Lesotho political stalemate: Should and can SADC do more?
Correspondent | Friday September 12, 2014 15:42
The LDF maintain that they were merely doing their job to confiscate some weapons from the police who were planning to distribute them to the radical youth of the ruling party in order to disrupt a peaceful march planned for the following morning, aimed at pressuring the Prime Minister to re-open parliament which he had prorogued in June after consultation with the King.
Other observers differ with this view and suggest that the LDF were acting on the orders of their beleaguered commander Lt. Gen. Kennedy Tlali Kamoli who had been dismissed from duty the previous evening by publication of the Government Gazette Legal Notice Number 64, which simultaneously announced the promotion of Brig. Gen. Maaparankoe Mahao to the rank of Lt. Gen., simultaneously appointing him the new commander of the LDF. In the ensuing turmoil of that fateful morning, the LDF are accused of having attempted to assassinate Lt. Gen. Mahao and to abduct the Prime Minister. The latter were earlier whisked away to safety in South Africa on a tip off that the LDF was looking for them. It is based on this that Lesotho’s Prime Minister the Right Honourable Thomas Thabane maintains that there was a coup attempt. Supporting this position, Prof. Francis Makoa of the National University of Lesotho is quoted as having said that whether it was by design or by accident the LDF’s actions on that Saturday morning bore all the hallmarks of a coup.
Another explanation given implicates Deputy Prime Minister Hon. Mothetjoa Metsing of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) who faces corruption charges and enjoys the support of the LDF. The corruption charges brought against him raised tensions in the ruling coalition of Thabane’s All Basotho Convention (ABC), the LCD and the Basotho National Party (BNP) of Chief Thesele Maseribane. This resulted in a fall out which saw the LCD signing a new alliance agreement with the Democratic Congress (DC) in July 2014. Following the coup attempt, the Prime Minister, the other coalition partner and Minister of Sports, Hon. Chief Thesele Maseribane of the BNP and Lt. Gen. Mahao fled to South Africa for safety in light of reports that the military was looking for them. In their absence, Deputy Prime Minister Metsing who had initially remained was announced as the acting Prime Minister leading many to believe that he had something to do with the coup attempt as he did not fear for his safety.
What has SADC done so far?
While in South Africa, the other coalition partners were later joined by deputy Prime Minister, Metsing for emergency talks at the behest of the regional block SADC which had been approached by the Prime Minister Thabane to send troops to contain the situation in Lesotho. The Troika of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security currently chaired by South Africa had held a series of emergency talks with the Lesotho coalition partners throughout the weekend culminating in the issuance of a joint statement on the 1st September 2014.
The statement announced that the parties had agreed that SADC would send a facilitator to assist the coalition partners to implement their agreed roadmap with clear timelines aimed at lifting the suspension of parliament. It would appear as if SADC acted swiftly and decisively to prevent further violence in Lesotho given that one police officer had died and several others were wounded during the weekend putsch. The talks thus caused the coalition partners to recommit to the Windhoek Declaration, which was an agreement facilitated by Namibian President, Hifikepunye Pohamba in August 2014. The declaration enjoined the leaders to work together to restore political stability, peace, security, law and order in the country.
Prime Minister Thabane’s request for military action was declined by SADC. To ensure Thabane’s safety, President Zuma who is the chair of the SADC Organ Troika authorized contingents of heavily armed members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) Special Task Force and the Special Operations Unit to escort Prime Minister Thabane back into the country on the 3rd September. The SAPS units were also deployed to guard Thabane and his key officials at their residences including Lt. Gen. Mahao. They also secured the Lesotho Police Head Quarters in Maseru since the army had disarmed the police leading the Commissioner of Police to flee to South Africa and order all Police officers not to wear their uniforms to avoid intimidation by the army following their clashes on Saturday 30th August 2014. The SAPS units thus filled the security vacuum in Lesotho’s security cluster as police officers did not report for duty for a few days to avoid contact with the LDF.
Possible reasons for SADC’s delayed military intervention The decision to send the SAPS instead of the military appears to have been well received as there were no reports of violence or clashes with either civilians or the LDF who largely remained in their barracks. However hardly two days after their return to Lesotho Prime Minister Thabane and Lt. Gen. Mahao announced on the 5th September 2014 that the country looks set for civil war after efforts to negotiate a truce with the alleged coup plotter Lt. Gen. Tlali Kamoli hit a blank. Lt. Gen. Kamoli who refuses to step down had last week reportedly ‘plundered the state armoury and absconded, deploying every type of weapon in defensive positions around Maseru’. The weapons taken include anti air craft weapons, anti-tank weapons, small arms, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and mortars. Lt. Gen. Mahao was also quoted as saying that Kamoli had taken control of Lesotho’s Elite Special Forces and the Military Intelligence units all totaling around 200 men reported to be slipping in and out of the mountains around Maseru. With these new developments, Thabane made new calls for SADC’s military intervention in the process reneging on an earlier commitment to re-open parliament by the 19th September, which also drew a blank. On Tuesday 9th September 2014, President Zuma met with the parties again in Maseru where he gave them up to the end of the week to agree on a date to re-open parliament amongst themselves. Sceptics have suggested that SADC is probably waiting for more blood to be let first before it decides to send troops to Lesotho.
