Understanding farmer- herder conflict in Africa

Solly Rakgomo | Monday August 14, 2023 06:00

The rise of farmer-herder conflict in Africa is more pernicious than fatality figures alone, however, since it is often amplified by the emotionally potent issues of ethnicity, religion, culture, and land. Militant Islamist groups in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso have instrumentalised such divisions to inflame grievances, thereby driving recruitment. Similarly, rebel groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) have positioned themselves as defenders of pastoralist interests.

Ironically, most livestock herders have no association with extremist groups and are often victims of their actions. Nonetheless, once the genie of inter-communal conflict is unleashed, passions take over. Attacks become deadlier, expulsions more frequent, and reprisals extend to communities not immediately linked to the initial flashpoint. The stakes quickly shift from questions over resource access or local politics to deep-seated notions of identity. Entire communities are labelled bandits, insurgents, or terrorists. Although farmers and pastoralists have held competitive relations for centuries, the current climate of violence is unprecedented in modern times. The relationship between manageable farmer-herder disputes and spirals of inter-communal violence is complex. Nonetheless, positive lessons exist even where violence has been most concentrated.

Drivers and Triggers of

Farmer-Herder ViolenceThe surge in farmer-herder violence in Africa has been concentrated in Nigeria, along the central Mali and northern Burkina Faso corridor, and parts of the CAR . The fact that there are geographic hotspots underscores the importance of understanding the local and regional factors that have contributed to violent outcomes. It also highlights that most farmer-herder disputes are resolved amicably. The following is a review of some of these conflict drivers.

Growing land pressure: The most common trigger of farmer-herder conflict is crop damage caused by passing livestock. Although well-established local conventions dictate how such conflicts should be resolved, this process can break down. As the region’s rural population has grown dramatically, many herders have seen their grazing lands put into cultivation making their livelihoods more challenging. According to a recent research by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, the rural population in the Sudano-Sahelian zone of West and Central Africa has grown by more than 40% over the past 20 years, reaching more than 281 million people. Over the past four decades, cropland has doubled in area reaching nearly 25% of the total land surface, a trend that scientists project to accelerate alongside population growth.

Pastoral land scarcity pushes herders into protected areas, such as national parks and classified forests, and increases their dependence on nominally illicit practices such as tree branch lopping. Security and forestry agents responsible for enforcing these regulations are perceived as disproportionately targeting pastoralists in exacting fines and even committing violent abuses. Likewise, counterinsurgency campaigns in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria have worsened inter-communal relationships as security forces have at times acted against pastoralist communities seen to be supportive of violent extremist groups.

Dispossession: The encroachment of cultivated land into grazing areas deepens pastoralists’ grievances that their rights to resources be it land, water, wood, or forage are weaker than those of farmers and consequently have been ignored. Pastoralists typically only need seasonal access to resources, so their land rights are often treated as secondary to those of farmers. Similarly, land use decisions are often made when pastoralists are not present, effectively excluding them from the process. Even where laws aim to protect pastoral resource rights, they tend to go unheeded at the local level. For example, Joseph Seegle states that Benin has a strict law prohibiting cultivation within livestock corridors, but the laws are frequently disregarded because the corridors pass through traditional farming lands.

In some contexts, the lack of access to land has led young people to lose faith in their community elders who appear unable to protect their resource interests or are involved in land deals themselves. In Nigeria, grazing reserves and other lands under pastoral community control have been the target of elite land acquisition. Rural land deals generate significant exchanges of wealth and serve as rewards within patronage networks as national and state actors seek political support. The consequent intra-community tensions can contribute to armed group recruitment as youth seek emancipation and an autonomous livelihood. Paradoxically, the presence of armed groups further reduces the availability of pastoral land as herders are expelled or prohibited from key areas like protected forests, which armed groups occupy.

Theft: Livestock is the most valuable resource across many rural communities and is a common target of theft. Increased frequency and magnitude of livestock theft is both a cause and effect of violent conflict. Armed groups use stolen cattle to fund their activities. The risk of theft causes herders to arm themselves to protect their animals. The increased demand for arms enriches criminal syndicates involved in arms trafficking. All these factors raise the risk of violent altercation. Meanwhile, aggrieved groups may perceive stealing livestock from communities with which they have been in conflict as a form of justice. This has led to a rapid expansion in the number of community-based armed groups to ostensibly guard against livestock theft, though such groups can also be engaged in reprisal violence. In many Nigerian states and parts of Central Africa, “war economies” have emerged around livestock trade networks and migration routes.

Social inequalities: Recent shifts in livestock ownership in some locations from rural pastoralist communities to wealthy urban dwellers have generated perceptions that herders are representing elite interests. This has contributed to the breakdown of traditional systems of mutual dependence such as the sharing of crop residue. Conversely, this reinforces other conflict triggers such as the likelihood that a farmer will demand exorbitant fees of a herder for any damage to his crop. Similarly, a herder who has the backing of political elites may refuse to participate in dispute resolution with local farmers on the assumption that the owners of the herds hold sufficient political sway to avert accountability.

Perceptions of social inequality also affect relationships within communities where local elites, typically clan elders or household heads, possess substantial economic and social power over their subordinates. In central Mali, for example, this hierarchical community structure is codified within a neo-feudal caste system and has allegedly contributed to grievances among the youth and lower castes, which militant Islamist groups exploit to foster recruitment. Pastoralist-allied armed groups in the Central Africa Republic gained influence by protecting herders during that country’s internal conflicts, which subsequently led to a power struggle between those groups and traditional community authorities.

Conflict of interest and mistrust: Trusted dispute resolution institutions, including informal negotiations, serve as a linchpin for mitigating farmer-herder violence. If these adjudicating institutions are perceived to be subject to inducements, however, trust in the entire process is eroded.