Bunkum and Bugaboos: Boers, Sechele and Dimawe
Fred Morton | Thursday October 23, 2025 06:00
Every country loves a good story, one that revs up praise of their virtuous (and brave!) citizens past and present and feeds the image that its people together are steeped in a history of cooperation, especially when the ‘chips are down’. I grew up in the US fed on such nonsense and it took some time to shake off the stuff intended to make me feel good and proud as an American and begin to see things for what they were (and continue to be!)
So when I watch accounts such as the above delivered on TikTok to a young, gullible audience (reminding me of my early self), I am naturally irked after having spent lots of years studying Botswana’s past, to witness this sort of bunkum pile up in our history-starved nation. For now I am grateful for the chance to publish here what I consider to be a more truthful version of Dimawe, and to offer evidence readers are unaccustomed to face. I do expect some pushback from devotees of grandiose tales of the past. Heroes perched atop pedestals are hard to bring to earth.
There are too many errors in the Growthwellpodcast quoted above to tackle here, but I want to take up two that often appear elsewhere as ‘common knowledge’: (1) the Boers wanted to occupy Botswana and (2) Sechele led a coalition that ‘repelled’ the Boers and saved Botswana.
Boers bent on occupation. Those familiar with the early history of the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek, as it was recognised just months prior to Dimawe, know it as a thinly-populated, dispute-riven, collection of mostly illiterate farmers concentrated around Pochefstroom, in the Magaliesberg area, in outlying pockets in Soutpansberg and Lydenburg, and loosely governed by a cash-strapped Volksraad. Its leaders liked to proclaim they were entitled to rule over the ‘natives’, citing as their entitlement their alleged defeat of Mzilikazi (not true, the Zulu impis did the deed) along with a grant from the English. But the reality was one of weakness. They had the guns and horses to intimidate but lacked the population and institutions to govern, much less expand. The ‘Rustenburg District’ on paper (1851) had in its western areas but a few scattered farmsteads in the Swartruggens and Klein Marico. In the latter part as of 1852 only seven farms were occupied near what years later became Zeerust (1872). The area to the north, all the way to the Dwarsberg was occupied not by Boers but in places by Batswana, including Sechele’s Bakwena, who built their capital at Chonoane, where David Livingstone made his appearance and before they relocated to Kolobeng in 1847. Insofar as white settlement, the land north of Zeerust was not effectively occupied until the 20th century, while there the likes of Tlokwa, Tlhako, Lete, and Hurutshe groups took up residence.
So, given that the Boers were slow to control, much less occupy, territories adjoining Botswana, the question still arises as to why a large Boer commando showed up at Dimawe in August 1852? The answer lies in the pattern of ZAR commando activities in the 1850s and 1860s. As has been documented, Boers raided Africans on its borders on a routine basis, ostensibly to rattle these communities perceived as threats, but invariably to rustle their stock and round up children (as ‘orphans’). Beginning with the raid on the Thembu in 1851, commandoes attacked the Kwena and the Pedi in1852, Langa and Kekana in 1853, Letwaba in 1855, Ramabulana in 1856, Langa and Tlhaping in 1857, and so on until as late as 1868, when commandoes raided the Langa and Rolong. In the process, thousands of children were snared and inboekt ‘indentured’, a euphemism for enslavement. [Eldredge and Morton, eds, Slavery in South Africa: Captive Labor on the Dutch Frontier, 1994, see table 10.1]
The attack on Dimawe was typical. As reported by Sechele himself,
“The boers took, I think, one thousand children from my town, two hundred women, burnt my town, took all the things belonging to the English, which had been left in my charge, most of the cattle, sheep, and goats, belonging to myself and people. Eighty-nine of my men fell in the fight.” [Sechele statement, April 1853]
Molehabangwe Mebalwe, LMS evangelist present at the battle, went on record:
“During and after the battle: Many women and children were abducted from the Bakuenas. The young children were put in bags hanging from the sides of the horses; the head alone was free. As for the women who were breastfeeding, their children were taken from them to give to others, so that, if they were to escape, their children at least would remain in the power of the Boers.” [as recorded at Motito mission station, October 1, 1852]
Boer mounts arriving at Dimawe with empty sacks astride tell us all we need to know. The ZAR official accounts give what they regarded as legitimate causes, such as wanting to arrest Mosielele for alleged misdeeds and being provoked by a trash-talking Sechele, but they conveniently omit the human plunder. For good reason. Seven months prior to Dimawe, the Boers had signed the Sand River Convention, in which the English agreed to recognize the ZAR’s independence on condition the Boers outlaw slavery.
