Pros, cons of coalition governments

Ryder Gabathuse | Tuesday February 11, 2025 10:35

For nearly six decades, weaker opposition coalitions wriggled to oust the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) from power. It was an exercise that proved arduous with all efforts simply pitiful and ludicrous. The opposition was not given even the slightest chance and its posture depicted a body of frustrated lot fighting for elusive change. Efforts to unite opposition parties for the purpose of winning the elections were trialled many decades ago. The Botswana Progressive Union (BPU), Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) and Botswana National Front (BNF) tried a pre-election coalition styled under the guise of Peoples Progressive Front (PPF), following a meeting held in Francistown in 1994. The Botswana Independence Party (BIP), which was part of the talks, would pull out of a possible coalition before the talks could even commence in earnest. Another key opposition political formation, Botswana Congress Party (BCP) would later merge with the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM), (the latter is a party composed of Botswana Independence Party (BIP), Botswana Action Party, and Botswana Freedom Party in a merger that ultimately yielded one solid party going into the 2009 General Election. This was also an attempt to solidify the BCP. This development came after the BNF had pulled out of the arrangement (BAM) at the 2004 polls. Some section of the BPP leadership would also pull out pouring scorn on the viability of a coalition post the 2004 polls. The BCP was birthed in Palapye in 1998 as a splinter party from the BNF following a tumultuous conference.

On a number of occasions, the BCP abandoned coalition talks with the BNF and preferred a standalone due to common issues of mistrust and generally governance issues. At some stage, the BCP had also had a working relationship with the Alliance for Progressives (AP), which never lasted. The emergence of the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), which was founded in 2012, faced challenges of the seemingly unreceptive political market, as it appeared it would not be a viable project. Every elections year since it was formed, the UDC project was tested twice before it eventually won the elections in 2024. It was post the 2019 General Election that the UDC went to court challenging the results of the polls citing massive irregularities, unfortunately, the courts never progressed the cases to the merits of the opposition cases.



This however, never discouraged the Duma Boko-led UDC. Even when the UDC strategic partner, BCP bolted out, Boko remained hopeful of victory and he would later rope in another of a returnee partner in the Alliance for Progressives (AP). With this gloomy background, it is not surprising that a University of Botswana (UB) academic, Professor Zibani Maundeni, is on record having raised alarm about the viability of coalition governments in Botswana and elsewhere in Africa. Maundeni authored an academic paper in the past stating that Botswana has not generated sufficient conditions for the establishment of election-winning coalitions. In his research paper entitled, ‘Political Instability, Electoral Violence, and Coalition Governments in Africa: The Basis for Successful Liberal Politics and the Failure of Coalitions in Botswana’, Maundeni has said attempts by opposition parties to institutionalise their own cooperation through coalitions for winning elections have been problematic with visible and costly failures. “Coalitions between Botswana opposition political parties have also been attempted but either collapsed or failed to win elections,” emphasised Maundeni.

The UDC (BNF and BPP)) were forced to reconstitute and readmitted former ally ,the AP, and the results catapulted them to the seat of power in the 2024 General Election thus breaking all past barriers. Although it remains unclear, the UDC would later embrace the Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF) in another loose ally post the General Election. The UDC coalition government is facing a stern test to its government. Symbolically, the first 100 days are considered a benchmark to measure the early success of a President and his/her team. In the neighbouring South Africa, upon realising that its strength has weakened, the 30-year ruling African National Congress (ANC), which had performed badly in the 2024 General Election falling from 57% to 40% in the historic election, looked somewhere to stabilise a weakened ANC government. The ANC was forced to join hands with other nine political parties to form a 10-party coalition government. From across the spectrum, parties came together to chart a new path forward for the RSA in the form of Government of National Unity (GNU). There is debate that South Africa is at a critical juncture. The country’s GNU is internally divided, “but subject to healthy debate.” Beyond ironing out matters of disagreement on basic education, national health and land redistribution, the SA coalition is going to have to tackle the arguably “deeper issue of rebuilding confidence in the political system.” William Gumede, an Associate Professor, School of Governance at the University of the Witwatersrand and executive chairperson of Democracy Works Foundation, has written that fears that coalitions will bring instability, paralysis, and service delivery failures, are misplaced, as coalition governments, for South Africa, one of the most diverse nations on earth, are more fit for purpose than dominant-party governments. To this best-selling author, coalition governance is particularly beneficial in ethnically, regionally, religiously, politically diverse and low-trust societies. “In such diverse countries as in the case of South Africa, governing parties must be inclusive of all political, ethnic, language, regional and local differences. Often, coalition governance does this well than monopoly parties,” he has explained.

