An attempt to understand the attempted coup in Lesotho: Some initial musings
| Friday September 5, 2014 14:57
In a case where strange bed fellows have found themselves in an uncomfortable matrimonial bed of erstwhile foes, recent developments should come as no surprise. The following views are a modest distillation from media reports on the subject laced with personal views from yours truly resulting from some research on the subject of Lesotho and SADC.
On the morning of Saturday 30th August 2014, the world woke up to news of an alleged coup in Lesotho, this came as a shock to many and a disappointment to most since the country had recently made strides in democratic maturity. This followed its most peaceful 2012 elections which saw the formation on a ruling coalition between three opposition parties which was a first for the country and the region. For some time the ruling coalition seemed to be steering the country well until the other coalition partners started complaining about the Prime Minister, Thomas Thabane’s tendency of making decisions without consulting them. Historically Lesotho is no stranger to military take overs and political instability having experienced many such since its independence in 1966.
Against the above backdrop, the current stalemate we see in Lesotho is the result of political point scoring and grand standing. Contemporary politics in the mountain kingdom have deteriorated into a ruthless zero sum game where the ordinary Mosotho is the biggest loser. Both sides i.e the Prime Minister (D.P) and the Deputy Prime Minister (D.P.M) appear to be hell bent on holding onto or acquiring state power by all means possible (legal and extra-legal). It’s little wonder therefore that the current tension and suspense gripping “The Kingdom in the Sky” reads like a script from a Hollywood blockbuster. Media reports identify the root cause of the conflict as the prorogation of parliament in June by the Prime Minister in consultation with the King. Yet others see the dismissal of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) commander, Lt. Gen. Kennedy Tlali Kamoli who by the way did his MPA at the University of Botswana (2002 – 04) as the trigger for the LDF’s raid of the Police headquarters and the shoot-out that ensued with the Police on the morning of Saturday 30th August.
Lt. Gen. Kamoli also lived in Gaborone briefly from around 2008 - 10 while seconded to SADC and before being appointed commander of the LDF. The events leading to the prorogation of parliament were spurred on by the disingenuous attempt by D.P.M Metsing’s Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) to pass a vote of no confidence in PM Thabane and form a new ruling coalition with the Democratic Congress (DC) of former PM Phakalitha Mosisili who had formed a breakaway party from the LCD. This followed Thabane’s zero tolerance policy and crack-down on corruption which implicated key LCD figures including DPM Metsing. In reaction, Metsing tried to retaliate to what he viewed as a witchhunt by attempting to pull the rug from under Thabane’s feet with a motion of no confidence. Being the slick, calculating politician and strategist that he is, Thabane would have none of that. He moved fast to suspend parliament (prorogation) for nine months with the blessings of the King. All this happened in June, when at around the same time there was an assassination attempt on Thabane which resulted in the bombing of his girlfriend’s residence in Maseru (Thabane is recently divorced).
The next few months that followed were characterised by tension in the Kingdom which saw the recently appointed Commander of the army (then Brig. Gen. Maaparaankoe Mahao who also lived in Gaborone while at SADC (2010 - 2013) being hauled before a military court martial on what he dismisses as trumped up charges by a kangaroo court. The straw that ultimately broke the camel’s back was the announcement on the night of 29th August and the unilateral dismissal of Lt. Gen. Kamoli from the LDF command. The government gazette announcing the dismissal also announced the promotion and appointment of Lt. Gen. Maaparankoe Mahao as the new LDF commander. D.P.M. Metsing and the LCD working in cahoots with Lt. Gen. Kamoli who was by the way appointed by their [LCD] former ally Phakalitha Mosisili of the DC while still in office, decried the fact that the appointment was illegal since it wasn’t done in consultation with the Defence Commision or Cabinet nor any of the coalition partners as required by the constitution.
They as such dug in their heels, in an effort to pre-empt the dismissal, they raided the Police HQ since the Commissioner of Police is loyal to Thabane claiming that there was a hidden weapons cache which was earmarked for distribution to the Under The Tree Army (UTTA) made up of radical youth from PM Thabane’s All Basotho Convention (ABC) party. We cannot at this stage ascertain the veracity of their claim which is of course not without some merit given the violent acts of the UTTA in the past. On the morning of the attempted coup, the LDF was also reported to be looking for the PM and the other coalition partner Basotho National Party (BNP) leader Thesele Maseribane. There were further reports of an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Lt. Gen. Mahao’s life which destroyed his property and killed his dog. The LDF was the prime suspect in all instances. Additionally, Metsing’s camp has also apparently dug up some dirt on Thabane’s past underhand dealings and they want to use it to blackmail him into dropping the charges against Metsing. I also alleged that when the LDF troops raided the Police HQ on Saturday morning, ostensibly in search of the concealed weapons cache, they ransacked the place for DPM Metsing’s corruption docket in an effort to destroy it.
