LSB bid to block SA FMD expert lawyer fails

Spira Tlhankane | Monday August 17, 2026 06:00

In a ruling delivered at the High Court this week, Chief Justice Gaolapelwe Ketlogetswe declared that the Society’s challenge was “misconceived”. Ketlogetswe dismissed with costs the LSB’s urgent application seeking to rescind his July 30 order admitting Advocate Reginald Willis to practise in Botswana on an ad hoc basis. Willis, a South African advocate, had been brought into the country to represent JS Beef (Proprietary) Limited and Primefast (Proprietary) Limited in an urgent application against the Director of Veterinary Services, Dr Kobedi Segale, Minister of Lands and Agriculture Dr Edwin Dikoloti and the Attorney General.

The underlying dispute concerns the government’s handling and management of FMD, an issue the Chief Justice described as one of undeniable public importance given its implications for Botswana’s cattle industry, beef exports and the wider economy. At the heart of the LSB’s challenge was its contention that Willis should not have been admitted without giving the Society a proper opportunity to oppose his admission.But in his ruling Ketlogetswe rejected the argument and found that the LSB had been notified as required by law and was not a necessary party to the application.

More importantly, he found that the case itself met the statutory threshold for bringing in a foreign advocate. Ketlogetswe was unequivocal about the significance of the underlying litigation.“As to the question of whether or not the matter that Advocate Willis SC had been briefed on was of public importance and the issues complex, it was clear to me, as it still is, touching as it did on the handling and management of the Foot and Mouth Disease in Botswana. “The beef industry is key to the economy of Botswana. It has always been. This therefore cannot, by any standards, be regarded as a small matter,” he said.

The remarks strike at the heart of the LSB’s attempt to challenge Willis’ admission on the basis that the matter had not been demonstrated to be sufficiently important and complex to justify the involvement of foreign counsel. According to the judgment, the LSB argued that the admission of Willis could disadvantage members of the local legal profession who might otherwise handle complex cases before the courts and gain experience from them.

But the Chief Justice dismissed that argument, saying the issue was not whether local lawyers wanted the work. “In my view however, the question is not whether or not the local lawyers may wish to do such cases, but rather whether or not the case satisfies the legal threshold of being an important and complex case justifying the employment of a foreign advocate equipped with the necessary expertise not readily available in the local bar,” he ruled. Ketlogetswe’s judgment provided a significant judicial clarification on the circumstances under which foreign advocates may be admitted to practise in Botswana under section 7(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act. That provision allows a foreign advocate who is qualified to practise in a superior court of a Commonwealth country to be admitted for a specific cause or matter of “importance and complexity”, provided the advocate has been instructed by the Attorney General or an attorney in Botswana. Willis, being a South African advocate, qualified under the provision. The Chief Justice explained that when the petition for Willis’ admission landed before him on July 30, he was working from home because of ill-health. After examining the papers, he concluded that the statutory requirements had been satisfied and granted the admission without requiring the parties to appear before him.

Ketlogetswe said this was consistent with how he had dealt with similar applications since assuming office. “When I receive a petition such as the one in casu, I peruse the documents filed of record, and if satisfied that the papers are in order, and that the requirements for the admission of a foreign advocate have been met, I never require the attorney who has filed the application to appear, I grant the order right away,” he said. Ketlogetswe added that he regarded an in-person appearance in such circumstances as “completely unnecessary”. The LSB subsequently approached the court seeking rescission of the order, arguing that it had not been given adequate notice and therefore had been deprived of an opportunity to oppose Willis’ admission.

The Society’s executive secretary, Lillian Marang Muzimo, stated in her supporting affidavit that the petition had been served on the LSB on July 30 and that the Council resolved the same day that the Society should oppose it. However, the LSB only learnt of the actual admission order the following day, according to the affidavit. The Society then attempted to bring its own urgent application, but encountered difficulties in getting it filed. The Chief Justice nevertheless found that the LSB had been notified in accordance with section 7(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act. He drew an important distinction between being notified and being a necessary party to the proceedings. “The requirement for notification of the LSB is not, in my view, the kind that elevates the LSB to a necessary party,” Ketlogetswe ruled. Rather, he said, the notification allows the Society, as regulator of the profession to alert the Chief Justice if there is something untoward about the application such as a foreign advocate not being properly qualified.

But where the advocate is qualified and the dispute centres only on whether the underlying case is sufficiently important and complex, Ketlogetswe said the LSB cannot simply substitute its judgment for that of the court.

“The LSB cannot wish to substitute its judgment for the discretion exercisable by the Chief Justice in such cases, although it is clear that such discretion is one exercisable judiciously,” he said. The Chief Justice nevertheless acknowledged that the LSB is not completely shut out of such proceedings. He said there could be exceptional circumstances in which the Society could seek leave to intervene as an amicus curiae and even oppose an application for the admission of foreign counsel. But such intervention, he warned, must be properly justified. “In very exceptional cases, the LSB may wish and be entitled to intervene, lest it becomes a busy body,” he added. That warning was coupled with a broader concern about the potential consequences of routine opposition to foreign counsel applications. Ketlogetswe said unnecessary interventions could lead to “a plethora of unnecessary pre-trial hearings which may bog down case flow management and create unnecessary and costly delays in litigation to the prejudice of litigants”. The Chief Justice also rejected the LSB’s reliance on another provision of the Legal Practitioners Act which provides for notice in applications concerning admission of attorneys. He found that Section 10 was not applicable to the admission of foreign advocates under Section 7(1).

The Society subsequently relied on Order 48 Rule 1(a) of the High Court Rules, arguing that the July 30 order had been erroneously sought and granted without notice to an affected party.

“Even if it could be accepted that the kind of notification of the application to the LSB under section 7 (1) of the LPA, supra, makes the LSB a necessary party, which I hold it is not, the LSB has duly been notified as required by law,” he ruled. He further found that neither Willis’ attorneys nor the LSB was to blame for the manner in which the original application had been handled.

The Chief Justice said the LSB had been given sufficient notification to alert the instructing attorneys or the court administration if it intended to oppose the application. Instead, he said, the Society “chose to silently prepare to oppose a petition as if they were a party thereto”. The Chief Justice also rejected the argument that the LSB would suffer prejudice if Willis remained admitted.

According to the judgment, the Society was not responsible for Willis’ legal fees and could not dictate to litigants which lawyers they should use. “The LSB is not responsible for his fees, nor can the LSB force the litigants to appoint certain local advocates and not a foreign advocate with the necessary legal expertise in the issues to be tried in the main urgent application,” Ketlogetswe said. Ultimately, the court found that the original admission order had not been improperly obtained and that the LSB had failed to establish grounds for rescission.

“It is also worth stating that the case for the admission of Advocate Willis SC met the legal threshold contemplated by section 7 (1) of the LPA, and nothing that the LSB has stated in its rescission application has changed that state of affairs,” Ketlogetswe ruled. “The application for rescission is misconceived and it ought to fail, and I so order.” The LSB’s application was consequently dismissed with costs.

The ruling leaves Willis’ ad hoc admission intact and clears the way for him to represent JS Beef and Primefast in the FMD-related litigation. More broadly, the judgment sends a strong message that while the LSB retains its regulatory role over Botswana’s legal profession, that role does not automatically translate into a right to oppose every application for the admission of foreign counsel. For the Chief Justice, the decisive considerations were whether the foreign advocate was properly qualified and whether the underlying case satisfied the statutory test of importance and complexity.

And on the FMD dispute, he had little doubt and that Botswana’s beef industry, the judgment makes clear, was enough to place the case firmly in that category.