The growing power of security institutions
The Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS) was established, in the words of the enabling act of 2006, to combat 'any foreign influenced activity' and 'subversive activities from the country's detractors'. Its officers could use Þrearms when 'necessary and reasonably justifiable'. They had wide powers of arrest, seizure and detention without warrant. Their powers were undefined and threatening - Section 36, for example, provided that 'when a person is guilty of an offence for which no specific penalty is provided . . . that person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years' (and, as it recently emerged, agents possessed immunity when operating). Its personnel are appointed on terms and conditions chosen by the President. It was also well funded, being initially expected to get the bulk of the P3 billion given to the Office of the President in early 2008. The existence and role of the DIS is closely identified with President Khama.

Within little more than a year, the threat to human life and lawful government represented by the DIS was apparent. One particular event, and people's reactions to it, was highly illuminating. On the evening of 13 May 2009, John Kalafatis was shot dead in a hail of bullets in a car at a shopping centre in Extension 12 of Gaborone, the country's capital. Two others were in the vehicle, which was parked adjacent to a popular bar. Little is known about John Kalafatis, other than that he was a citizen of Botswana and allegedly suspected of burglary. However, it t was quickly reported in the independent press that the killing was an execution carried out by state agents and that it was supposedly the second such shooting within a week.

For the Vice-President, Lieutenant-General Mompati Merafhe, it was a non-event. He was reported as saying that 'the integrity of this country cannot be determined by one or two shootings'.

Others saw things differently. Dumelang Saleshando, MP for Gaborone Central and information secretary for the opposition Botswana Congress Party (BCP), publicly stated that Kalafatis had been killed by the DIS and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), and that the former was in fact 'a law unto itself '. The Minister for Defence, Justice and Security, Brigadier Ramadeluka Seretse, he further noted in his letter, had recently stated in Parliament that there had been 12 shooting incidents involving police between April 1, 2008 and March 2009 in which eight people were killed.

He noted that the DIS was supposedly overseen by a Tribunal, which was actually made up of the President's 'political cronies whose loyalty [was to him]'. These may well be accurate judgements. Brigadier Seretse is first cousin to Ian Khama, and the members of the Tribunal were Isaac Seloko, a senior figure in the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), chair; Tsetsele Fantan, cousin to Khama; and Adolf Hirschfeldt, former police officer.

At the top in the DIS was the Director, Isaac Kgosi, close associate of Khama during his long years as BDF Commander when Kgosi rose to the head of the elite unit, Military Intelligence (MI), and became senior personal secretary to the Vice-President, 1998-2008.

When the prominent human rights lawyers, Dick Bayford and Duma Boko, announced that they were acting for the Kalafatis family, they alleged that neither John Kalafatis nor the other occupants of the car were armed, and that eyewitnesses' accounts indicated that the killing was done without any warning. Seretse and the Minister for Communications, Pelonomi Venson-Motoi, held a press conference on May 19, which concentrated on exonerating the President and ignored the substantive issues of May 13. In response to these events, the Law Society of Botswana accused the government of shielding Kalafatis's killers. 'Immense fear' existed in the nation, they said, which appeared to be sliding towards anarchy. Sidney Pilane, who had been Special [Legal] Adviser to President Festus Mogae, publicly accused Khama of autocracy and ruling by fear and patronage.

Pilane stated that the public was weary of 'a President who places himself at the centre of everything' and demanded that Khama establish a swift, independent, and credible investigation into all the killings of the past year, and ensure that they ceased.9

As the President's attorneys threatened to sue the Sunday Standard and the paper announced that, if this happened, they would counter-sue the President (on the assumption that he 'would have tacitly waived' his immunity), Dick Bayford expressed what he called the 'public perceptions' of President Khama: 'He is nepotistic, corrupt and misuses government resources for personal and family gain'.

As Vice-President 'he was contemptuous of Parliament', and he 'abused government property' despite repeated calls from the Ombudsman not to do so. Bayford alleges that under his presidency security agents have killed unarmed citizens and the DIS has spied on people 'because he is paranoid about being displaced as leader of the ruling party'. Further, the President 'surrounds himself with friends, relatives and sycophants as advisers'.

Information emerged in the independent press on the operations of the security agencies. These reports claimed that MI, an established unit, and the DIS often worked together in both planning and executing operations.

