Opinion & Analysis

Early reflections on the SADC double troika on Lesotho

 

The summit was prompted by the recently deadlocked talks between the ruling coalition partners in Lesotho but also addressed other pressing issues in SADC’s in tray such as the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process of FDLR combatants in the DRC. The summit came after emergency mediation talks led by President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, between Lesotho’s coalition partners in the aftermath of August 30 attempted coup had deadlocked.

This contribution will provide some early reflections on the resolutions of the summit based on five analytical points. Firstly, the summit has confirmed the fact that SADC views the crisis in Lesotho as essentially a political problem requiring a political solution and not a military one. They have as such spared no effort in exhausting non-military methods of resolving the deadlock.

The summit appointed South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa as a Special Facilitator with clear terms of reference to restore peace in both the short and long term. The resolution to deploy the full SADC OPDS Troika Observation mission to Lesotho for three months will be a test for the recently created SADC Mediation Unit (SMU) in the organ since SADC has historically suffered capacity constraints in as far as technical mediation expertise at the secretariat is concerned.

Secondly, the summit to some extent depending on how one looks at it, succeeded in untangling the knot revolving around calls for the reopening of parliament by resolving to call for early elections. Both the opposition and the ruling coalition had tried to avoid this since the outcome of an early election is unpredictable because both sides have lost some political capital through their role in the current crisis.

Some see the opposition as the biggest loser however since they have failed in their bid to remove the ABC without going for elections. Opposition Mps are also due to lose their daily allowances, monthly salaries; pension eligibility and other benefits as they have not completed their current term in Parliament.

There are also no guarantees that they will be selected again to represent their parties in their respective constituencies.  Against this backdrop, elements in the opposition have questioned the legality of the resolutions of the summit arguing that the decision to convene early elections is illegal since the ruling coalition was formed through a legal process in parliament.

They thus argue that it is there that the process of constituting another government ought to happen since early elections constitute an unbudgeted expense which will not solve the protracted political and security problems of the country. Further the summit’s failure to provide a new time frame for the reopening of parliament may necessitate constitutional reforms to sustain the status quo as parliament cannot remain closed indefinitely. In a way this appears to favour the prime minister who has maintained that parliament can only be opened once the security situation has abated.

Thirdly, the resolutions of the summit have largely remained silent on how to deal with the two LDF commanders going forward. Some media reports talk about a possible deal struck with the now “rogue” Lt. Gen. Kamoli for a blanket amnesty and redeployment to other departments within government. This is however unconfirmed. Failure to appease him and the other chiefs of the security organs may result in a further deadlock and even violence. On the other hand if a deal is struck with him, this may vindicate him and set a bad precedent for impunity.  This also raises questions of whether others amongst his loyalists will be given amnesty and negotiated packages.

Fourthly, the resolutions of the summit have not been well received by the DC party of former Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili which has more seats in parliament than the party of incumbent Prime Minister Thabane. A senior DC party official was recently quoted as saying that there would be a blood bath if Kamoli was forced to step down. The DC see the current impasse as an internal problem which should be solved by the parties without external interference. South Africa and SADC’s role is thus misunderstood and at times not welcome by elements in the opposition who maintain that they cannot be dictated to by SADC although they are a sovereign country.

Reports from Maseru this past week indicated that 72 parliamentarians had held a meeting where they planned to submit a petition urging for the reopening of parliament and the return of the South African Police Service forces currently guarding key national points in Lesotho. They argued that the presence of the SAPS is worthless as it undermines Lesotho’s independence and sovereignty and will only create unnecessary debts for the country.

A possible explanation for this is that, the outcome of this week’s SADC summit has frustrated the opposition DC party who with the possible reopening of parliament were a stone’s throw away from getting back to government. Their frustration also stems from the fact that fresh elections are not likely to be held in under a year’s time due to the security situation and budget constraints.

Fresh elections may also result in a hung parliament with no significant change in the complexion of parties as currently constituted thus bringing the country back to square one. Cynics thus view early elections as an unnecessary expense and an exercise in futility.

Lastly since we cannot at this stage pre-empt the outcome of the mediation process which started with a meeting planned for September 18, between Ramaphosa and the key political actors, one can only call for a greater role for local actors in the mediation effort. A similar approach worked during the post 2007 election dispute in Lesotho and led to the successful May 26, 2012 elections. This effort was led by the Lesotho Council of Churches and the civil society coalition in the country but supported by SADC, the Commonwealth, the German and US governments as well as the UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).

GABRIEL MALEBANG

* Gabriel Malebang is a Political Science Lecturer at the University of Botswana