The balance between private and public funding differs substantially from country to country. According to some sources political parties in Israel receive the bulk of their support (about 85 percent) from the public treasury, while in the United States of America (US)po1itical parties receive a substantial part of their funds from private sources.

Private financing will continue to play an important role even when public funding of political parties is in place. Politics devoid of the influence of interest groups is difficult to imagine. This is so because politics is about people and groups of people, their ideas and interests. Because people seek political involvement through groups, it would be inappropriate to seek to prohibit private financing completely.

It is submitted that individuals or groups of persons are entitled, as part of their freedom of association and free speech, to donate to any cause of their choice. In my view, the freedom to associate is not only limited to formally joining a political party, it also encompasses the freedom to support the cause of that organisation financially. Such contributions are also another form of expressing oneself. Consequently, it would be inappropriate to prohibit completely any financial donations. Like any other right, the right to express oneself through making political donations is not absolute.

However, it is subject to restrictions that are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

Under the said exception, it becomes necessary to place certain limits on donations requiring that they be disclosed. Such a limitation is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society because contribution limits enhance equality of electoral opportunities and are not inconsistent with a democratic order. Countries that decide that private contributions should provide the bulk of party resources have elaborate regulatory mechanism intended to promote transparency.

In such countries, the legal framework does not only content itself with providing contributions limits, but requires disclosure of contributions as well.

Some countries, such as Germany, which rely more on public funding of political parties, do not have an onerous regulatory mechanism for private donations. The German system, for instance does not have any limit on the amount of private contributions that can be made to a political party.

Disclosure requirements in Australia are quite elaborate. The require all donations greater than $199 for individual candidates or $997 (about P6, 071)for groups of candidates to be disclosed political parties are not required to separately disclose election Contributions are only disclosed by parties as part of their annual disclosures. On reporting the donations, relevant particulars pertaining to the amount, name and address of the contributor are to be disclosed. The reporting is required within 15 weeks after polling day.

In Queensland, a commission that was set up to investigate public registration of political parties in 1992 recommended that political donations (defined as a gift made to a political party or candidate in the form of property, cash or provision of service other than volunteer labour) should not be exempted from disclosure requirements. The commission also recommended that a separate threshold should apply for political parties and candidates. The threshold for political parties was set at $1 000; and that for candidates at $200.

In respect of donations below the threshold, it was recommended that they should be aggregates and disclosed as a single sum. The reason for placing a legal limit on the size of donations that come from individuals and companies is that it goes against the principle of equality for a legal system to allow wealthy individuals and companies to have a disproportionate influence on the political process, in that they have more ready access to law makers. Such access is usually not available to an average voter.

Very large donations create a real danger that special favours may be extended to donors by politicians in government. In the United States, electoral law requires candidates to establish a single central campaign committee through which contributions made on their behalf can be reported. In other countries like Germany, the law prohibits donations from anonymous donors.

Most, if not all parties rely on donations varying degrees. These donations often come from the professional sectors of civil society or from business people. It is a matter of record that the trade unionists gave financial assistance to the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in Zambia, to help it wrestle power from the ruling party in 1991.

There is no evidence to suggest that the situation in SADC is different from the rest of Africa where opposition parties battle for support from the business community who would rather support governing parties which can deliver some returns instead of risking the vengeance of vindictive governments.

In South Africa, it is reported that the African National Congress relied on donations from abroad to fight the 1994 elections. It is further reported that, three years following the 1994 democratic elections, the ruling party found itself in financial difficulties and had to retrench 163 out of 560 staff it employed and sold its assets, such as vehicles.

Arguments Against Private Funding

Critics have often argued that allowing private funding promotes corruption because it tends to limit the independence and freedom of action of members of parliament and governments. This is so because there is a general tendency by those who fund candidates or political parties to wish to gain some influence thereby. In order to minimise corruption it is often suggested that private donations should be disclosed. But some critics also oppose this. Disclosure of donations has often been opposed on the ground that it violates the right to privacy and tends to expose the donor to negative repercussions from the government of the day, if such donation is directed to the opposition party.

