Behind the missing spy equipment
| Friday May 23, 2014 13:02
When Lieutenant General Gaolathe Galebotswe was announced as the Commander of the Botswana Defence Force in July 2012, not everyone in the army’s senior echelons embraced it.
Those unhappy about the announcement are understood to have thought that the departure of Major Generals Pius Mokgware and Otisitswe Tiroyamodimo would create positions for their own ambitions.
Their fate was, however, not written in the stars and several events later, a case has hit the public sphere over missing equipment.
Mmegi sources inside the BDF have revealed a maze of egos, personal vendettas, revenge and settling of scores behind the equipment saga. The alleged involvement of senior government officials gives the saga an even more interesting twist.
1983, 1985 – Galebotswe and Magosi join the BDF
In 1983, a fresh-faced Galebotswe joined the army as an officer cadet. The army was a new entity then, and very few young Batswana held his qualifications.
By all accounts, Galebotswe performed well. Two years later in 1985, another young man, Peter Fana Magosi, joined the Force as an officer cadet. He would later become the No 1 Infantry Brigade Commander and the man charged with the disappearance of the intelligence equipment. But back in 1985, Galebotswe and Magosi did not know each other.
1988 – The two men are trained by British Special Air Services
In 1988, the two men were introduced together to the British Special Air Services.
“The two have worked together for most of their professional careers and in fact Galebotswe has for most parts of his life at BDF, been surrounded by Magosi, Terry Macheng and Molefe Seikano who all now hold the rank of brigadier,” Mmegi’s sources say.
”Macheng is regarded widely in the BDF as a gentleman and a half, while Molefe Seikano has always been the less ambitious of the three. He now heads the 2nd Infantry Brigade in the North. “He is a humble man who is the only brigadier in the BDF still using an official vehicle which is only good as a museum piece. The car is now close to 20 years old.”
The common thread among the four – Galebotswe, Magosi, Macheng and Seikano – is that they are all qualified as Special Forces (SF).
“SF forms the cream of any military and is envied by many within the military,” our source says.
“It is here that the macho man is made complete. However, it seems trouble and conflict have always been the defining factor in the relationship between Galebotswe and Magosi, with issues around dominance and submissiveness.” Their relationship, or rather their association started in 1988 when both were trained by the British Special Air Services (SAS) together with Seikano, while Macheng was on a similar course in Canada.
1992 – Tiroyamodimo called to mediate
As the two grew in their Special Forces careers, their professional differences became well defined and the animosity between them took centre stage. When these problems manifested themselves further at a later stage, Major General Tiroyamodimo, who was Colonel at the time, was called in to intervene with his efforts focused on reconciling the two officers.
As an intervention measure, Tiroyamodimo recommended Magosi’s transfer to 41 Infantry Battalion in Selebi Phikwe where he stayed until he was moved to a Presidential Guard Unit in Mogoditshane, made up largely of paratroopers.
1996 – Cobra is established
In 1996, Magosi played a crucial role in establishing a BDF security organ code named “Cobra” after he was allegedly being roped in by the current Director General of Intelligence and Security, Isaac Kgosi. The latter was then in Military Intelligence (MI).
“This organ worked directly under the command and leadership of the MI. Magosi was never to leave the intelligence community after that, having secured what soldiers refer to as “the opportunity of a lifetime,” sources said.
Magosi was roped in to fulfil more operational functions and less intelligence work. It is here that Magosi grew his roots deeply in the intelligence community and by most sources, continues to maintain the same influence today, even though he is now an infantry commander.
Military intelligence in its proper functions and definition is supposed to be a support unit, which overtly works for manoeuvre or operational units with strategic operational and tactical intelligence. Specifically it exists for the purpose of providing Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
“The officers and men in this unit wear uniforms with identifying insignia like any other in the barracks,” our sources reveal.
“But for BDF MI, they operate more like the police CID or America’s CIA, which remain veiled in suits and private clothing. Thus the MI has operated more covertly than overtly.”
It is not clear when Magosi left Cobra
2000 – Galebotswe hands over Commando to Magosi
In July 2000, Galebotswe, who had been with Commando Squadron for several years, handed the unit over to Magosi and at the time they both held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Galebotswe was transferred from Thebephatshwa Airbase to head No.12 Infantry Battalion under 1 Infantry Brigade in Glen Valley. He continued to excel even though his infantry troops were allegedly uncomfortable with his Special Forces attitude, where physical training is emphasised. On the other hand, while at Commando, Magosi is said to have lobbied his superiors for the merger of his unit and the Presidential Guard Unit to form what is now known as Special Forces Group. This merger brought together two units, which are both battalion size to make up a group which is a brigade size equivalent.
“This move helped Magosi be promoted to the rank of brigadier to head this brigade. During his stay at this group, he created a hybrid of both SF and paratroopers,” Mmegi was informed.
2012 – Galebotswe appointed BDF Commander
From being the Commander of Ground Forces, some believe that is when Galebotswe knew he would have an upper hand over his old foe. When he took over as Commander at BDF in July 2012, he immediately dealt with his old archrival by placing him at No.1 Infantry Brigade as Commander. Under Galebotswe’s predecessor, Magosi had been Chief of Military Intelligence, a job he enjoyed until Galebotswe’s ascension to the highest position. “This appointment, viewed by some as a demotion of sorts, prompted whispers in the corridors of MI offices and BDF Headquarters of ‘ba mo groundile’, (they have grounded him),” our sources say.
“This was a clear sign that some had been unhappy with his stay at MI.”
Within the BDF, several sources believe Galebotswe has brought the missing intelligence equipment matter into the limelight due to the unease within senior structures in the wake of his ascension to the highest post. As the two powerful military men tussle under the glare of public opinion, it has emerged that a third actor – with influence in the Government Enclave – has taken sides in the battle.
Mmegi’s sources say Galebotswe has been barred from touring BDF camps in the country, a sign that he has ruffled some feathers with the court case.
This week, Mmegi sent the BDF an extensive list of questions on the matter, but received a curt response, with Director of Protocol and Public Affairs, Colonel Tebo Dikole, declining to comment.
“As the BDF we wish to express shock and dismay at the recent spate of distortion of facts pervasive in some media houses regarding the BDF Commander Lt Gen Gaolathe Galebotswe and Brigadier Peter Magosi. “This disregard for professional standards of reporting can only be interpreted as calculated to discredit the MI in pursuit of profit from sale of news.
“In view of the deliberate distortion of facts and total disregard to professional reporting we reserve our right to comment about BDF Military Intelligence and Cobra through the media,” reads Dikole’s response.