Sechele led a coalition that repelled the Boers. The plaque at the Livingstone Kolobeng Memorial site mounted by the National Museum, claims that when the Boers arrived at Dimawe “they found mobilized against them Bangwaketse, Bangwato, Bakaa, Balete, Barolong, Bakgatla gagaMmanaana, Bahurutshe and Batlokwa altogether about 3000 under Kgosi Sechele leadership.”
Sechele, again our star witness, recounts summoning assistance in anticipation of the Scholz commando.
“Moselele [Mosielele], chief of the Bakhatla, came to my place, he said, he was flying from the boers who were coming in a large body to attack us. I told him I was glad he had come to me, we could now fight together, as I also was determined not to become a slave. I also called upon Senthue [Senthufe, son of Sebego and Segotsane [Segotshane, son of Makaba II] [of the two Bangwaketse factions] to join me that we might be able to make a stand against the boers. They each sent a number of men, and these I supplied with powder and lead.”
Sechele mentions no others in support. (The Kaa, then living under Sechele, claim to have joined in the fight, and Sechele may have included these subjects as ‘my people.’ Mokgosi’s Lete and Matlapeng’s Tlokwa joined Sechele at Dithejwane after Dimawe.)
However, when the musket balls began to fly on August 31st, whoever had Sechele’s back quickly made themselves scarce. As Sechele stated “my people tried to fight, but they could not fight with boers. The tribes whom I had called to my assistance fled at the first fire. I was surrounded on a hill, with only a few men.” David Livingstone, writing from Kuruman in early October, after reading Sechele’s letters describing the battle: “The Bakhatla and Wanketse never fired a shot.’ Mebalwe: “The Bakhatlas fled as the Boers approached.”
If Sechele’s supporters exceeded his own recall, one looks forward to the evidence. Some writing claims a combined Sechele force invaded the Transvaal all the way to Pretoria in retaliation and frightening the pants off the Boers, but the only recoil I have come across is the cattle raiding carried out by the Ngwaketse and Rolong among the few farmers in the Zeerust area, who were upset with the Rustenburgers whose Dimawe commando left them exposed to Tswana rustlers. Especially miffed was Marico veldkornet Jan Viljoen, who had developed cordial relations with Sechele and was absent when the attack took place.
Final thoughts. The sins of Boers deserve exposure, but the Boers as a constant menace have become the standard horse to beat for lazy storytellers. You can hear the ‘Boer threat’ invoked in public and private historical accounts and by salaried authorities entertaining tourists at the foot of the Three Chiefs monument. The Boer bugaboo, all the more salient since 1948, has served not to reveal the past so much as to avert attention from the major inroads made by white English South Africans, who implanted racial segregation in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, along with land alienation, military conscription, and mining labour and who tried to stamp out Ruth and Seretse’s marriage. I refer to the “British” (and their Queen) who you can still hear some say “protected” even “saved” Batswana from the Boers.
*Fred Morton is a retired professor of History (UBS/UB 1976-1987, UB 2009-2020) and Honorary Secretary of The Botswana Society. His book Cattle People: The Tswana (2024) is published by The Botswana Society. His articles on Tswana history can be accessed on https://ub-bw.academia.edu/FredMorton