Can the BDF help tame Al-Shabaab?

Richard Moleofe | Tuesday February 18, 2014 13:45

 

It is almost 20 years since the Botswana Defence Force left the Horn of Africa after one of its most successful peacekeeping missions. They were withdrawing from the town of Bardera, the birthplace of the late Siad Barre, the former ruler of Somalia.

The BDF had initiated negotiations with local tribal leaders for the purpose of attaining peace. Although the initiative was not sanctioned by the UN, it proved to be one of the most creative moments in the careers of our officers and their men.

When one looks at the history of Al Shabaab and the organisation's current status, one notices a level of confidence that makes taking the militia on board through negotiations. The fact that the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are independently engaging in talks with the Taliban is a clear indication that the Shabaab should also be approached along similar lines.

It should be noted that NATO emphasised on getting rid of the Taliban from the two countries, but after 14 years of armed conflict, someone has come to their senses and is engaging them in negotiations. In the case of Somalia, while the Shabaab has been driven out of Mogadishu, it continues to do as it pleases in the countryside, suggesting that loosing a foothold in the capital city has not resulted in a weakening of the Shabaab. Frequently they make their presence felt in Mogadishu by detonating one or two bombs in critical areas of the capital city.

NATO’s struggle against the Taliban having failed after a decade-and-a-half, there is little reason to think that Kenya and the African Union forces can secure peace in the Horn of Africa without a change of tactics and approach. These forces are far less resourced than their NATO counterparts in the Balochistan region of South Asia, which is a collective geographical name covering both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In 2011, Kenya commenced its operations against the Shabaab and was ultimately able to dislodge it from the port city of Kismayu. Kismayu has been central to the financial support of the group, which means that the group must be financially ailing at the moment. To add salt to the wound, the United States has strengthened its maritime patrols in the Gulf of Eden, thus castrating the last effective ability of the Shabaab to generate income and to grow by recruiting new fighters. When the Shabaab was driven out of Mogadishu, like the Taliban they ceased to exist as an identifiable regular force. They simply melted into the existing communities and commenced guerrilla warfare. Once these two identical groups operated insurgencies, the tone and tempo of fighting them completely changed. It took less than 15 weeks for NATO forces to flush the Taliban out of Kabul in what was conventional warfare where the lines of engagement were crystal clear. But it has taken 15 years to rid the countryside of the same elements. It is unfortunate that at the time when the BDF successfully engaged the Shabaab, there were no academics to study the methods and approach of the BDF to gain success where others had failed. Infact, at the time, the BDF had not established its Command and Staff College, which is the military’s premier university.

Nevertheless, there are several approaches that the BDF used in the past to gain success during their deployments in foreign lands. For instance, in Mozambique, troops were not allowed to take their UN leave while in that country but only benefited from this privilege once they were back home. This helped a great deal in preventing unnecessary interaction with local women, something that came with unwelcome consequences for other countries. The fact that BDF troops had no interaction with local girls (who were dying to have a feel of BDF’s exotic camouflage battle dress uniforms) lowered the chances of contracting and spreading HIV. BDF’s approach to the Somalis has always been intriguing. While still serving with forces of other countries in Mogadishu, Botswana troops were the only ones that could cut across the green line that separated the warring factions. This was a shortcut to the airport, compared to taking the longer route along the coast.

* Rev. Richard Moleofe is a retired Military Officer.