Peter Magosi was head of MI, having been promoted from the position of deputy under Kgosi when the latter left to set up and then direct DIS. Khama and Kgosi had drawn a lot of staff from MI, which formed the core of DIS. A report in Mmegi Online suggested that when DIS agents operated, they appeared to act under the assumption that they had been given orders to shoot.

Moreover, the subordination of the Botswana Police Service, the ostensible law enforcement agency, was standard operational procedure in security areas. When a suspect was shot and killed by the DIS, the Police Service had the task of explaining the incident to the public and protecting the DIS from scrutiny.

If such reports are correct, then testimony from the other occupants of the car, Ray Gare and Joseph Piet, indicates that such procedures appear to have been followed on May 13. They state that four soldiers arrived, with three of them shooting. Then the soldiers disappeared and 'their supervisors attended to the scene'. Bayford and Boko claimed that the police were 'actively engaged' in efforts to frustrate the gathering of evidence.

In June, President Khama withdrew his lawsuit against the Sunday Standard in a statement read on the state-owned BTv news that sought to assure the nation that he was not involved in the death of Kalafatis - but he did not speak in person then or later on the killing. Revelations continued in the press, and in mid-June Bayford and Boko announced that the Kalafatis family would launch a private prosecution against four soldiers, a sergeant and three lance-corporals, named in full in their letter to President Khama (and published in the Sunday Standard).

The basis for the action was that the named individuals, 'acting in concert . . . brought about the death of John'.The Deputy Police Commissioner, Kenny Kapinga, had informed The Standard in early June that his investigations into the killing would be completed by the end of the month and handed to the Directorate of Public Prosecution, but this did not happen. In answer to a parliamentary question that referred to the deaths of some 14 people at the hands of the security services since April 2008, Minister Seretse declared on June 30: 'I do not see the need to set up an independent inquiry as a measure to restore confidence of the public in the law enforcement agencies.' If there had been any drop in conÞdence, he said, it was due to the general increase in the rate of crime.

The ascent of General Ian Khama
During his Presidency General Khama has used the techniques and capacities of personal, militaristic rule to an exceptional degree. Such techniques appear to compensate to some degree for the narrowness of his qualifications for political leadership in a democracy. His experience is restricted to three areas alone: the military; chieftaincy and dynastic politics; and state power, briefly at the highest level. His formal education appears to have peaked at the Sandhurst Military Academy in Britain, 1972-4. His first big experience of preferment was in 1977 when his father, founding President Seretse Khama, appointed him at the age of only 24 as Brigadier in the new BDF, bypassing more experienced and better educated officers in the then Police Mobile Unit. His next career step came in April 1979 when he was installed as Kgosi Khama IV of the Bamangwato in Serowe. The third occurred swiftly in 1998, when he formally resigned as Commander of the BDF on March 31, registered as a member of the BDP, and was appointed as Minister for Presidential Affairs on April 1. The next day Khama was nominated as Vice-President, without reference to any local or national electorate.

Khama made clear where his loyalties lay, and that he moved into high political office on his own terms; that the law and political practice prevented a chief from directly entering politics was of no concern to him.

When approached by President Mogae, he declared: 'I am a Kgosi. If you want me into politics, then do not ask me to follow Bathoen's example of abdicating [my chieftaincy].' He entered government on his own conditions, and brought with him his close attendants from the BDF. He knew that the BDP, riven by factionalism, corruption scandals, and popular anger from the early 1990s, needed him more than he needed them.

As he made explicit: ' I allowed myself to be persuaded to leave [the BDF].' But 'politics does not attract me . . .

My motivation is management and administration . . . I strive for unity and welfare of the people . . .

countrywide.' Mogae acceded to his demands. In the view of an experienced ex-minister, Kgosi Khama IV came to 'wield more power than was ordinarily due to a Vice-President . . . and [acquired] privileges hitherto inconceivable.'
Corruption, factionalism and automatic succession
Growth had reached record levels in Botswana under President Ketumile Masire, and generated greed among his ruling elite. According to Magang, Masire was 'a Santa Claus' in an era in the 1980s and early 1990s of 'literally free, throwaway money'. Easy money and cronyism were the 'hallmarks of [Masire's] presidency', as the elite exploited the ministries and agencies for which they were responsible.19 Documented corruption involving Masire and other leading ministers and the imbroglio 'marked the genesis, in earnest, of cut-throat factionalism in BDP politics'. One camp opposed the introduction of anti-corruption measures, and notably included Daniel Kwelagobe and Ponatshego Kedikilwe.

