Yes, Sechele united Batswana to defeat the Transvaal Boers in 1852-53
Jeff Ramsay | Monday October 27, 2025 15:19
The above passage from James Chapman’s journal captures the predicament facing the Transvaal Boers in the Madikwe region on November 6, 1852, just sixty-eight days after the bloody standoff at Dimawe [Travels in the Interior of Africa, p. 84]. It further dovetails with numerous other accounts from the period, including Sekwena accounts, such as those found in the private papers of W.C. Willoughby and Isaac Schapera, which speak of Sechele’s post Dimawe resort to “ka bonokwane” tactics against the Boers.
At Dimawe, a Boer commando of over 1000 men, including indigenous auxiliaries, failed to overcome Sechele’s defenders in a daylong battle. In the aftermath of that battle, and his subsequent failure in a skirmish against Senthufe’s Bangwaketse at Kgwakgwe Hill, Kanye, the Boer Commandant-General Piet Scholtz was forced to disband the commando. As he acknowledged a dispatch to his superior, Andries Pretorius, dated September 12, 1852:
'I must regretfully inform you that I have been obliged to disband the commando, owing partly to the weakness of horse and oxen and partly to opposition among the men, who would not stay on any longer...If God spares me and grants peace, I hope to give Your Honour my full report in person. Here, I cannot mention half the matters that will appear in it.
'I also had an attack upon Senthufe, but there was no time to do it properly. Moreover, I greatly fear, since I cannot keep the commando [intact] to accomplish anything, that the Marico district will be unsafe. This will compel me to remain with groups pending further developments.
“I think of letting Mahura come with Commandant J. Jacobs in order to help me, because things have not worked out to my liking. I have further taken the liberty of keeping the metal cannon here. I hope Your Honour will not hold this against me.
“If the Lord wills, I hope to appear with my report before Your Honour at a meeting of the Raad [State Assembly]. May God remain our shield and our rock to all eternity. I give everything into the hands of the Lord, who does wonders to all eternity.”
The above passages give insight into the Boer Commandant's frustration in the wake of the battle. While the original copy of Scholtz’s dispatch can be found in the South African Archives at Pretoria, it has otherwise been long available to this author and others [in its original Dutch] as part of the six-volume Suid-Afrikaanse Argiefstukke, Transvaal (1844-1866). Additional relevant archival collections, published by the Union of South Africa government between 1937 and 1950, include Transvaalse Argiefstukke (1850-53) and Voortrekker Argiefstukke (1829-1849).
As it was, Scholtz's words proved prophetic as Sechele and his growing number of allies launched retaliatory raids throughout the western Transvaal lasting into the early months of 1853. As the May 14, 1853 edition of the South African Commercial Advertiser reported:
“The natives had united in a strong body, followed up the retreating force of Boers, and fallen upon the farmers in the Mirique district (through which the commando retreated), and every one of these has been obliged to fall back with the commando upon the Mooi River. Great destruction, of course, marked the progress of the conquering natives. Every homestead has been burned, and standing corn ripe for sickle, together with vineyards and gardens, which were then in full bloom, have been entirely destroyed.'
Who were these “conquering natives”? While it is true that the Scholtz’s commando was resisted at Dimawe by Bakwena, Bakaa, Bangwaketse, Bakgatla bagaMmanaana, and Bahurutshe deserters, in the months that followed, other merafe, notably including Barolong, Balete, Batlokwa, Bangwato, and additional Bahurutshe, joined the struggle.
By November 1852, Boer emissaries were arriving at Dithubaruba, suing Sechele for peace. There they were met by the Mokwena’s demand for the return of children captured by the Boers during their campaign into Botswana. How many children were taken? In the immediate aftermath of the battle, multiple accounts by Sechele, Chapman, and various missionaries in the region reported figures of between 200 and 300. Many subsequently escaped, in some cases thanks to the bravery of their mothers, who had followed the retreating Boers. In this respect, Livingstone compiled a list of the Bakwena missing, which, as of January 1853, had been reduced to 124 (68 boys and 56 girls). A copy of his final list can be found at the Livingstone Museum in Blantyre, Scotland.
Given the above evidence, Sechele’s April 21, 1853 statement as transcribed by Sam Edwards in Cape Town that “The boers took, I think, 1000 children from my town, 200 women,” as well as his January 1853 claim to the British Resident Commissioner at Bloemfontein of 400 children and 200 women being carried into captivity, has been understood at the time and since as an exaggeration aimed at mobilizing anti-slavery sentiment in Britain against the Sand River Convention, which had aligned the Cape Colony government with the Transvaal Boers.
The Batswana-Boer War of 1852-53 was undoubtedly a pivotal event in Botswana's subsequent development as a nation-state. The legacy of the war, of which the well-documented battle of Dimawe was a critical opening event, has left a living legacy in the demographics of South-eastern Botswana. Our nation's eastern boundary with South Africa closely follows the post-war division between the free Batswana and the South African (Transvaal) Boer Republic, as can be seen in various maps predating the 1885 imposition of the British Protectorate.
As with any historical event, there is ample room for differing interpretations about the 1852-53 conflict. There have been a variety of perspectives since the 1855 publication of W.C. Holden's somewhat misleadingly titled History of the Colony of Natal. However, any revision should be based on the wealth of primary evidence available to Scholars and the general public, from Batswana, Boers, and others, about the conflict. In conclusion, one is left with the following 1892 assessment by the Rev. Roger Price, as part of his published obituary of the great Mokwena:
'It was also about this time that the Transvaal Boers began to bring themselves into hostile contact with the native tribes on their borders. Sechele was attacked by them, but not conquered. Indeed, he retaliated upon the Boers so successfully; the fainthearted native chiefs living on the Boer border came with their tribes and placed themselves under Sechele. He now encouraged English traders to come into the country, and he, and the tribes under him, possessed themselves of guns and ammunition and horses, and became formidable opponents of Boer aggression.'