Financial, administrative autonomy of Parliament paramount
Dithapelo Keorapetse | Friday February 19, 2016 15:12
The lack of financial and administrative autonomy of Parliament is one of the many examples of the independence deficiencies of most Parliaments in Africa including Botswana. Parliament of Botswana is faced with financial and administration problems which hinder its constitutional mandate of legislation and oversight.
The Constitution provides that the legislative authority of the country vests in Parliament which enacts, reform/modify and repeal laws for the good of the nation. There are three arms of government namely the Legislature, Judiciary and the Executive. These institutions in proper democracies are equal and compliment and provide checks on each other. No institution is suppose to be the boss. The legislature is the barometer of public opinion, it is constituted by the people through election of representatives. It has to articulate voters preferences into policies and laws. The executive has to implement policies, laws and decisions of the people passed by Parliament. The judiciary must interpret the law if there’s a dispute. All these institutions must be independent in exercising their functions but must be held accountable. The people should hold Parliament accountable by hiring and firing MPs or the whole government and replacing them with new ones if need be. Where Parliament seeks to legislate outside its powers, eg passing a law that are ultra vires the constitution, the judiciary can stop that.
What obtains in Botswana is that Parliament is relegated to number three institution after the executive and the judiciary. Parliament of Botswana is inextricably linked, financially and administratively, to the Office of the President (OP). The Chief Executive Officer of government is the Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP) and under him is the Director Department of Public Service Management (DPSM) which is part of the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration. These two are officers in the OP and these are the superiors of the Parliament Staff. The Clerk of the National Assembly is a Permanent Secretary junior to the PSP and the Director DPSM. The Speaker has no real powers over Parliament Staff; he or she is not the employer of Parliament staff. The staff are civil servants who are controlled at OP and or DPSM; their conditions of service and other human resource management issues rest with, not Parliament, but the executive.
Financially, it is the Minister of Presidential Affairs who presents Parliament budget. The minister, whose master is the the head of the executive and whose loyalty is with the President or the executive tables Parliament budget. It is worse in that the current minister in OP is a specially elected MP whose loyalty to Parliament would be less that to the Presidency or the executive. He is actually on his position at the behest of the President. In fact this minister is former PSP who has been part of the executive for more than three decades. It is this minister who decides how much recurrent and development money will be allocated to Parliament in a financial year. In the process, he works with his subordinates (Parliament bureaucrats including the clerk) on the needs of Parliament. MPs are not even involved in the process; they only meet this budget in the House where they are expected to rubber stamp it. How can the executive then give adequate financial and human resources to Parliament when the latter troubles the former with scrutiny or oversight. Parliament is supposed to trouble the executive through tough questions, themes, motions and committee sittings, hearings and reports. This can be possible if Parliament is adequately resourced. Can it therefore be in the interest of the executive to provide adequate material and human resources to Parliament? The answer is a big no. Should the power to fund Parliament therefore lie with the executive? Again no!
Whilst it is embarrassing to admit, it is worth saying that even conditions of service of MPs are decided by the executive in the Presidency. When there’s a suggestion of small adjustments to MPs salaries or allowances eg the 6% adjustment, it is the minister in the Presidency, not the Speaker who addresses the General Assembly on the same. This is how much power the executive has on Parliament. Currently it is clear that Parliament staff is overwhelmed. In some cases there’s no qualified staff to assist MPs on a variety of issues. Where they are available, they are either few or overstretched. Certain offices such as the budget office are deliberately not there.
The time to examine the prevailing relationship between Parliament and the executive has come, including to re-look the governance structure of Parliament. The constitution and related statutes have to be more clearer on Parliamentary independence. There has to be an independent Parliament Commission to look at the administrative and financial management of Parliament. Most of the Powers of the Leader of the House should go to the Speaker. The Speaker in terms of stature and remuneration should be at the level of the PSP and The Chief Justice if these three are taken to be heads of their institutions. This would asset the equality of these there organs.
There’s a need to specifically look at the independence, effectiveness and accountability of Parliament. It is important that the legislature has independent funding and financial controls and there are international best practices that can be emulated. Parliament should be in control of its budget. It should draw this budget and it shouldn’t be up to the executive whether it approves or not. If there are proper financial accounting and reporting on/accounting for expenditure, there would be no need for executive interference under the guise of intervention.
The relationship between the executive in the Presidency, the Speakership, the corporate body, the Clerk and his or her bureaucrats must be reorganised in terms of the distribution of power and responsibilities and accountability mechanisms. Moreover, there’s a need to further look into matters professional and nonpartisan Parliament support staff to aid MPs. These must not be civil servants who owe allegiance to the executive but career professionals directly recruited by Parliament. The international best practice is that Parliament should establish independent parliamentary service recruited on merit principle.
The status quo whereby Parliament is controlled through staff deployments and financial resources is untenable and an antithesis of democracy. The belief that Parliament shouldn’t be independent and shouldn’t be accorded its proper equal status with other branches is inspired by the cynical believe that MPs cannot and shouldn’t be empowered in anyway lest they become uncontrollable and troublesome to the sovereign through effective oversight.