African Hero: Neither Zunaid Moti nor President Boko is at fault - Blame the political system
Bugalo Chilume | Monday September 28, 2026 15:35
The two were, in effect, abiding by the rules of multiparty politics, the foremost of which is that substantial financial resources are often a prerequisite for electoral success. Neither man invented the rules; they merely played the game.
The fundamental reality of multiparty politics is brutally simple: elections cost money. Parties need money to organise, campaign, advertise, transport supporters, mobilise voters and sustain their operations.
The Duma Boko-led opposition Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) coalition lacked the financial muscle to mount a credible challenge against a well-resourced Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The UDC then turned to Moti for financial support.
Moti is a rand-billionaire reportedly of a questionable character with a number of court appearances over business deals in Africa and Europe. His wealth is said to have been built, at least in part, through cultivating relationships with political leaders and allegedly providing financial inducements in return for government contracts, licences and other commercial advantages.
He is also suspected of routinely seeking out financially vulnerable opposition parties in Africa that appear to have a realistic prospect of gaining state power; and the UDC fitted the bill. According to unverified suspicions, he provides such parties with the capital required to finance their electoral campaigns, allegedly in exchange of government contracts and other commercial benefits should they win power. Such deals may also involve financial inducements directly to opposition leaders themselves as an incentive to strike a deal.
The fulfillment of agreements of this nature can place governments under pressure to circumvent, weaken or ignore established procurement procedures, citizen-empowerment policies and government financial regulations. Whether that has happened in this particular case is a matter for public scrutiny.
The African Hero project has been presented as a social-upliftment initiative involving the construction of 100 schools and 50 clinics across the country. Reportedly a collaboration between Moti and the President Boko’s administration, it has been portrayed by some sources as a mechanism through which Moti could recover the financial support allegedly extended to the UDC during the 2019 and the 2024 election campaigns.
The Moti Files - a 2023 investigative series by the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism based on thousands of leaked documents - quoted Moti stating, '...I am free to donate to a political party if I so wish, in the furtherance of the multiparty system of democracy.'
The leaks also revealed that Moti provided $9.4 million (approximately P126.5 million today) to the UDC for its 2019 election campaign. In exchange, he anticipated 'certain commercial opportunities with the cooperation and assistance of the Botswana Government' should the party secure power.
When the UDC lost, the outcome was disastrous; it left it burdened with a massive debt, making victory in the 2024 General Election essential - a driving force behind its ambitious manifesto pledges. Missteps by the incumbent administration also played a key role in helping propel the UDC into office.
Following its 2019 loss, the UDC attempted to save face by alleging election fraud without presenting credible evidence. The fraud allegation arose from a Moti-funded report by British-South African investigator Paul O’Sullivan, which had projected a UDC victory (31 seats to the BDP’s 22, BPF’s 3, and AP’s 1). The UDC then launched a legal challenge to overturn the results, but the case was dismissed on a technicality without a hearing on its merits.
According to some sources, Moti could stand to make a profit of no less than P16 billion (about $1.2b) from constructing the schools and clinics using prefabricated modular panels. This figure, if accurate, does not appear to include the potential benefits arising from government support for the proposed industrial hub for manufacturing prefabricated panels to be used for the project and for export to regional markets.
These are, however, the only details of the deal that have entered the public domain. What other provisions may exist between the parties remain unclear. Until the full agreement is made public, the public can only speculate about the complete nature and value of the deal.
If the reported details of the deal are substantially accurate, Moti appears to have driven a hard bargain when he provided campaign financing to the UDC. It would be reasonable to assume that he did not provide such financing for a high risk venture without expecting a substantial return.
Boko, for his part, may have felt that he had little choice if he was to occupy the State House. He may therefore have accepted terms that were less favourable to a future government than they otherwise might have been.
The fact that implementation of the deal reportedly took almost two years following the 2024 General Election may point to significant opposition within President Boko's administration. In fact, in early 2025, the President attempted to advance the deal but encountered resistance from the Ministry of Finance led by the president of the Alliance for Progressives (AP), the second largest political party in the UDC coalition.
President Boko eventually appears to have prevailed, with the Ministry of Finance ultimately approving the deal. The following questions arise: What changed? Was the deal improved? Were the objections satisfactorily addressed? Were the financial risks reassessed? Or did political pressure ultimately prevail over bureaucratic caution? It is noteworthy that, before the AP joined the coalition, its vice-president had publicly expressed disdain for Moti at a political rally. More recently, he reportedly did not attend the launch of the African Hero pilot project at Block 7. Given that the AP president was overseas, there was an expectation that his vice-president would represent him at the event. But he did not, and reportedly none of the AP MPs were present at the event.
This apparent negativity towards Moti may reflect wider reservations about him within the AP leadership. If so, the African Hero project could become a source of serious tension within the UDC coalition, particularly if an opposition coalition emerges and seeks to court the AP into its fold.
Ultimately, the question should not simply be whether Moti or President Boko is at fault as those opposing the deal assert. The more fundamental question is whether multiparty politics is the appropriate political system for Botswana, given that it creates an environment in which wealthy individuals can finance political parties and subsequently position themselves to reap enormous commercial benefits when those parties attain or retain power.
If we are serious about preventing state capture, political corruption, patronage and the growing influence of private wealth over public policy, perhaps the country should seriously consider an alternative political model - including a one-party political system in which existing parties are collapsed and consolidated into a single national political organisation as prevails in China.
Such a proposal would undoubtedly be controversial. It would face fierce resistance, particularly from politicians (both ruling and opposition) whose careers depend upon the existing system. For that very reason, any meaningful debate about political reform should not be left exclusively to politicians. Civil society, academia, traditional leadership, professional bodies, churches, business and ordinary citizens should all be part of the conversation.
The question to be addressed would be whether the current political system itself is producing incentives that make relationships between money and political power inevitable - and whether those incentives ultimately serve the interests of the ordinary Motswana. Perhaps the time has come to stop blaming the players and start examining the rules of the game.