According to this argument, what a person does with his/her money, like his/her vote, is a private matter. If the donor is a company, it is argued that funding an opposition party may affect the work it has been getting from government. There is also the danger that disclosure of financial donations may be abused by mischievous elements, who may inspect the public register in order to expose donors who might prove an embarrassment to certain political parties.

The practical effect of this influence is that candidates and political parties cease being accountable to the electorates, but to the donors.

Public Funding

Rationale Behind Public Funding of Political Parties

The rationale for public funding of political parties is often linked to the desirability of establishing, as far as possible, a level playing field. Public funding may also improve the general performance of parties in areas such as policy formulation and effective representation. Where political parties are unable to effectively represent their constituents, it is not the members of the political parties alone who may suffer, but also members of the public, because they too would be denied effective representation. Public funding can also help political parties improve their ability to represent their constituents by enabling representatives to conduct research and therefore be in a position to engage in informed debate on matters of national importance. More significantly, public funding would reduce political parties' dependency upon special interests. The Australian Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform (JSCER) endorsed this approach when it wrote that:

"The concept of public funding centres on the essence of legitimate political decision making, that is, ensuring that no element in the political process should be hindered in its appeal to electors nor influence in its subsequent actions by lack of success to adequate finance.

From the above discussion the aim of public funding can be crisply summarised as follows: (i) to ensure equality of opportunity in a multi-party democracy characterised by inequalities in wealth; (ii) to reduce the opportunity of undue influence; and (iii) to prevent corruption.

A vibrant multi-party democracy requires that there be strong opposition parties to choose from in the event the government of the day fails to execute its mandate to the satisfaction of the people.

Public funding of political parties also allows opposition parties to access funds that can help them come up with more thoroughly researched policies. Without such funding, it is extremely difficult to come up with viable alternative policy packages.

The mobilisation of voters and dissemination of policies involves vast sums of money that cannot be raised from subscription fees alone. As an illustration of how expensive campaigning could be, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa estimated spending R200 million (about P1.2 million)to fight the first non-racial elections in April 1994.

Public funding of political parties may take different forms. One possible form it may take is state funding, or it may be facilitated by, for instance, appropriate tax legislation. Public funding of political parties also raises two related questions: the qualifications for sharing in the funds and public scrutiny and/or control of party funds.

An appropriate tax legislation scheme may take two forms. First, it may be introduced as a deductible expense to be set off against tax otherwise payable. This is dependent on taxpayers sending a receipt as evidence of contribution. Under this scheme, those taxpayers who contribute to political parties would get a tax benefit.

The second form could entail allowing citizens to allocate what proportion of the tax payable by them should be allocated to the party of their choice. This arrangement ensures that no taxpayer would be forced to make a financial contribution to a party, which he opposes or dislikes. The problem with the above arrangement is that it is difficult to predict how much money may be raised and most importantly whether it will be able to meet the budgets of various parties.

Another form that is often used is direct funding of political parties from the state's coffers. This may be in the form of assistance in kind, such as opening up public facilities for use by political parties or through cash grants. The difficulty with cash grants is that it may not meet the needs of political parties. Some parties may want money to pay full time activists or to run their offices, while others may want money to conduct research in order to come up with sound policies. The costs of the tasks may differ considerably.

It is the standard practice in many western democracies to provide public funding for political parties and candidates. The financial assistance that is rendered to political parties in most European systems is not only confined to campaigns, but also to regular political party activities. The system of funding political parties is therefore sufficiently established in most parts of Western Europe. It is common practice in many countries to distribute finance to political parties according to a formula based on the number of parliamentary seats or proportion of the votes the party won at the last general election. Most public funding systems attempt to balance the principles of proportionality and equity. The principle of equity attempts to accommodate smaller parties because it is believed that they too play an important role in a democracy. Those countries that follow the principle of equity provide some funding for lower levels of demonstrated support.

In Namibia political parties are funded on the basis of the proportion of votes a party won in the last general elections. However, the Electoral Institute of South Africa has observed that although the funding of political parties in Namibia is useful for purposes of strengthening parties as a key institution of democracy, various issues such as improving the formula used for public funding and accountability mechanisms need to be addressed.

