Pros, cons of cadre deployment
staff writer | Friday November 6, 2026 16:49
In essence, the attitudes of the parties that make the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) simply insinuate, “We were elected to change things, so we need our own people inside the State to make sure our policies are implemented, not blocked by the old bureaucracy”. In 2024, the UDC government took over from Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which had been in power for nearly six decades, 58 years to be exact. In summation, observers say in a merit-based system it is the best person for the job whilst in cadre deployment it is best person in the party for the job. Veteran politician, Otsweletse Moupo told both the special policy forum and a presser post the Selebi-Phikwe meet that the policy as advocated for by the party he once led should be based on merit and competence and not just party membership as a qualifying criterion. The former Botswana National Front (BNF) president’s point is that they want to avoid possibilities of patronage and nepotism which manifest sharply when the main consideration is party membership. “Also, when there is no flexibility.” Interestingly, under the leadership of President Duma Boko, the UDC has widened its net to even accommodate non-aligned members who are commonly known as direct members and they enjoy the fruits of the coalition’s labour as well. Some of them have been appointed to Cabinet positions, councils, state owned entreprises and in other roles.
Amongst others, in a coalition government, cadre deployment entails appointing party loyalists or activists to key positions in both parastatals and civil service. This practice is common albeit, controversial. Emerging from its recent special policy forum in Selebi-Phikwe, BNF, an affiliate of the UDC, came back fully charged that the government had to align some of its policies to ensure that those implementing government programmes believe in the coalition’s manifesto and won’t sabotage it.
Merits
One of the merits of cadre deployment is that, “it is useful especially when coalition partners don’t fully trust the existing bureaucracy.” The Selebi-Phikwe policy forum concluded to develop a specific cadre development policy. Whilst members want greater representation in key positions, Boko cautioned them against using cadre deployment as a political reward system. His take is that competency and performance must take precedence over party affiliation. “It is not that some party members are not employed. Some are. Some are failing,” Boko told the special policy forum. He could not mince his words that some of the party deployed cadres were even involved in elements of corruption and think that they should protect them. “No. Let us employ members who are capable, will deliver and protect what we believe in,” Boko insisted. Although the UDC government through its President Boko has been shouting meritocracy as a means of appointing people in some quarter, there has been an argument that the powers that be should appoint people to strategic positions. They argued that these political appointees are people they can hold politically accountable, rather than career civil servants who may be loyal to the previous regime.
There is also a strong belief that by appointing people to some positions, coalition partners often try hard to get a fair share of positions as part of power-sharing negotiations. The move, it is believed, can keep the coalition stable and prevent one party from dominating the set up, which may cause some unnecessary friction. As a lead presenter on cadre deployment, Moupo reminded the special policy forum to identify strategic positions across central government, local authorities and parastatals for consideration for placement of appropriately qualified members. The ex-BNF president, who is an attorney by training, argues these will show that the UDC is in control of the government. As one of the justifications for cadre deployment, there is a feeling that loyal cadres may execute decisions quickly without bureaucratic hurdles or resistance.
Demerits
On the flipside, there are fears that positions may reward political loyalty rather than competence, qualifications and experience. These are issues that BNF cadres deliberated upon with Boko raising a cautionary advice after Moupo gave the issue both sides as the lead presenter on the topical issue. Concern was raised that if cadres would be appointed mainly on the basis of their party loyalty, without other key prerequisites that qualify them, it may lead to poor service delivery. There was also fear that if cadre deployment could be implemented blindly, it may erode the principle of an independent, professional public service. A BNF loyalist who preferred anonymity post the special policy forum intimated that there is a likelihood that such a system could become a system of rewarding friends and punishing opponents. The insider fears this could lead to tender corruption, nepotism and misuse of State resources. “Competition over who gets which deployment, like which party gets which ministry, board or council post is one of the biggest causes of coalition collapses. Partners fight over jobs instead of policy,” the source was quick to warn. “There is also a likelihood of citizens looking at the State as captured by the parties in the coalition and thereby reducing public confidence and legitimacy.
This to some extent may discourage skilled professionals from joining the public service.” Cadre deployment like any other policy has its pros and cons as a tried and tested policy.
Cadre deployment successes
South Africa
In the neighbouring South Africa post 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) used cadre deployment to transform the apartheid state, putting black South Africans into senior positions in civil service, military and parastatals that were almost exclusively white. In the first 10 to 15 years, it was seen as necessary to ensure policy alignment and representativeness.
Botswana
Post-independence in 1966, the former ruling BDP deliberately deployed educated Batswana cadres to replace departing British officers to localise the civil service. It’s generally viewed as a success because it was combined with merit-based training and scholarships.
USA
In the early 1800s journals show that President Andrew Jackson’s spoils system with a common mantra: “To the victor belong the spoils”- succeeded politically in breaking an entrenched elite and making government more responsive to elected leaders, though it later became corrupt.
Rwanda
In 1994, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) deployed loyal cadres to rebuild the State after the genocide, which helped create stability and fast implementation of development policy.
Cases where cadre deployment collapsed/cited as failure
In later years, in South Africa, the same ANC policy is now widely blamed for weakening SOEs inter alia; Eskom, Transnet, PRASA and SAA. The Zondo Commission report linked deployment to State capture, where loyalty was prioritised over technical competence, leading to load-shedding, corruption scandals and coalition tensions in metros.
Zimbabwe
With the ZANU PF, extensive deployment of party cadres into the army, civil service, judiciary and electoral bodies was common. It helped ZANU PF retain power but it’s cited as a cause of economic collapse, hyperinflation and loss of institutional credibility.
Lesotho
In the case of Lesotho coalitions in 2012/2023, it depicts that every coalition change led to mass replacement of principal secretaries, diplomats and local chiefs with cadres from the new coalition partners. This created extreme instability, lawsuits and policy discontinuity and government rarely lasted full term.
Soviet Union
With Russia’s Nomenklatura system a list of key posts are reserved for Communist Party members. It ensured ideological control but eventually led to stagnation, lack of innovation and economic failure because competence was secondary.
The ANC’s policy on cadre deployment
This policy has existed since the ANC’s 50th national conference in Mafikeng in 1997. The conference adopted a resolution on deployment which affirmed the need to deploy cadres to various organs of State, including the public service and other centres of power in society. The aim was to implement National Democratic Revolution which was the ANC’s goal to control all levers of power. The eye of the needle was the ANC’s guiding document for selecting cadres. It says cadres should be committed, capable and rooted amongst its people. Cadres were to be deployed not only in government but also in SOEs, legislature and according to original documents also in the private sector and civil society. Lessons from the ANC’s 27 years of formal cadre deployment both intended and unintended are currently studied by many coalition and ruling parties in Africa. Good lessons include inter alia; transformations needs deliberate planning, deployment without training fails, need for clear rules and separation of party and State.
Bad lessons include patronage becomes self-perpetuating, it destroys accountability, legal and public trust cost, short-term fix and long term liability. Most analysts advice that cadre deployment can transform a State quickly, “but if it is not limited to political posts and replaced with merit-based recruitment for professional posts, it will eventually undermine the very transformation it was meant to achieve.”