the same matter but from a different angle. The issue with this paper was that Gen Galebotswe had gone on a shopping spree of an assortment of military equipment overseas. The main focus was the appointment of the middleman in Galebotswe’s arms procurement programme.

When I read through the article I realised there were a lot of gaps in the paper, caused by lack of facts on BDF equipment status. Whoever gave them the information was not objective but rather the bias focused so much on the middleman and the inflated purchase prices.

It would be very unwise of Gen Galebotswe to get new middlemen on board when he assumed leadership. BDF’s developmental problem can be traced back to the politically connected middleman.

Displacing the old order would certainly create problems for his command. So he decided to deal directly with the overseas based manufacturers.

I do admire the bravado that Gen Galebotswe carries in himself because he has challenged the status core. Indeed the middleman in arms deals has cost this country an arm and a leg.

In the past I have written to argue that the main problem with Botswana’s military is the absence of a well defined doctrine. In the absence of a sound doctrine like is the case with us, the middleman will determine what equipment will best suit the needs of the military. Gen Galebotswe wants the commanders to decide what equipment is relevant for the military. For this reason, he is not the type of fellow you can keep if he has a natural dislike for the middleman.

There are several examples where this country has lost billions of Pula on the purchase of obsolete equipment that has only come to haunt the end users through the demands of frequent maintenance.

If Gen Galebotswe has ordered several Piranha armoured vehicles as reported, it is fitting because all of BDF’s armour is not serviceable even though it was recently procured.

An example is the Austrian SK 105 light tanks that have come to give BDF headaches only. This tank was purchased under a lot of haste because the Leopard 1 tank deal had fallen off with the Dutch government. Officers were dispatched to Europe to discuss the new deal. Surprisingly for those in the team, a middleman was put in a plane with them at government cost.

For a lot of us who were at BDF at the time (including Galebotswe who was a Major at Commando Squadron) have witnessed a career ended because they dared question the functions of a middleman who knew nothing about military equipment.

In other cases, the middleman has driven government to settling all the bills all at once because they wanted to claim their full five percent commission. The case in point is the purchase of the new PC-7 turbo. The manufacturer had proposed a long term payment schedule.

But the middleman wanted the bill paid right away fearing that if UDC takes over government in 2014 their commission may not be honoured.

For these reasons, the current BDF Commander is absolutely right to pursue arms purchases without the middleman in the detail. He never would get an extended contract to serve beyond his date of retirement even if he asked because he does not dance to the old tunes of the masters of defence.