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Mending ties: De Beers, Botswana hold hands again

Side by side: Cook and Boko are heading the global fightback by natural diamonds PIC: KENNEDY RAMOKONE
 
Side by side: Cook and Boko are heading the global fightback by natural diamonds PIC: KENNEDY RAMOKONE

A few years ago, Botswana used gruesome words to describe De Beers, the type of words partners don’t say to each other even in the heat of the moment. At the time, it seemed like the relationship between De Beers and the government had soured beyond mending, but time and a change of guard at the Government Enclave seem to have mended the country’s most important commercial relationship.

Recent diamond campaigns internationally have seen De Beers and government walking side by side, with De Beers’ executives and government officials singing from the same hymn book, condemning synthetics and mounting pressure on Western markets to turn back to rough diamonds again.

But a few years ago Botswana was ready to quit its marriage with De Beers, calling the terms of the marriage 'fraudulent'.

Those who have been following the diamond industry long enough probably knew that some relationships aren’t easy to quit. More so, this particular one was woven into the country's story right from Independence.

Historical accounts show that in 1965, before Botswana had raised its flag and taken its place amongst independent nations, Harry Oppenheimer whispered something to Seretse Khama that would change the country’s fortunes. The De Beers supremo knew of 'special stones' beneath the soil of a territory widely regarded as poor and offering little economic promise.

According to former Minister of Minerals David Magang`s account in Delusions of Grandeur, Oppenheimer informed Seretse of a kimberlite pipe with the potential to transform the economy. This was two years before the official announcement of the diamond discovery.

Seretse confided in Peter Fawcus, the British Commissioner whom he trusted, and the information was closely guarded. Magang’s account places this discretion amongst the consequential decisions surrounding Independence. The public diamond story would unfold later, but the relationship between Botswana’s founding leader and the diamond empire had already begun.

“I cannot help feeling that somehow providence intended that this should be a highly successful country,” Oppenheimer is quoted in the book as saying.

Seretse’s decisions on handling the resource would later ensure that the mineral wealth would belong to the nation, rather than enrich only the tribe beneath whose land it lay. Botswana’s diamonds became a national resource, and the partnership established with De Beers in 1969 became central to turning them into development.

Orapa opened in 1971, followed by Jwaneng in 1982. The mines generated revenues that helped government expand schools, hospitals, roads and other public services. For a country emerging from poverty, the proceeds changed what was possible.

The relationship between De Beers and government was prospering, flourishing even. Botswana supplied diamonds that became indispensable to De Beers’ business, whilst the company provided expertise, capital and access to international buyers. The partners became known as Siamese twins, their fortunes so closely linked that imagining one without the other seemed almost impossible.

But as market forces began to choke the industry and revenue shocks began to affect the government's ability to deliver development and economic growth, as in the '80s, Botswana started rattling De Beers for more ownership of its natural resource.

During the President Festus Mogae era, government was clear on wanting a larger piece of the cake.

Mogae threatened to pull the plug on De Beers’ operations in Botswana if the company refused to bring diamond beneficiation into the country. It was a jolt out of the blue, but, as Magang would recount, a demand long overdue. For decades, Botswana had supplied the stones that kept De Beers afloat, yet reaped only a fraction of the value once those diamonds were cut, polished and sold.

In 2006, government concluded a multi-year agreement with De Beers, which committed to helping Botswana to beneficiate its diamonds. Under the terms of the agreement, the Diamond Trading Centre, which was based in London, would shift to Botswana and more beneficiation would take place locally.

The relationship adjusted. Under the 2011 agreement, De Beers committed to relocating its London-based sales operations to Gaborone by the end of 2013, bringing skills, technology and international buyers. Government also secured an independent allocation of Debswana’s production.

These were substantial gains, but the question of whether Botswana received enough would return with greater force under immediate past-president Mokgweetsi Masisi.

During Masisi's tenure, Botswana took the war to De Beers’ doorstep, in a gambit that garnered international attention. Masisi shot from the hip and called the Botswana-De Beers marriage “a deal fraudulent and fraught with error”.

Diamond negotiations stalled in 2023 when Masisi threatened to walk out on De Beers if his terms were not acceded to. His demand was for Botswana to secure greater access to the value in the diamond industry’s pipeline, beyond simply being a miner of the precious stones.

The biggest worry for Masisi was the clause that prohibited Botswana from participating in the diamond value chain beyond the sale of rough diamonds. In remarks at the time, he said he wanted the world to come to Botswana to set up a vertical integration model for diamond development.

For many Batswana, these words were spine-chilling. For decades, the nation’s citizens had been left in the dark about the fine print of agreements that underpinned their entire economy. But Masisi saw no reason to shield them. To him, exposing the 'dark side' of the deal was a patriotic duty.

“I told the CEO of Anglo and De Beers that if they come back thinking we will sign the same deal, they better get out of my Cabinet room and the deal is off,” he said. “It was a bad agreement; it was bad for Botswana. We got too little, and De Beers got far too much out of a bad agreement. It was based on a lack of knowledge and sophistication in negotiating deals on our side. “We were taken advantage of by our very own partner.”

Snap back to reality: the kitty is empty again, and President Duma Boko has made fresh calls for increasing the stake of Botswana in De Beers. With Anglo’s exit, the field has been thrown open.

A fresh opportunity and danger loom. President Boko has already sharpened his rhetoric, calling for Botswana to increase its stake in De Beers and secure a greater share of the wealth that has for too long slipped through its fingers.

The negotiations survived a change of government. In February 2025, the UDC administration signed new agreements, increasing Okavango Diamond Company’s allocation from Debswana to 30%, with provision for 40% and potentially 50%, whilst extending Debswana’s mining licences.

Boko nevertheless brought demands of his own. He criticised De Beers’ performance and pressed for Botswana to assume a larger role as Anglo American pursued its exit. Government’s ambition now extended to increasing its ownership of the diamond giant, beyond the 15% it already held.

Buying more of De Beers would mark another major turn in this marriage. It would also commit Botswana more deeply to an industry facing uncomfortable questions about demand, prices and competition.

Synthetics have gained customers, particularly in lower-priced categories. De Beers reported that its consolidated rough sales volumes increased in the first half of 2026, yet rough diamond revenue fell. Selling more stones was no guarantee of earning more money.

At Chatham House in London in September, Vice President Ndaba Gaolathe argued that uncertainty surrounding the partnership had weakened market confidence and helped create an opening for synthetics.

He said buyers had understood that “there was this relationship which was prepared to do anything under the sun to ensure that the diamond continues to be resilient”.

His assessment gave the public quarrels a wider consequence. Whilst Botswana and De Beers fought over their arrangements, the market was watching whether they would continue defending natural diamonds together.

But recently in London, Las Vegas, and New York, the two partners have shown they are increasingly willing to fight together. The diamonds that once made their marriage prosperous now require both of them to defend it.

At JCK Las Vegas this year, Minerals and Energy Minister, Bogolo Kenewendo, appeared alongside De Beers chief executive Al Cook in a discussion organised by House of Botswana. The government-led platform brought diamond partners together around promotion and recovery.

House of Botswana has been taking the country’s diamonds, tourism and development record directly to international industry audiences. Its engagements give government a more active role in persuading retailers and consumers to choose natural stones.

In New York, Boko joined De Beers and National Geographic at the Okavango Eternal gathering, promoting the connection between responsible diamond production, conservation, and livelihoods.

Government is also partnering with De Beers to plan, fund and execute international marketing initiatives. Ends...