Alcohol not an excuse for murder, rules Kebonang
Pini Bothoko | Wednesday May 6, 2026 06:00
Delivering judgment on extenuation and sentencing in Makwatse versus State, Kebonang emphasised that intoxication or emotional distress cannot be used to justify taking another person’s life, particularly in circumstances where the accused had time to regain self-control. Makwatse had earlier pleaded guilty to the 2015 murder of Dipuo Ramalepa in Rasesa.
The conviction followed a summary of agreed facts submitted by both the state and the defence, in which the accused admitted to attacking the deceased with an axe whilst she slept at her boyfriend’s residence.
According to court records, after committing the crime, Makwatse openly confessed to passersby and later to the deceased’s family, even leaving the murder weapon in their yard before walking away. Kebonang said the court was satisfied that the accused’s guilty plea was voluntary and informed, noting that both Makwatse and his legal representative confirmed there had been no force.
In considering sentencing, the court was required under Section 203 of the Penal Code to determine whether any extenuating circumstances existed that could justify a lesser sentence than death, and Kebonang found none.
“The admitted facts do not indicate any conduct by the deceased that could have triggered or justified the accused’s actions. The killing was carried out on a defenceless victim who was asleep at the time,” he said.
The judge further described the accused’s behaviour after the murder as aggravating, saying it added a layer of trauma to the victim’s family. During mitigation, the defence attempted to introduce a narrative suggesting that Makwatse had been provoked, claiming another man answered the deceased’s phone, that she attempted to stop him from smoking, and that she allegedly attacked him with scissors.
However, Kebonang dismissed this version as inconsistent with the agreed facts and lacking credibility. He explained that for provocation to succeed as a partial defence under Sections 205 and 206 of the Penal Code, it must meet both subjective and objective tests, namely, that the accused lost self-control and that an ordinary person in similar circumstances would have done the same.
“In this case, there is no evidence that an ordinary person would have been provoked to such a degree,” Kebonang said.
The court also found that Makwatse had, in fact, initiated the confrontation by assaulting the deceased, thereby disqualifying himself from relying on provocation as a defence. Kebonang took a firm stance against Gender-Based Violence, rejecting any notion that jealousy or perceived infidelity could justify murder.
“Women are not property to be owned or controlled by men. Men have no right to decide whether women live or die, or who they associate with,” he said.
Whilst the Defence highlighted Makwatse’s age at the time of the offence, 30 years, and his status as a first-time offender, Kebonang said these factors carried little weight given the gravity of the crime.
“The deceased was killed in her sleep, in her most vulnerable state. She had no opportunity to flee or call for help. That is a significant aggravating factor,” Kebonang said.
The judge also underscored the principles of sentencing, including deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, but noted that in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the law left the court with no discretion.
“As such, the mandatory sentence applies,” he ruled.
Makwatse was sentenced to death with execution to be carried out at a date and time to be determined by the President. However, he was informed of his right to appeal both conviction and sentence within six weeks.