The perils of transnational crime to the SADC region

Solly Rakgomo | Monday August 15, 2022 06:00

There are numerous criminal activities identified within the 11 states that make up the SADC region. Independently these crimes would normally be considered a matter for local authorities and not relevant to the construct of strategic development.

However, these have proved to be serious crimes that transcend to all the SADC states perpetrated by criminal syndicates that respect no sovereign borders of any of these states.

Transnational organised crime encompasses virtually all-serious profit-motivated criminal actions of an international nature where the whole SADC region is involved.

There are many criminal activities that are perpetrated by criminal syndicates in the region, which includes drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, human trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in firearms, counterfeit goods, wildlife and cultural property, and even some aspects of cyber crime.

These criminal activities threaten peace and human security, lead to human rights being violated and undermine the economic, social, cultural, political and civil development of societies within the SADC region.

The vast sums of money involved really compromise legitimate economies and have a direct impact on governance, such as through corruption and the “buying” of elections. Every year, countless lives are lost as a result of organised crime. Drug related health problems and violence, firearm deaths and the unscrupulous methods and motives of human traffickers and migrant smugglers are all part of this. Millions of victims are affected each year as a result of the activities of organised crime groups.

Despite its horrific impact, Transnational Organised Crime is still very much understudied in the SADC region. It was only in 2010 when the first annual review of organised crime in this sub-region prepared by the Pretoria-based Institute of Security Studies gave an overview of this phenomenon in the SADC region. These kinds of reviews were supposed to be repeated on a regular basis. However, due to high costs involved coupled with challenges associated with research environment, it has been very difficult to do so.

A study by Ellis and Shaw, demonstrates that in most parts of the African continent (SADC region included) are usually associated with a set of relationships, which involve senior political figures, powerful local intermediaries and professional criminals. It is common to find a wide variety of illicit or “grey” activities are going on and criminal activities vary on a spectrum from purely private to state-legitimated activities.

An example would be the alleged involvement of some high level officials in the security sector such as immigration, police, military, intelligence and others who solicit money from criminal syndicates to smuggle counterfeit goods, Small Arms and Light Weapons, drugs and other illicit products. The illegality of these products is in most cases covered up by procuring genuine official documents from senior state officials. Here, the line between the state and organised crime actors become very blurry as the state itself turns into the facilitator of a criminal activity.

It is therefore not necessarily the existence of transnational organised crime in the region itself that may pose the great challenge, but rather the intrinsic state involvement in these activities. Sadly this can have detrimental effects on how the state is seen and respected by its citizens and to what extent it can fulfill its duties and responsibilities towards them.

Most states in the SADC region are characterised by weak law enforcement and high levels of corruption. Criminal groups often expressly target the highest level of the state to facilitate illicit operations and control criminal markets. Of course as I have already stated, state involvement has different degrees and articulations as it may include the engagement of low-level officials, such as customs, migration officials or traffic police.

In the midst of these very hierarchical organisational para-military structures that have often been inherited from the colonial era, officials at the lower ends of the command chain may have some leverage.

This means that they may be able to extort a bribe independently from their supervisor. In other contexts, there may be involvement of high-level officials who give orders to lower level civil servants concerning, for example, the free passage of certain illicit products.

Shaw opines that the direction of payments/bribes and the information inside the respective institution concerning the trafficking of an illegal good can be seen as an indicator of the depth of state involvement in organised crime. If low-level state officials have leverage, can extort bribes and then share a part with their superiors, there is state involvement, without a doubt.

However, if the order to be absent from the control post at a certain time of the day comes from high up, if, for example, a superior gets a call from the ministry and then instructs lower level officials to turn a blind eye, this means state penetration by criminal actors has gotten a lot further. The manifestation can change from country to country, but may also differ concerning the commodity trafficked. In this constellation, some states in the region have become proactive agents in supply chains of organised crime.

Some of the characteristics mentioned are key to understanding the complexity of actors and activities in the region as well as the impact that public policies and measures taken against it can have. It is interesting to note that state involvement in organised crime is not confined to so-called ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states. It is also visible in middle income states in the region, such as South Africa and Botswana, suggesting that it is not necessarily linked to general poverty levels but also has something to do with post-colonial state structures and the way connections were formed between new governments in the post-independence era, (neo-) colonial political and economic interests as well as the increasingly globalised private sector.

Members of the SADC bloc should understand that when organised crime becomes deeply entrenched in their societies especially when aided by the corrupt political elite and public officials, it has the potential of not only destabilising member countries but also the entire region thus undermining development at large.

Its impact on both national and regional security can become so adverse to the level where transnational criminal organisations may end up controlling socio-economic and political institutions thereby increasing the levels of corruption extortion, racketeering and violence, as well as a range of other more sophisticated crimes at the local level.

Violent gangs can also turn inner cities into dangerous areas and put citizens’ lives at risk. So it is against this background that as the SADC bloc navigates its way into findings ways to make a meaningful participation in the African Continental Free Trade Area, member states should understand that it is equally important to devise strong institutional frameworks that can go a long way in eliminating transnational crime as it has a huge potential to impede socio-economic and political development in the whole region leading in untold suffering to millions of people in the region.