The duopoly of presidentialism and autocracy

| Friday March 20, 2009 00:00

Facing the Realities
Botswana is in a deep trough of its rulers' making, from which no easy or quick escape is foreseeable. The country is caught between an autocratic and increasingly powerful presidency and vision less, stultified ruling party, on the one hand, and a disorganised people and divided opposition, on the other. Underlying all is diamond dependency, set to deepen even further with the establishment of sorting and aggregation functions in the DTC Botswana and the corresponding responsibility for 'maintaining the integrity' of the inherently fraudulent commodity. This was the special role of the secretive, monopolistic De Beers private corporation. But it is an impossible task for a democracy. Skills and some jobs may be acquired in jewellery manufacture, but accountability and openness are set to worsen.

As a directorate of intelligence services, and enhanced electronic surveillance systems become realities, the over-empowerment of the rulers increases, with no likely reduction in their existing arrogance. Instead, the gulf between the ruling elite and the people will widen further. There are no indications either that the rulers will turn away from the established growth-first strategy of economic development which maintains poverty and inequalities at critical levels.

The political duopoly of presidentialism and predominance gained the support of less than a quarter of the electorate in 2004, but maintains a slough of stasis and complacency.

The ruling party is bereft of new ideas, but blocks the electoral change that could produce them. Predominance promotes low turnout in the discriminatory first-past-the-post system, and presidentialism stifles debate on the issues. The task of winning a parliamentary majority by a weak opposition appears almost Sisyphean.

But the foundation and need for it is there. Elections in 1994 and 2004 indicated that, against the odds, people want change. Since almost 50 per cent of the population live in poverty, the need to escape from that is manifest. Forty-eight per cent of voters in 2004 supported the two main opposition parties, a level of support far greater than the 12 percent gained by the main opposition party in South Africa then.

Structural barriers are huge. The undiversified economy deprives the people of the physical and human resources for the development of popular organisations. An independent civil society is the great absent member, and it is unlikely to grow without broad economic development and extensive political reform. Change is inevitably for the long-haul, and the abandonment of all illusory notions is a vital first step down that road.

A quick survey of essential reforms is indicative of the problems ahead. Constitutional reform must be extensive. A basic need is for sovereignty to be placed in the hands of the people. The powers of the president must be reduced across the board -locating executive powers in the cabinet collectively, restricting the president's appointment powers, and providing for his/her popular election on the basis of 50 per cent or more of votes cast.

The legislature must be greatly strengthened, recognised as being the servant of the people, and accorded broad powers of scrutiny on that basis. Namibian constitutional arrangements offer exemplars here. It is possible that support for such reforms would attract support in parliament, and an electoral programme on these issues could attract strong popular response; the BNF's Campaign slogan in 1994 was 'Time for a Change', and its need now is much greater.

It is of course certain that strong resistance would quickly arise from the presidency, utilising prevarication, propaganda and coercion. General Khama will be president in 2008; he is pleased to be known as an authoritarian, likes 'decisions to be made quickly and carried out properly', and prefers his democracy imbued with 'discipline' [quoted by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, London, 3 July 2005); he is contemptuous of parliament and uninterested in discussion. This would have to be faced by a reformist constituency, and the people could learn from that overt opposition and confrontation.

Change within the judiciary must also be extensive, to establish openness and uniformity, and to scrutinise the role of the attorney general and the Circulation of positions between that executive office and the high court. South Africa provides important models for law reform.

Human rights provisions must be extended, modernised, institutionalised and strengthened: the concept of a living  wage should be introduced and minimum wages and pension provisions improved in accordance with it. The right of free speech must be transformed and freed of all presidential dominations.

Political reforms in many areas are vital. New and improved institutions to promote accountability and clean government; enactment of freedom of information and of whistleblower protections; the introduction at last of an effective register of members' assets, with enforcement powers in law, and accessibility to the public. The DCEC and the ombudsman must be empowered and required to enforce strict conflict of interest provisions, to sever the linkages between power and wealth.

Other dimensions of reform include the party, electoral and voting systems: introducing either a proportional or a preferential voting system, while retaining the liberal-democratic constituency foundation, with a threshold (or filter) requirement for parliamentary representation; and introducing state funding for all parties, based on their share of the popular vote over a chosen period.

Only when most of these changes had been introduced would the country be in a position to determine, on a sound non-elitist and deliberative basis, future economic strategies for reducing diamond dependency, for diversification, and the reduction of poverty and inequalities. The rise of an active civil society, and a participatory democracy, would accompany and strengthen structural change.

The subordination of the San within the gulag of special settlements constitutes an enormity long unaddressed by the rulers and scandalously unmentioned in the 'miracle' story. No movement forward has occurred since the episode of the early 1990s.

A brief survey indicates the extent of the work required for the achievement of democracy and development in Botswana. It must also be recognised that Botswana is at present poorly equipped in most ways other than in the wealth of the UMC for realising these advances. It is more poorly placed than many of its neighbours, South Africa especially.

The point is that diamond dependency and presidentialism have been co-joined and mutually supportive over the life of the country, and their debilitating effects are scorched into Botswana society. The range of the necessary reforms attests to the inherited problem, not to the impossibility of the tasks ahead. Change is destined to be slow. But the incentive for confronting the barriers lies in the great needs and unchannelled capacities of the people. Youth after all have been in inchoate rebellion against remote and repressive authority since 1995. The potential constituency for change is large - the San and other remote people are about ten per cent of the population, overlapping ethnic minorities constitute at least one-third of the population, and the poor are half the total.

Good's attraction to and fallout with Botswana
I arrived in Botswana from Kaunda's Zambia, attracted by the country's multi-party democracy and relative efficiency. It already had a large political literature, and I soon settled into serious research and writing. My first published article of early 1992, 'Interpreting the Exceptionality of Botswana', reflected my enthusiasm.

On Friday 18 February 2005, soon after I returned home from work around 5pm three men appeared at my door. The apparent leader announced without preamble that he had a message from the president; I had been declared a prohibited immigrant, and had 48 hours in which to leave.

I needed a lawyer and raced over to Dick Bayford's office. A night of feverish activity followed, with Joao Salbany and Duma Boko, Bojosi Otlhogile, Vice Chancellor at UB, expressed his shock, and said he had known nothing of the impending PI. He offered constitutional advice to Bayford throughout the evening.

The immediate task was daunting. Papers had to be prepared to call out a judge of the high court on Saturday, when they are usually unwilling to appear in Lobatse 80 kilometres from Gaborone. The PI order effective on Sunday night had to be stopped and arguments to substantiate this assembled. On Bayford's suggestion, we decided to fight on the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. The essential documents were prepared and faxed to the court. A hearing could be gained.