The other saw that retention of power necessitated reform, and it involved Festus Mogae and Magang. But the factionalism 'festered and became malignant'. Out of a series of manoeuvres between 1995 and 1998 came the elevation of Mogae and then Khama, both non-party men, as short-term correctives.

The strategy pre-eminently involved the introduction in 1998 of automatic succession of the Vice-President, in order to place Mogae, Masire's deputy, ' beyond the clutches' of the Kwelagobe-Kedikilwe faction. But according to Magang, it was clearly 'retrograde and undemocratic' - Parliament was denied any role in the transition - and, in its second stage concerning Kgosi Khama IV, it was a throw-back to hereditary politics.

Ian Khama and state power
Apart from his declared liking for chieftaincy and the military and his aversion for politics, little is known about Ian Khama. The editor of Mmegi, Gideon Nkala, observed on the eve of his inauguration that everything about Khama was shrouded in secrecy, while for Magang he was simply 'a closed book'. President Mogae had elevated the Kgosi and worked with him closely for 10 years, but even he could not say in February 2008 how Khama would rule as President.

Two characteristics of Khama's highly personalised rule during the period 1998-2009 stand out - his reliance on edicts or directives, and decision by caprice. Indications of what was to come were provided at the end of 1998, after the passage of a new Statutory Instrument which banned the serving of alcohol in restaurants except between 12 noon and 2pm and between 6pm and 11pm, regulations which were believed to have been inßuenced by Khama. At 11 pm on New Year's Eve the measures were enforced for the first time, as police and paramilitary units swarmed into entertainment places across the country, ordering owners to stop selling liquor and arresting customers for illegal consumption.

It is apparent that Khama acted on his distaste for alcohol, and as President he moved to restrict consumption severely. He enforced a tightening of trading hours in liquor shops, and in 2008 imposed a levy of 30 percent on the price of alcohol, with no apparent thought for the effects of these measures on either sales and employment at Kgalagadi Breweries and the entertainment sector, or on interference in people's private lives.

The Vice-President gained election in the safe BDP seat of Serowe North, and when he prepared to relinquish the seat en route to the presidency - the President of Botswana holds no elected office - he declared at a rally in Serowe in September 2004 that he expected that his younger brother, Tshekedi, would inherit the electorate directly from him, neglectful of democratic norms and BDP practice of primary elections to select parliamentary candidates.

Social behaviour was further addressed by the President in March 2009, when a directive instituted strict and detailed dress codes for civil servants. Declaring that it was 'mandatory for public employees to dress in a manner that reflects credit on the Public Service', the instruction threatened punishment and job loss if employees came to work in tight skirts or pants, sleeveless tops, and clothing that showed cleavages or backs, the stomach or underwear. The measures were clearly directed more against women than men.

Arguably the state has endeavoured to extend its control over personal communications, forecasting, at the end of 2006, the installation of a high-tech surveillance network to intercept all cell-phone and electronic mail entering and leaving the country. When the system encountered technical and budgetary problems, the government fell back on the registration of all cell phones and their users. People who had not recorded their identity details by the end of 2009 were threatened with disconnection. President Khama has frequently insisted that democracy demanded discipline, and the latter is arguably his dominant concern.

While problems of alcoholism in the country remain oddly un-deÞned in his government's discourse, Khama appears convinced that moral weakness abounds. Vice-President Merafhe voiced his agreement that 'moral decay exist[ed] in society', and if people failed to heed the President's warnings they would borrow what he called 'some disciplinary measures from the military' to instill discipline.

Khama's moral concerns are, however, not what the people see as their major problems. In a sample survey involving 1,200 adults across the country, Afrobarometer found that economic problems were the primary popular concern, with unemployment at the top, and poverty second - it had risen, they noted, 'sharply and quite substantially' since 1999, and it 'continue[d] to grow'. The third issue was rising food prices. Two-thirds of respondents (67 percent) felt that the government had failed badly to tackle job creation; inßation, which had concerned 64 percent of people in 2003-5, troubled 87 percent now.

People attributed these economic problems to the prevailing state system. Respondents believed that President Khama had issued more directives than his predecessors. Popular dislike for rule by one man was strong, climbing from 86 percent in 1992 to 92 percent in 2008. Most people (89 percent) strongly disliked military rule. The survey also noted that 'perceptions on rule by the military [in Botswana]' had grown since April 2008, and people believed that 'they are making inroads into the civil service'.

