Inside Boko’s struggle to dismantle Botswana’s deep state
Lewanika Timothy | Monday July 7, 2025 06:00
In political theorem, the deep state refers to a sect of unelected officials that run the government and dictate policy behind the scenes. In this case, the deep state refers to the entrenched, unelected machinery of government that continues to exercise significant power and influence regardless of which political party is in office.
President Duma Boko’s recent words suggest that the distinction between being in power and controlling the public sector is not imaginary. In multiple public addresses to accounting officers, parastatal heads, and government executives, Boko has repeatedly expressed concern that his administration’s vision is being stalled by the very machinery tasked with executing it.
Boko has also been consistent in accusing the public sector of “ingrained habits” and calling for a “bold break from the past”. The President has also emphasised the need for a performance-driven, ethical, and responsive public service, while reinforcing Vice President cum Finance Minister Ndaba Gaolathe’s role in driving a coherent economic rescue plan.
Despite these statements, bureaucratically, it will take time for change to trickle in, especially at the top of the civil service and within state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Former politics and administrative studies lecturer at the University of Botswana, Adam Mfundisi, is among those raising alarm against this trend, arguing that while the UDC may have won political office, it has not yet seized administrative power. He contends that the public service, especially its upper ranks, are not politically neutral, but instead a powerful and entrenched network shaped by decades of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) patronage.
“The UDC has gained political power but has yet to attain bureaucratic or administrative power. The public service is a powerful body that shakes and moves governmental power. It matters more than political institutions because it possesses critical mass, monopolises data and information, has wider discretionary powers, has a near monopoly over implementation of public policy, and comprises of the cream of society', said Mfundisi shared
Mfundisi's thoughts are that the public sector head honchos can undermine a government if not transformed. He further notes that the BDP regime, under former president Mokgweetsi Masisi, took political appointments to their most blatant level—installing loyalists in senior positions without subtlety or concern for merit, something which he says can block the success of the UDC regime
These claims point to a broader challenge for the UDC, how to implement a transformative agenda with policy implementers who have supervised a government with completely different ideals to those of the UDC government.
Boko’s government has made some moves to signal change, initiating forensic audits into past procurement, freezing or reviewing 70 infrastructure projects, and planning reforms in procurement, but none of these actions directly change the leadership landscape of the civil service or the parastatals. And therein lies the concern for some quarters in the political sphere whether government can change policy direction when those expected to implement it are not aligned with that vision?
Calls have grown for Boko to bring in “new spanners”—a metaphor for a new generation of administrators, planners, and thinkers who can reflect the UDC’s political values and implement its agenda without legacy resistance. Supporters of this view argue that relying on BDP-era administrators to build a “new Botswana” is like pouring new wine into old wine skins, as the biblical manuscripts suggest.
But the counterargument is not merely political, it’s financial.
With over 76% of the 2025–2026 national budget consumed by recurrent expenditure, primarily salaries and operational costs, the fiscal space to carry out a bureaucratic overhaul is constrained. Labour laws, pensions, and long-standing contracts make mass firings legally complex and politically dangerous.
Retrenchments would require either severance packages or reassignments, both of which could place further stress on the government’s already stretched balance sheet. The administration is already under pressure to avoid social instability, maintain service continuity, and stabilize its financial position. These realities pose tough questions about how far and how fast the UDC can move in reshaping the state’s human architecture.
Other concerns over Botswana’s public sector size have also loomed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in an array of studies and reports over the years on the Botswana economy, has pointed out the need to slash the public wage bill to rebase it in accordance with levels manageable by a growing economy like Botswana. In its 2024 article on Botswana, the IMF revealed that the country’s fiscal buffers and declining revenue were huge push factors for the government to act on the unsustainable wage bill.
Observers also question whether the UDC has the technical and political experience required to manage such a sensitive transition. While the party came to power on a promise of social justice, anti-corruption, and reform, it lacks deep roots in the bureaucratic terrain. The danger is that the civil service could become a guerrilla obstacle, not in rebellion, but in delayed decisions, and institutional inertia. If that happens, the UDC’s ability to deliver on its electoral mandate could be fatally compromised.
Efforts to reassert control remain ongoing. The UDC leadership has indicated that more accountability is coming, and that performance contracts, leadership changes, and new appointments are being considered. There have been moves to audit parastatals and establish stricter oversight, particularly in procurement and service delivery.
The issue goes beyond loyalty; it cuts to the heart of how Botswana’s state is structured. The civil service has, over time, grown into an institution that views itself as the custodian of stability and continuity, not just the executor of political will. That culture, rooted in decades of uninterrupted BDP rule, is not easily shaken.
Changing it will require more than public speeches or performance reviews; it requires institutional transformation.
The hard questions remain. Can a new Botswana be built by the hands that upheld the old one? Does the budget allow for re-engineering the civil service without triggering economic instability? Can the UDC assert control without destroying the very institutions it needs to stay functional?