Africa’s drone warfare politics

Solly Rakgomo | Monday November 9, 2026 09:09

In the past year, there have been more than 2,100 violent incidents and an estimated 9,000 fatalities attributed to drone warfare in Africa triple the number of reported fatalities in 2024

Paralleling patterns globally, this is reflective of a profound shift in the manner in which warfare is conducted across the continent. Armed forces in at least 40 African countries have acquired drones as part of their arsenals.

Moreover, armed non-state actors are employing drones in at least 17 African countries. Eleven African countries now produce military drones, and several others have production efforts underway.

African governments vary enormously in what kinds of drones they can field. The top 10 countries account for nearly four-fifths of all procured units, with Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya each possessing more than 100 drones.

Nigeria stands out for its diversity, having acquired 34 distinct types of drones from a range of suppliers, a sign that the continent’s most capable militaries are building varied portfolios (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies}.These portfolios, however, remain heavily weighted toward one category.

For nearly a decade, long-endurance drones have formed the backbone of African UAS arsenals. Overall, 25 different African governments have acquired long-endurance systems. They remain almost entirely dependent on external actors to acquire them, with China and Turkey emerging as the predominant suppliers. The most popular models include Turkey’s TB2 (acquired by 15 countries) and AKINCI (7 countries) drones, followed by China’s CH (9 total countries) and Wing Loong (9 total countries) series.

Long-endurance drones have earned their dominant position in three distinct roles. The first is persistent surveillance. Able to loiter unseen and undetected for hours, long-endurance drones are used to collect real-time intelligence on enemy movements and cue indirect fire.

For example, after being pushed out of much of Khartoum early in Sudan’s internal war, the Sudanese Armed Forces turned to Iranian Mohajer drones to track the RSF’s movements and dislodge them with pinpoint artillery strikes.

The second is long-range strike. Through their extended ranges and flight times, long-endurance drones enable African militaries to attack hundreds or even thousands of kilometers from where the drones are launched.

The armed forces of the DRC have used Turkish TB2 and Chinese CH-4 long-endurance drones to target rebel-held positions in M23-held areas of North Kivu, even though they were stationed several hundred kilometers away.

This includes a strike that killed M23 spokesman Will Ngoma near the mining town of Rubaya in 2026. Burkina Faso’s armed forces have used long-endurance drones to target militants planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Somalia has used long-endurance drones to strike al Shabaab training camps and weapons depots in the country’s south. The Ethiopian National Defence Forces decisively used long-endurance drones to sever a single tarmacked supply road running from rebel-held Tigray toward Addis Ababa in 2022 a development that proved crucial in stopping the offensive and ending the war.

The third is close air support. The ability to loiter and target precise munitions from high altitudes enables long-endurance drones to provide critical support to infantry and armored units.

When Ansaru and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) fighters attempted to overrun the Burkinabé military base in Djibo in December 2023, TB2s broke the assault by targeting the insurgents’ own massed formations.

Another appealing attribute of long-endurance drones is that they typically operate at altitudes above the reach of small arms and most portable air defense systems that nonstate armed groups can currently field.

African Nonstate Drone Capabilities

Africa’s armed nonstate actors have adopted a different approach to drone integration and weaponisation, focusing on acquiring or modifying small unmanned systems that can be easily assembled or smuggled. In a span of three years, many of Africa’s major armed nonstate groups have acquired armed drone capabilities.

They have received varying amounts of support, from state-sponsored technical assistance to clandestine training through international jihadist networks.

Virtually all of Africa’s militant groups now use drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). JNIM, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), and al Shabaab have possessed drone-enabled ISR capabilities dating back to 2018.

Even Ahl al Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) considered the least well-resourced of Africa’s militant Islamist groups has used drones to identify targets in complex attacks against port towns and hydrocarbon infrastructure in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.

Some militant groups use drones to direct, command, and control forces during an attack. Most of Africa’s militant groups use drones for propaganda, filming videos of achievements, attacks, or training to bolster recruitment and gain support.

Amongst the most successful in this regard is al Shabaab, which has used drones for both surveillance and propaganda purposes since at least 2018, and also uses varying UAS platforms to plan and coordinate attacks.

Though it has yet to successfully weaponise drones, al Shabaab has demonstrated an interest in acquiring advanced UAS capabilities and an even greater interest in drone jamming technology to evade surveillance and strikes.

The group recently sent as many as 400 fighters to train with Yemen’s Houthis, from whom it has already attempted to acquire drones.