In Malawi, Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) ousted Peter Mutharika, which along with several opposition parties (nine-party alliance) formed a coalition, the Tonse Alliance. In Mauritius, Alliance du Changement (Alliance of Change) won the election in 2024 with a landslide, winning all but one of the country’s 21 constituencies. The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) reports that cases of coalition collapse abound in Mauritius. It reports that invariably it is due to deep personal rivalries and differences that cannot be reconciled and incompatible styles of managing the affairs of the country, amongst others. “As there is no formal rule and agreement on coalition government, problems arise once the parties are in power and they become unhappy with the operation and the effectiveness of power sharing. The junior partner may feel that it is not getting a fair share of the benefits, especially in terms of jobs for its party followers,” reports EISA. Adam Mfundisi, University of Botswana (UB) lecturer in politics and administrative studies talks to Mmegi about the strength of the UDC coalition government by far.

He cites their tolerance to divergent views, opinions, and perspectives on the current economic, social and political space is worrisome. He describes coalition politics as a tall order particularly where it is done pre-election rather than post it. In addition, he says, the UDC coalition is not anchored on any bidding coalition agreement (if at all there is). His rating of the UDC government by far is that, “So far so good with the UDC as there are no visible cracks despite simmering discontent in some coalition partners who feel they have been left out of the spoils of power.” His observation is that the UDC was not per se a winning coalition in real sense.



He feels that voters suddenly decided to change government and the UDC happened to be a better alternative. As for the assertion that Africa is yet to establish conditions for elections-winning coalitions, Mfundisi says it still stands. This he insists is true for post-election arrangements rather than pre-election ones. “Moreover, it is true that one party dominance of a coalition arrangement is more viable than two equally strong contenders. In addition, the fewer are political parties, the more stable it is.” History, he says, will judge the UDC coalition's viability and sustainability after the five-year rule. The public policy analyst is worried about what he calls the snail-paced changes on many fronts including the public service. “Many people were and are dissatisfied with the delivery of the public service. They were eking for drastic and bold changes in all spheres of public life. They did not expect political changes devoid of bureaucratic transformation,” he says.

He feels some citizens are becoming sceptical as well as cynical of the changes to date. In terms of solidness and coherence in the UDC coalition, he leaves that to time to tell. Most of the UDC political leadership according to Mfundisi “lacks government knowledge, experience, skill, expertise, and wisdom. They are, therefore, reliant on the bureaucrats appointed by former president Mokgweetsi Masisi, who are partly blamed for the mess that befell Botswana.” Another academic, UB political scientist, Dr Leonard Sesa acknowledged that since the formation of the UDC coalition government on October 30, 2024, its stability has been a topic of both public and political debate. He also concedes that coalition governments, by nature, require strong internal cohesion, compromise, and a clear governing framework to ensure functionality.

The UDC’s experience so far has revealed both strengths and challenges that could determine its long-term viability.

He cites key strengths of the UDC amongst others as:- * Unified opposition against the ruling party: The coalition’s ability to consolidate opposition forces under one umbrella has strengthened democratic competition and provided an alternative governance model for Botswana. * Policy coordination and governance agenda: Early indications suggest that the coalition partners have managed to align on key policy areas, particularly on economic recovery, youth employment, and social welfare programmes. * Public support and political will: Having secured electoral legitimacy, the coalition has demonstrated a commitment to governance, balancing political interests while engaging citizens on national priorities.

Challenges facing the coalition

* Internal divisions and power struggles: Coalitions often struggle with internal party dynamics, and the UDC is no exception. Differences in ideology, leadership ambitions, and resource allocation may pose a threat to stability. * Policy implementation delays: While coalition partners may agree on broad goals, differences in execution strategies can result in policy gridlocks, slowing government performance. * External pressures and opposition manoeuvres: The ruling party and other political actors will likely exploit coalition weaknesses, making governance a constant battle for legitimacy and control. Sesa posits that the stability of the UDC coalition will depend on its ability to manage internal disagreements, maintain policy focus, and deliver tangible results. Effective conflict resolution mechanisms, a strong governance structure, and clear leadership will be critical in ensuring that the coalition does not collapse under its own weight. While the UDC has survived its first months in office, the real test, he says, will be its ability to maintain unity, implement reforms, and sustain public confidence in the long run. “The coming months will determine whether the coalition is a viable long-term government or a short-lived political experiment,” he concluded.