Tshekedi: Mineral development champion?
Lewanika Timothy | Wednesday November 18, 2026 12:02
The then Gammangwato regent, Tshekedi Khama brother to Sekgoma II the then chief of Bangwato, died precisely eight days after the signing of the mineral concession agreement he had fought tooth and nail to bring to life. Though he died in a London hospital, back in Serowe the agreement was signed in a mission hall overlooking the Bangwato royal burial ground. Tshekedi, whose efforts had brought the parties together, was too ill to attend.
The agreement of June 2, 1959 would help pave the way for the development of Selebi-Phikwe’s copper and nickel deposits. A related diamond exploration grant would produce clues later pursued in the search that led to Orapa. Tshekedi died knowing the deal had been signed, but without knowing the extent to which minerals would transform the country.
For a man who had spent years resisting mining concessions, this might appear a surprising final chapter.
Veteran geologist, Norman Lock, traces these negotiations in two instalments of his Desert Diamonds memoir, published online and shared with Mmegi.
In all of Africa, mineral discoveries had brought wealth, but also wars, displacement of thousands and an economy in which Africans supplied labour whilst others controlled the proceeds. For Bangwato leaders, opening the ground could mean losing control of what happened above it.
Tshekedi had inherited that concern from his father, Khama III, who had distinguished permission to look for minerals from permission to extract them. Exploration was one discussion according to them but digging and the terms attached to it would require another. When Tshekedi became regent following Sekgoma II’s death in 1925, Seretse was still a child and those responsibilities fell to his young uncle.
They would bring him into conflict with Sir Charles Rey, the Resident Commissioner who arrived in 1930 determined to promote mineral development. Where Rey saw employment and economic activity, Tshekedi questioned who would benefit and what mining settlements would do to the territory.
According to Lock’s account, Tshekedi refused to sign a concession inherited from Khama III’s time and took the document to tribal elders and advisers. Their objections were substantial. Mining might proceed, but they wanted a say over the conditions under which it arrived.
Visits to South African mines did little to reconcile the opposing views, Tshekedi would, according to historical accounts, return concerned about wages, workers’ circumstances and the social consequences of mining. Rey’s assessment was markedly favourable and the disagreement concerned the practical meaning of development for the people expected to accommodate it.
Lock is openly sympathetic to Tshekedi, casting the confrontation in terms of a hero and a villain. The negotiations themselves, however, reveal more than a contest between two personalities. There were elders to consult, administrators with differing views and companies whose offers had to be assessed.
“Tshekedi Khama did not object to mineral development, only the detrimental and inequitable impacts of mining in general. “As time moved on and the post-war world evolved, his vision switched to actively promoting minerals development,” Lock writes.
In later discussions an agreement pursued with mineral properties investigations during the war years went nowhere. By the mid-1950s, the administration was entertaining approaches from Anglo American, but Bangwato opinion favoured having both Tshekedi and Seretse present to guide discussions.
In 1956, a journey to England provided another opening where alongside efforts concerning Seretse’s return from exile, Tshekedi sought an alternative mining partner. Through a contact arranged by John Buchanan, he met Sir Ronald Prain, chairman of Rhodesian Selection Trust, over lunch in London.
The discussion moved towards how foreign technical expertise and Bangwato interests could be brought together in a business. Tshekedi then asked whether Prain’s companies would themselves consider such an agreement. Negotiations followed, with agreement in principle reached early in 1957.
“This last and best-known Mineral Concession, MC12, was freely negotiated between the Bamangwato Tribe and RST. In fact, the concession was the end product of the unique situation of a tribe approaching a multinational corporation, rather than the other way around,” Lock reveals.
The terms gave substance to the ownership question. An exploration company, Bamangwato Concessions Limited, would receive a ten-year prospecting concession, with its programme agreed annually. The arrangement provided for royalties calculated at 15% of gross profits, a 15% free equity interest in mining companies formed and two board seats for tribal nominees.
Those provisions offered participation in decisions and financial returns beyond employment. They also required outside capital and expertise to turn uncertain mineral prospects into operating mines. Negotiating a concession was only the beginning of that process.
Lock also cautions against treating subsequent exploration as discovery of an entirely unknown landscape. African mining had taken place at deposits later investigated under the concession. The development of Selebi-Phikwe would, moreover, proceed under terms altered by independence and new legislation.
“The final agreement for the development of the Selebi-Phikwe deposits differs somewhat from the terms of the original concession. This was because of the granting of Independence to Botswana, the ceding of mineral rights in the Tribal Territories to the State and the introduction of new mining legislation,” he writes.
Tshekedi had supported equitable sharing of royalties amongst the territories’ tribes. Turning mineral ownership into a national framework nevertheless required further political negotiation, carried forward by Seretse, other leaders and the independent government.
Tshekedi’s contribution belongs within that longer history. He neither discovered Orapa nor settled every question of mineral ownership. He helped negotiate an agreement that recognised local participation, after resisting arrangements he considered damaging.
After the Serowe signing, Prain flew to London to tell Tshekedi personally. The regent received confirmation of a bargain whose consequences would unfold over decades. The mines, the new towns and the national mineral economy were still ahead.