Such perceptions may have stemmed from the entry of the military into government that had begun in April 1998, but increased after 1 April 2008. General Merafhe became Vice-President, the former Captain Kitso Mokaila became Minister for Environment, Wildlife and Tourism, and, as noted, Brigadier Ramadeluke took over at Justice, Defence, and Security. Under him came the BDF, the Police Service and DIS, along with the Attorney General, Public Prosecutions, and the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime - the DIS, as noted, built upon a cohort of BDF/MI personnel.

The appointment of military men reportedly cascaded downwards, with retired Lieutenant-Colonel Moakohi Modisenyane as general manager of the Central Transport Organization and Colonel Silas Motlalekgosi as head of the Prison Service. Colonel Duke Masilo was appointed as deputy senior private secretary to the President and Tefo Mokaila (brother to Kitso) became private secretary at State House. Later, retired Senior Assistant Police Commissioner, Molefhe Sejoe, was named head of BTv.

Ian Khama's presidency seems to be not only militaristic but highly personalised in its reliance on a group of trusted loyalists, often from within the family: Tshekedi Khama, brother and MP; Defence Minister Seretse, cousin; Dale Ter Haar, nephew, trained at Sandhurst, engaged in mining and resource projects; Johan Ter Haar, formerly married to Ian's sister, Jacqueline Khama, chair of the Business and Economic Advisory Council; Isaac Kgosi, DIS chief; Pelonomi Venson-Motoi, 'very close and trusted friend', Minister for Communications, in charge of the government's radio, television, and print networks with their unique nation-wide coverage; Ian Kirby, High Court judge, ex-Attorney General, conÞdante; Sheila Khama, cousin through marriage and head of De Beers Botswana; Tsetsele Fantan, relative to Ian Khama and member of the Tribunal of the DIS; the Mokaila brothers, childhood friends and BDF colleagues; Thapelo Olopeng, retired soldier, little-known Þgure with a long friendship with Khama.

President Khama's apparent reliance on close loyalists inßuences his leadership style, elevating his military and dynastic personality, and excluding others and especially established institutions and processes from the running of the country. While the government should have been operating under National Development Plan 10 by April 2009, only a draft plan had entered Parliament in July. The President had earlier directed, in an unprecedented move, that the implementation of the new Plan would be suspended for at least 12 months. While the normal planning period in Botswana was six years, NDP 10 would now span seven years.

Khama restricts his own direct communications with the people. The President has never addressed a press conference. In July 2009 he rebu_ed an invitation from the Botswana National Youth Council to participate in a face-to-face debate with other leaders in preparation for national elections in October. The BDP soon followed up his rejection with an order instructing the Youth Council to stop its programme of debates immediately.

Brought into politics to restore the BDP and terminate factionalism, Khama's failings were visible through mid-2009. His new rubric that ministers could no longer hold senior party positions saw Kwelagobe losing ministerial office, while Khama himself retained his dual presidencies.

Factionalism intensiÞed, as one camp, represented by Education Minister Jacob Nkate and General Merafhe, was actively supported by Khama, while the other, led by Kwelagobe and Kedikilwe, was opposed by the President. At a BDP congress in July, a majority of delegates supported the latter camp in voting from the party ßoor. Rather than seeking conciliation in the cause of party unity ahead of imminent national elections, Khama seemingly used his appointment powers to undermine the winning team and unilaterally suspended the newly elected Secretary General, Gomolemo Motswaledi.

Conclusion
From the warnings of the Law Society to the assessments of Saleshando, Pilane, Bayford, and Afrobarometer, there is marked consensus in Botswana on Khama's presidency. The editor of the Botswana Gazette, quoting in part a speech by High Court Justice Key Dingake, said that a democratic Botswana needed institutions rather than individuals, and that 'the cult of personality ... will set our political system back to our feudal days'. For the Sunday Standard, Khama's leadership style was 'reclusive, divisive, secretive [and] isolationist'. It was contemptuous of civil society, the media, and the opposition, and of the rank-and-Þle of the BDP too.35 Considered in the context of the shooting of Kalafatis, it is thus clear that the rule of law and democracy are seriously undermined in what is often seen as an African success story.

*Kenneth Good (kenneth.good@rmit.edu.au) is Adjunct Professor in Global Studies at RMIT University, Melbourne. This paper appeared in the academic publication African Affairs published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal African Society.