Security needs

| Friday March 21, 2014 14:26

 

 

When doing a mental assessment of the security needs of any country including our own, the first thing that should be brought to the fore is looking at the immediate threats to the security of the country. This should inform the purchase of arms and beyond this short term assessment, it is the doctrine of the country’s military that is key in directing such procurements.

Since the fall of the white minority rulers both in Rhodesia and South Africa, Botswana does not have any immediate conventional threat that requires the purchase of air defence hardware such as fighter aircraft. The level of peace that prevails in this part of the world does not necessitate any further development of our air defence capabilities over other pressing priorities. I am not in any way suggesting that as a country we have sufficient air defence capabilities that can withstand any future threat. In doing this assessment, one takes into account the capabilities of our immediate neighbours and what they have in their inventory. For instance, South Africa has one of the world’s most advanced fighter and our envisaged T-50s from South Korea are more or less trainers in comparison. It is very important to factor South Africa in the equation of our arms purchase because we share the longest border with them. The forecast at the moment indicates that South Africa does not pose any conventional threat to Botswana.

Reading David Feinstein’s book on South Africa’s arms deal, one comes to the realisation that even they did not need to go ahead with the procurement of the Swedish Grippen. The conclusion of the deal was solely aimed at benefitting those in political power. Take for instance the choice of German frigates over the French ones, the choice was not based on the need of the navy but rather the cuts that the politicians would collect on the other end of the deal. In fact the admirals in charge had opposed the deal but it went ahead regardless. It has emerged in Feinstein’s investigation that the minister of defence and a former general were intimately involved in the deal which would have a financial trickle down to the ANC. We also need to check the background of the T-50 deal because the devil might be in the detail. Are former generals involved in the deal especially that we are in an election year?

I would like to argue that Botswana’s immediate strategic security threats point to food security and energy needs. It is highly possible that our powerful neighbour in the south might just put food sanctions on us this year. When taking into account the fact that just last week South Africa’s parliament challenged the wisdom of exporting power to Botswana when they had their own deficit at crisis levels, we are likely not going to receive sufficient food supplies from that country. There are several factors that will influence this decision. Torrential rains have negatively affected crop production and this is likely to have a negative impact on our food imports.

Therefore our immediate needs in line with the development of our air capabilities would be addressed by the purchase of several helicopters and transport planes. At the moment, Botswana Defence Force has played a critical role in the protection of our wildlife and the provision of helicopters would enhance their work in this area. As climate change has made the weather more unpredictable, we must brace for more floods and this is one area where helicopters become important air assets. The purchase of a few more cargo planes would benefit this country if need arises for emergency food imports. The two types of aircraft discussed here are multi-role and can help the defence force to continue to function positively in the economy of the country. Fighter jets are not multi-role aircraft and this immediately makes them a luxury item in the military’s procurement list. The history of our military shopping list is sufficient evidence that supports my line of argument. In the 1980s Botswana Defence Force procured second hand Strike Master jets. They were never used in any other role except for training purposes and acrobatic displays at BDF day celebrations. They were later replaced by CF5s that are now at the end tail of their serviceability and airworthiness. The only thing they are doing now is that they are increasing the fuel bill of BDF by a staggering 60% because they are heavy on gas. Upon the arrival of the T50s, the CF5 will be retired before they experience any combat role. No helicopter of transport plane will be retired before they see action in either conducting rescue missions and or delivery of crucial supplies. The reasons why the Canadians had mothballed the CF5s was for the reason that a defence review of that country’s use of the CF5 had come to a conclusion that the aircraft could not be cost effectively employed in their service. This is how the aircraft ended in the hands of the BDF. This leads to a fact that it is imperative never to rush into major arms purchases without a detailed assessment of the total worth of the asset in inventory. Lastly, the history of armed conflict in African shows that the use of fighter jets has not had any meaningful contribution in deciding many wars and we are all aware that this continent never runs short of armed conflict. In actual fact, it is the artillery pieces and armour that have become decisive in almost all conflicts in Africa. For the Americans, air superiority has become primary while these other ground forces assets are secondary. The latest conventional conflicts that the US has been involved in has always seen fighter jets playing the role of game changer. They have been to Iraq twice and the results were identical because of air superiority. Currently, such air assets have become redundant in both Afghanistan and Iraq because the conflict has moved on from conventional to an insurgency. In Africa, there has only been three armed conflicts where jet fighters were employed in their role to become game changers. The 1973 conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia saw the F5s pitted against the Russian made Mig21. Years later after the succession of Eritrea, Ethiopia used Mig23s as game changers in the bitter war against the two states. Closer to home it was Angola versus South Africa in a bitter battle of Quito Qwanavalli in 1987. The Angolans employed the use of Mig29s after suffering several defeats at the hands of South African Mirages. Quito become the defining point of the Angolan conflict. Looking at this history, Botswana might never have to employ such aircraft in any combat role in the next one hundred years.

 

*Richard Moleofe is a retired military

officer