High Court stays Goo-Tau installation
Mpho Mokwape | Monday March 23, 2026 06:00
In a dispute over the position of Kgosi of Goo-Tau, Judge William Moncho ordered that the implementation of a judgment issued on December 12, 2025, be suspended pending the determination of an application for leave to appeal. In a ruling delivered on March 18, 2026, the court further interdicted the respondents from acting on the judgment, including taking steps to fill the position currently held by the applicant, Maele Morena Maele.
The applicant, Maele, had approached the court on an urgent basis seeking to halt the enforcement of the December ruling, which had set aside his removal from office.
The December judgment rescinded the earlier order that had favoured Maele and directed that the position revert to its pre-September 2024 status, thereby potentially enabling the first respondent, Temalo Lerato, to reclaim the role.
Maele argued that unless the court intervened urgently, the respondents could implement the judgment at any time, which would undermine his intended appeal and potentially render it academic.
He further contended that there is only one position of Kgosi of Gootau, and that execution of the order would directly affect his rights.
The application was opposed by Lerato, who raised several preliminary objections, including lack of urgency, failure to meet the requirements for a stay of execution, and the existence of alternative remedies.
Lerato argued that the applicant had not demonstrated that he would be denied substantial redress in due course and pointed out that Maele had not yet been reinstated under a separate judgment delivered in June 2025.
“The applicant could pursue contempt proceedings against the government for failure to implement the earlier order and that he was already participating in an appeal relating to that judgment,” reads the judgment.
In addressing urgency, the court noted that the application was filed six days after the impugned judgment and accepted that the order could be executed immediately, creating a legitimate basis for concern.
Although the court found that the applicant had not adequately demonstrated why substantial redress could not be obtained at a later stage, it nevertheless held that the matter was sufficiently urgent to warrant consideration.
On the issue of alleged disputes of fact, the court rejected Lerato’s argument, finding that there was no real or material disagreement between the parties regarding the applicant’s reinstatement status.
The court also dismissed the claim, holding that Lerato had not suffered any prejudice arising from representations allegedly made by the applicant in earlier proceedings.
In determining whether to grant a stay of execution, the court considered the potential impact of immediate enforcement of the December judgment.
Justice Moncho found that failure to stay the order could render the applicant’s intended appeal null, particularly if the position in dispute were filled before the appeal is heard.
The court further held that the applicant had demonstrated reasonable prospects of success on appeal, noting that the issue of whether the court should have taken judicial notice of a prior judgment was arguable.
As a result, the court granted the stay and interdicted the respondents from implementing the judgment pending the outcome of the application for leave to appeal.
Meanwhile, still in the same judgment, the court dismissed multiple preliminary objections raised by the first respondent in an urgent application concerning the disputed position of Kgosi of Gootau.
In the ruling, Justice Moncho rejected arguments relating to urgency, alleged disputes of fact, in proceedings brought by Maele Morena Maele.
The preliminary points came from Maele’s urgent application seeking to stay the execution of that judgment pending an appeal.
Lerato opposed the application and raised several points in limine.
On urgency, it was argued that the applicant had failed to explicitly set out the circumstances rendering the matter urgent and had not demonstrated that he would be denied substantial redress in due course.
The respondent further contended that the applicant had created his own urgency by pursuing parallel proceedings in different courts.
In its analysis, the court reaffirmed that urgency under Order 12 Rule 12(2) requires an applicant to satisfy a two-stage test: to clearly state the circumstances giving rise to urgency and to explain why substantial redress cannot be obtained later.
The court found that while the applicant had acted promptly by filing the application within six days of the judgment, he had not fully satisfied the second requirement.
Despite this, the court held that the matter was sufficiently urgent to proceed, citing the immediate enforceability of the December judgment and the potential impact on the applicant’s rights.
The first respondent also argued that the application was defective due to material disputes of fact, particularly regarding whether the applicant had been reinstated as Kgosi.
The court rejected this argument, finding that both parties were in agreement that the applicant had not yet been reinstated and that no genuine dispute existed requiring oral evidence.
On the issue of the claim, Lerato contended that the applicant had previously argued that related proceedings were distinct and should not now be allowed to rely on them.
The court held that a claim by representation requires proof that a party relied on a representation to their detriment.
Justice Moncho found no evidence that the first respondent had suffered prejudice as a result of any such representation and dismissed the argument.
The court further addressed submissions regarding alternative remedies, including the possibility of contempt proceedings to enforce an earlier judgment delivered in June 2025.
While acknowledging that such remedies were available, the court held that they did not preclude the applicant from seeking a stay of execution in the present matter.
Having dismissed the preliminary objections, the court proceeded to consider the merits of the application, ultimately granting a stay of execution and interdicting implementation of the December judgment.
The ruling allows the applicant to pursue his intended appeal while preserving the status quo in the disputed chieftainship.
Costs of the application were awarded against the first respondent, except for wasted costs incurred on December 30, 2025, which were ordered against the third respondent, being the Attorney General.
The matter is expected to proceed to the next stage of appellate review.