Batswana United: A hard sell
Fred Morton | Tuesday November 4, 2025 14:02
The point has been made by Sechele that he had counted on support from certain Ngwaketse and Kgatla Mmanaana at Dimawe, only to watch them flee at the battle’s onset and leave him stranded. It seems important to get our facts straight if, following Dimawe, we are to believe that Sechele and his “growing number of allies launched retaliatory raids throughout the western Transvaal.” Other Tswana merafe (Rolong, Malete, Tlokwa, Ngwato and Hurutshe) are said to have “joined in the struggle.” And, further a few weeks after Dimawe, Boer emissaries were ‘suing Sechele for peace.” Let’s have a close look at these claims.
Sechele’s actions and whereabouts: In early November 1852, Marico Commandant P.E. Scholtz received word from Sechele requesting peace on condition that Sechele retain his independence and would not recognise the laws of the ZAR (Scholtz to Pretorius 9 November 1852, SA Archives, n 444/fS2). Sechele’s initiative set in motion a series of exchanges that dragged on into December, and eventually led to the return in January of his son Kgari, stolen at Dimawe. But by then Sechele had already embarked on a journey via Kuruman to raise awareness of unprovoked Boer attacks and enslavement of his people, by giving talks in Bloemfontein and Cape Town, where he hoped to embark for England to underscore the ZAR’s violations of the Sand River Convention. Discouraged from continuing by the Special Commissioner Sir George Clark in Cape Town, Sechele returned to Dithubaruba in late April 1853.
It is difficult to explain how Sechele had the means to launch retaliatory raids with or without any allies, while negotiating with Scholtz for peace in November and December 1852 and then spending the next four months away in the Cape Colony.
Tswana raiding post-Dimawe: References to Batswana cattle raiding are mentioned by the Boers on the receiving end as well as by Dr. S.M. Molema’s history of Montshiwa and help to provide a timeline and identities of the raiders. The earliest references occur in December 1852, when “bands of Barolong young men under Mokoto Montsosi, of the Ratlou clan, Segae Motlhalamme of the Tshidi clan, Tswadibe and Tlhomedi of the Makgetla clan, as well as some men of the Bahurutshe tribe under their young scion Lentswe made determined forays on the Boer farms in the Marico, Magaliesburg and Rustenburg districts in December 1852 and took hundreds of cattle.” (Montshiwa, p. 46). Molema explains that, prior to this raid, Montshiwa (Tshidi Rolong) and 1800 followers had fled west to Setlagole (40 kms southwest of present Mahikeng) to join Gontse’s Ratlou Rolong. fearing a commando attack led by Scholtz as a punishment for Montshiwa’s withholding support on the attack on Dimawe. It is not clear but doubtful that Montshiwa gave the “bands of Barolong young men” a green light. For in January, spoor of the cattle taken in the December raids were traced back to Setlagole by a commando who then attacked Montshiwa at Mosite, west of Setlagole, where Montshiwa had further retreated. The commando seized more than 5000 cattle. Among those killed at Mosite was Lentswe, one of the leaders of the December raids.
Months later Marico Veldkornet Jan Viljoen reported in April 1853 that cattle raiding in Marico had been carried out by “followers” of Senthufe, Mosielele, and Montshiwa. He noted also that “most of Mooilo’s (Moilwa) Baharotsis (Bahurutshe) had returned to their former kraal and were conducting themselves quietly; as were the Bakwena, whose chief, Sechele, had not yet returned from Cape Town” (Viljoen to Pretorius, 16 April 1853, SA Archives, R 517/53).
The anonymous report in Cape Town’s South African Commercial Advertiser (4th May 1853) of raiding in the Marico of ‘great destruction marked the conquering natives’ appears to embellish the activities reported by Viljoen a month before.
In August or September1853, Montshiwa was approached by Sentufhe on behalf of Jan Viljoen and Commandant General M.W. Pretorius to enter into a peace treaty. In October, at Moilwa’s capital Mathebe (Dinokana), Montshiwa took part in negotiations but soon thereafter led his followers into Gangwaketse with the support of Sentufe’s rival, Gaseitsiwe (Montshiwa’s agemate).
Other Tswana: According to their own accounts, the Malete (Lete in recent times), and Tlokwa make no mention of participating in post-Dimawe retributions. The Bamalete say that Sechele invited Mokgosi’s people to join him at Ditheyane {Ditharuba] after the battle of Dimawe but, apart from recalling that some Boers killed two of his people gathering crops at their old Rakatana masimo, nothing is mentioned of having been part of an alliance attacking the Boers (History of the BagaMalete of Ramoutsa, 1937, pp. 41-42). The Batlokwa of Matlapeng joined Sechele at Ditheyane [Dithaburuba] and did assist him in fighting, not the Boers, but the Bangwato (History of the Batlokwa of Gaberones Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1939, p. 180). As for the Bangwato, Sekgoma had harsh words for the Boers hunters in Shoshong when word of the Dimawe battle arrived along with Sechele’s request to execute them all, including Jan Viljoen among them. But Sekgoma let them proceed on their way home. (“Jan Viljoen, the ZAR and the Kwena” South African Historical Journal, May 1997, p. 244).
IN SHORT, it becomes difficult to reconcile two known episodes of cattle raiding (December 1852 and March 1853) with the claim of a coordinated Sechele-led Pan-Batswana campaign of retaliation, not to mention that such events occurred when Sechele was absent. And, as noted above, the Tshidi and Ratlou Rolong were trying to put distance between themselves and the Boers rather than invade the Marico; that the Ngwaketse were divided between the followers of Gaseitsiwe and Sentufe; and the latter had by August 1853, a year after Dimawe become what Molema termed a ‘vassal’ of the Boers and was being used to lure Montshiwa into peace negotiations.
What can be demonstrated regarding the downstream effects of Dimawe is that for several years after that battle, the Marico Boers dreaded that Sechele might attack them and trafficked in rumours that made Sechele the perpetrator of alleged atrocities in order to spur commando attacks on Bakwena. On two occasions, commando preparations were underway, only to be called off when such persons as Jan Viljoen vouched for Sechele and persuaded Pretoria to calm down. Diplomatic efforts to avoid conflict continued and led to such initiatives on Sechele’s part of requesting Jan Viljoen to approach Pretoria for allowing missionaries to come among the Bakwena, leading to the arrival of the Hermannsburg Lutherans in 1857,
Fred invites your comments at fred.morton84@gmail.com.
*Fred Morton is a retired professor of History (UBS/UB 1976-1987, UB 2009-2020) and Honorary Secretary of The Botswana Society. His book Cattle People: The Tswana (2024) is published by The Botswana Society. His articles on Tswana history can be accessed on https://ub-bw.academia.edu/FredMorton