So the current situation is such that there is a stand-off where there are two commanders used as proxies in what is essentially a political battle between the PM and his deputy. The new commander appointed by publication in the government gazette (29th August 2014) in consultation with the king, while the old one [incumbent] is challenging the legality of his dismissal and replacement. By the time of writing (2nd September 2014) media statements citing the LDF spokesperson as well as the government spokesperson have been maintaining that incumbent commander Lt. Gen. Kamoli is the substantive commander dismissing any reports of a coup and his dismissal.
At the same time, P.M Thabane’s spokesperson as well as Lt. Gen. Mahao personally, have also issued separate media statements maintaining that the substantive commander is Lt. Gen. Mahao (who has since fled to South Africa for safety), dismissing Lt. Gen. Kamoli as a renegade general. All this is happening against the backdrop of SADC’s shuttle diplomacy and mediation efforts. The latest reports and a recent SADC Communique issued after the weekend meeting in South Africa, indicate that the SADC Troika of the Organ resolved that the PM should return to Lesotho and that the Troika would appoint a facilitator to supervise the implementation of the process of lifting the prorogation of parliament. Despite PM Thabane’s request for a SADC sanctioned military intervention, the Organ Troika resolved to send an Observer team made up of civilian experts in the areas of, Governance, Politics, Defence and Security. What remains unclear is how any unexpected violent outburst would be foiled in the absence of a neutral SADC military peacekeeping force.
SADC’s decision was possibly informed by its insistence on exhausting all peaceful and non- violent avenues of peace making before resorting to peace enforcement through military intervention. So at the end of the day the situation is very fluid because both sides seem to have a case. If Gen. Kamoli was to relinquish power right now he would run the risk of being tried for giving illegal orders, treason, sedition, assassination attempts etc. The move may also spark violence since a section of the army is still loyal to him. Should Lt. Gen. Mahao ascend to the LDF command, some may see this as a contravention of the law since at the time of his promotion and appointment on Friday 29th August, he was still on suspension from the LDF and facing a Military Court Martial for “conduct unbecoming of a military officer”. His ascendance also runs the risk of sparking violence from among sections of the army loyal to Gen. Kamoli.
The Lesotho situation illustrates the tragedy of contemporary African politics where the army’s top command is highly politicised. Remember that Samuel P. Hungtington once famously remarked that the army should remain politically sterile where the dog (civilian authorities) wags the tail (army) and not the other way around. A politicised army detracts on their credibility to function as an effective and apolitical apparatus of the state with full monopoly over the use of violence. One should also remember that the professional soldier is an expert and manager of violence in his profession of arms. Civil Military Relations is therefore a complex enterprise, theorists have come up with ideals which ought to be upheld by military officers undergirded by a requirement to be apolitical. The problem now comes with appointments to senior command posts which are political appointments. As seen in the case of Lesotho above, most of these officers tend to swear allegiance to the head of State who is their Commander in Chief and appointing authority rather than to the nation, constitution, coat of arms and flag. This becomes problematic when the appointing authority issues commands which contravene the constitution. Thrown into a quandary, such officers tend to run with their Commander in Chief - the hand that feeds them. The challenge for them is that unlike the judiciary which is a separate and independent arm of the state (also appointed by the head of state), which has in many cases managed to maintain its neutrality and independence, the military falls under the direct command of the executive which is the arm that implements government policy. This has resulted in an incestuous relationship between the executive and the military’s top command who are often members of the ruling party. In the case of Lesotho P.M. Thabane inherited Lt. Gen. Kamoli in 2012 upon coming into office, Lt. Gen. Kamoli had been appointed by former P.M. Phakalitha Mosisili of the LCD (currently with the break-away DC party). As such Lt. Gen. Kamoli has never been loyal to his Commander in Chief who also detested the fact that his was an accelerated appointment from the rank of Colonel all the way to Lt. General well ahead of other senior officers such as then Brigadier Gen. Maaparankoe Mahao. A lesson and best practice to be followed under such cases is that under no circumstances should the military dabble in politics or the running of the state. Where humanitarian conditions have deteriorated irretrievably, recourse can best be sought from regional organistions such as SADC and the international community guided by the Responsibility to Protect (RP2) principle, the SADC treaty, the Constitutive Act of the AU and the UN Charter.
*Gabriel Malebang is a Political Science Lecturer at the University of Botswana.