Seretse files leave to appeal Dipate ruling
staff writer | Wednesday August 5, 2026 06:00
The application follows Regional Magistrate Mareledi Dipate’s decision last month to dismiss Seretse’s bid to quash 63 counts of stealing by an agent, money laundering, forgery of an official document, and conspiracy to defraud the government. Seretse is charged alongside former business partners Sharifa Noor, Alfonse Ndzinge, and their associated companies.
At the centre of Seretse’s interlocutory appeal is the legal authority of Thabo Malambane, Deputy Director of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), to lead the prosecution. Seretse contends that Oteng Thamaku, Deputy Director in the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), lacked the constitutional mandate to delegate prosecutorial powers to Malambane. He further argues the state failed to produce evidence such as formal letters or meeting minutes proving that DPP Director Kgosi Nkgakaagae had ever delegated such powers to Thamaku in the first instance.
In his earlier ruling, Magistrate Dipate held that Thamaku’s delegation aligned with Section 51A of the Constitution and was supported by Statutory Instrument No.57 of 2005, which delegates prosecutorial powers to DCEC officers.
In his appeal, Seretse argues that Dipate erred by relying on Statutory Instrument No.57 of 2005 without first verifying its legal validity.
“The court relied upon the instrument as the source of legal authority to prosecute before satisfying itself that the instrument was lawfully made,” Seretse said.
Seretse maintains that public officers lack inherent legislative powers and that neither Section 51A of the Constitution nor Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act grants the DPP authority to enact subsidiary legislation.
Because delegated legislation derives its validity strictly from Parliament, Seretse argues that Statutory Instrument No.57 promulgated in 2005 by then-DPP Pat Dambe was relied upon without establishing whether Parliament had ever conferred such legislative powers on the office.
Seretse asserts that Section 51A establishes the DPP as the sole constitutional prosecuting authority; such that any prosecutorial authority exercised by officers of the DCEC is derivative of and dependent upon the constitutional authority of the DPP.
Acknowledging that interlocutory rulings are rarely appealable before trial concludes, Seretse argues his application is an exception due to the constitutional weight of the issues raised.
'Unless corrected by the appellate court, I will be compelled to stand trial before persons whom I contend have not demonstrated lawful authority to prosecute me,' Seretse stated in court filings, adding that any prejudice suffered from an unauthorised trial could not be undone retroactively.