Botswana needs a new National Security Strategy (Part 2)
Richard Moleofe | Friday September 18, 2015 17:04
This is not a hypothetical question; it is a question that demands real answers because as a country we are at what I would regard a turning point of not only Botswana Defence Force, but the rest of all our security apparatuses.
I should not only be regarded as a critic to our defence force, but rather the very questions I am posing need to be urgently addressed. No one individual should blame the way BDF for being run the way it is now; it all comes down to lack of policy.
The organisation has become what it is through a natural process of evolution rather than thorough planning processes. The recruitment was rather haphazard and disjointed. But this was not a deliberate cause of action; rather these were some of the mistakes that fell in place as the organisation was exponentially growing.
All these gaps I have discussed can be traced to the fact that there was never any thorough planning for the birth of this military organisation.
During the early years, BDF’s recruitment was more based on the personal taste of the Commandant at Force Training Establishment and there was no policy to guide it. Some young men ascended to become officer cadets even though the only thing they could show was a GCE certificate.
This military has now improved the system of recruitment to a level where the Commander appoints a Recruitment Board to manage the recruitment of the young men and women who so desire to wear the exotic battle dress uniform.
This was no different in the procurement of military hardware. The Commander’s taste mattered more than what the actual operational needs could be. The current leadership is sitting with a lot of such military articles that have become obsolete. In some instances, arms’ deals were directed to benefit certain individuals who had connections with the leadership.
This has been the norm generally in this country, that projects are done not with the country in mind but to benefit certain people. This explains why they refuse to account for billions of Pula that go down the drain with projects that take forever and ultimately fail.
Therefore, the way the military has always operated has been in many ways indicative of their civilian principals.
In this way, BDF’s growth has been determined by several personal factors rather than national ones.
The need to have a standing army was an important factor at the beginning and that became clouded by external influences which have been listed above. At its inception, the BDF had to deal with an apparent threat from their Rhodesian neighbours.
The National Security Strategy will help to address national issues ahead of personal likes and dislikes.
This document will erase all the biases that are real and perceived ones. It will inform all other policies in line with keeping the military machine well oiled. To the military, it acts like what the constitution is to the laws of a democratic country.
Talking about democracy; in a republic it is the public that matters in the formulation of the NSS. This means that those in power should go back to the drawing boards and get the ordinary people and professionals involved.
We would all understand why Botswana’s military has had a disjointed approach in terms of training and how it was equipped. The country did not possess the required financial muscle to establish and fashion its military. The country’s dependence on military handouts slowed its own development. On the other hand the political leadership was not willing to spend on military hardware.
The command also failed to rationalise and place the urgent needs of the military over personal gains as some were interested in amassing financial gains out of what was purchased.
BDF’s growth soon got out of control as the organisation became the largest single employer in all government sectors.
Botswana has traditionally been known for its export of labour to South Africa’s mining industry. At its peak, every homestead in Botswana had a son or two labouring in those mines.
It was natural for boys to graduate from being herd boys to mine labourers. This was something that was often seen as promotion.
Soon the BDF performed a similar role of providing young men with employment. The BDF’s existence eclipsed that of the mine recruiting companies and the military organisation even went on to buy the disused offices of these entities. BDF now occupies TEBA offices from Lobatse to Shakawe.
When NATO militaries were downsizing at the end of the Cold War, BDF grabbed the opportunity to buy obsolete arms from some of these countries.
Of course these were obsolete to the first world but not to third World Africa. At this stage in the life of our military, there was no reason to be buying out of impulse. But in the absence of NSS, any country is bound to be equipping its military in a disjointed manner.
Do we need to reduce the size of our military or maintain it at the current level or still, do we need to prop up the numbers. Whatever answer we may arrive at, still have to account for personnel and equipment.
The size of any military does not count on its soldiers or its equipment in isolation of the other.
This country is at a point where it needs to bring the debate on the NSS to the public sphere.
This public debate will help our military in the way it recruits personnel and the procurement of equipment.