In as much as this shows concern and a recognition of the gravity of the security situation this view fails to understand the basic role of peace keepers which is to keep peace. Peace can only be kept once it has been made preferably through non-military means. This is exactly what SADC is currently engaged in through its mediation and conflict resolution interventions. The regional block has probably done a lot more conflict prevention work to mitigate the conflict in Lesotho behind the scenes through its Regional Early Warning System (REWS) equipped with a situation room at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. The signing of the Windhoek Declaration and the swift manner in which the regional block convened on the 31st August are proof that the regional body has remained seized of developments in Lesotho. Critiques of this approach are of the view that this shuttle diplomacy approach has turned SADC into nothing more than a per diem watering hole for the grey haired diplomats with minimal results. The challenge for SADC though is its desire to strike a judicious balance between non-interference in the domestic affairs of its member states and its responsibility to protect citizens of member states.
Given the sensitive nature of the matter SADC is probably exhausting all options that will address the root causes of the conflict that go beyond the mere lifting of the prorogation of parliament. To send troops, it has to ascertain the length of time that the deployment may take and if it can be sustained since more than 60% of its budget is donor funded. In any military campaign there is always a likelihood of a shift in the objectives of the mission, which often results in an unplanned long term commitment. This is called “mission creep”. Examples of this are the US war in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq which all took longer than planned. The regional block is probably also assessing the type of impact a military intervention would have on the society which is still deeply polarized by its violent political history and reports of the renegade LDF commander slipping in and out of the mountains aren’t helping.
So in their cost benefit analysis they are probably careful not to exacerbate the social tensions and dynamics at the risk of leaving the society further polarized. Further, given the frail economic condition of the country, it is critical to exercise due diligence to avoid stoking more grievances which will fan future violence and conflict. Additionally it is difficult to garner political will and buy in from other SADC member states because they would have to finance the intervention from their own national coffers. Botswana and South Africa paid for the 1998 intervention which cost US$ 10.3 million from their national coffers as per the status of forces agreement. The Lesotho government who had asked for the intervention couldn’t afford to service their debt despite their commitment to incur part of the costs. So such factors are also being considered. The current SADC chairman Mugabe also endured the wrath of his people post the 1998 intervention in DRC which left a huge dent in Zimbabwe’s treasury. With such memories fresh in their minds most countries are wary of any hasty military action.
In Botswana, although there is no legal requirement for parliament to be consulted before any foreign military intervention, it is democratic and desirable to do so. This was however not the case in the 1998 Lesotho intervention as Parliament was informed after the fact. Unlike in the US where the president is required by law to consult Congress before any foreign military deployment, in Botswana the BDF Act and Part III Section 48 (1) of the constitution empower the President to act unilaterally as Commander in Chief and deploy his troops as he deems fit. At present even if there was a desire to consult parliament it would not be possible as it has been dissolved in preparation for the elections.
Another important point is that, a military intervention requires a chapter 7 UN mandate of peace enforcement. Given that the UN is the primary custodian of world peace, any enforcement mission without a Chapter 7 UN mandate is considered illegal according to international law, even if it has legitimacy. The legitimacy may be due to the fact that the regional force was invited by the leadership of the warring state. Further endorsements are required from the African Union Peace and Security Council, the supreme decision making body of the AU since the AU is the primary custodian of peace and security on the continent. However due to the principle of subsidiarity both the UN Charter (Chapter 8) and the Constitutive Act of the AU make provision for delegated tasks to regional organisations closest to the source of the conflict and best suited to handle them.
This notwithstanding, there is a lacuna in the AU’s policy framework regarding the specific procedure for deployment. As a result of the above SADC first has to consult the AU and the UN to get their blessings as was the case before the SADC deployment in Eastern DRC last year which was later done as a Joint Force Intervention Brigade with the UN. With regard to the two sets of SADC interventions in 1998 one in DRC by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia and the other in Lesotho by Botswana and South Africa, they were both described as being legitimate but illegal. Legitimate because the leadership of the conflict affected countries called them in, but illegal because there was no prior OAU and UN authorization. The cases were further complicated by the fact that SADC itself had not yet adopted the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security outlining the guidelines to be followed for intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign member state. The Protocol was only adopted in 2001, forming the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
SADC is possibly also engaged in numerous ongoing consultations with various actors in Lesotho, like the Lesotho Council of Churches, the Commonwealth and the UNDP all of whom worked in concert to mediate and deliver a peaceful and successful election in 2012 in Lesotho following the post 2007 election tensions. These were initially mediated by Sir QKJ Masire, the SADC appointed imminent person. He however resigned after a two year long effort citing a deadlock and lack of cooperation on the part of Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili’s government.
What can SADC still do?
To end the current stalemate SADC can propose that both commanders of the army and other heads of security institutions be retired in the interest of peace with the promise of a blanket amnesty. They can then be appeased with diplomatic posts or other equivalent civilian duties to pave way for fresh elections. They should further aim at changing the hearts and minds of individual leaders to empathise with each other and to alter the structure of the conflict to establish an atmosphere where the core issues to the conflict, incompatible goals, conflicting relationships, attitudes and perceptions about the conflict are reconciled. Innovative solutions to the long term economic problems and toxic political culture in Lesotho also ought to be found. The Lesotho saga has diverted SADC’s attention away from other equally pressing hot spots such as the DRC, outstanding issues in Madagascar and Zimbabwe as well as preparations for elections in Botswana and Mozambique which are one month away. There is thus little else that SADC can do as it has serious capacity constraints (human and technical). As such all we can do is to pray in solidarity with our cousins in Maseru and hope that the forces of amity will prevail over the current enmity that we are witnessing.
*Gabriel Malebang is a Political Science lecturer at the University of Botswana