Arguments Against Public funding

Critics have often argued that state funding of political parties will alienate them from their mass base, as they will be more dependent on the state for financing party activities. According to this argument, state finance will lessen the urge to recruit more members, from whom subscription fees may be sourced.

This will lead to declining membership and reduced popular participation in the affairs of the parties. It has also been argued that in countries where funding is given to parties which have parliamentary representation such funding may be viewed as discriminatory against parties which have no representation in parliament, especially to voters who find the agenda of one of the parties objectionable.

Critics have argued that public funding of political parties amounts to compelling all citizens to contribute towards public subsidies, by virtue of the fact that a proportion of their tax is being used for that purpose. According to this view, taxpayer's money can only be legitimately used for the provision of services and facilities and not to political parties as that would amount to abuse of taxpayers' money.

Some scholars have also expressed concern that public funding of political parties may weaken the links between the political parties and their rank and file membership in that the parties will be dependent for their operational costs on the State.

This dependence will in turn lead to bureaucratic control over political parties This may lead to demands that party officials, like civil servants, must be guaranteed security of tenure, pension rights and so on. If these demands are granteed party officials may be less accountable to ordinary party members.

Besides the fact that subsidies may reinforce the power of the central office (of political parties), it does not necessarily follow that public fund dependence of political parties on special sectional interests. The parties would in all likelihood continue to rely on donations from companies or wealthy individuals If the dependence on sectional interests continues, the overall effect would be that public funding would have achieved the worst of both worlds: dependence on institutional finance and the weakening of the links between the political parties and their rank and file membership.

It is argued, however, that the issue of declining membership that may be prompted by public funding is capable of being remedied. One possible remedy is to devise a system of public funding that encourages parties to recruit new members on a regular basis. This could be achieved by linking the amount of money received to the membership of political parties. This can have the effect of stimulating the growth of membership

Critics against public funding have also argued that public funding of political parties will compromise the independence of political parties in that in order to qualify for funding the state may impose some obligations that may effectively turn political parties into another arm of the state.

It must be indicated at this stage that the other problem with public funding of political parties is a number of competing challenges It may well be that certain issues, such as funding HIV/AIDS programmes, deserve more priority than political parties, Indeed there may be many other far more deserving social needs.

If public funding of political parties is regarded to be in the public interest, then it needs to be determined on what basis the funds should be distributed. There are three possible options. In terms of the first option, funds may be distributed equally among the registered political parties. The advantage of this approach is that it doesn't discriminate against smaller parties. The disadvantage of this approach is that it may encourage political parties to rely more and more on public funds and not make any attempt to raise money from their membership, because funding will not be linked to membership.

For instance, where the applicable rules make it easy to access funds, parties may simply be formed to access those funds and no more. This approach may also lead to the mushrooming of smaller parties. This concern was expressed in the United States case of Buckley.

The second option of distributing funds is one, which is based on the number of people who toted for a particular party in the preceding elections. In terms of this formula a specific amount is attached to a vote. Consequently, a political party that was elected by a majority of voters will take the lion's share of the funds available.

The third option, which is really a variant of the second, is to allocate funds on the basis of seats won rather than votes cast. Both the second and third approaches have the same effect: smaller parties stand to gain very little, whilst the major parties will gain a lot. The third approach is especially prejudicial to smaller parties in countries where the first-past the-post-the electoral system obtains because under such electoral system it is possible that parties with a large following may fail to secure a seat.

At this juncture the question that presents itself is what model or approach of distributing funds would be appropriate for different electoral systems espoused by the region? It is suggested that in order to be as inclusive as possible public funding of political parties must be pegged on popular support, and not necessarily parliamentary representation. To this extent, a threshold that would not exclude significant parties would be advisable. Such a threshold is to some extent a matter of value judgment, but one would think any range of between three to five percent would be reasonable. This will lead to the funding of parties that command a reasonable amount of electoral support.

Foreign Funding

In most countries funding may breed corruption. Therefore transparency International in 2004 issued "TI Standards on political Finance and Favours". The 4th standard provides that: "careful consideration should be given to the benefits of state funding of parties and candidates and to the encouragement of citizens participation through small donations and membership fees. Consideration should also be given to limiting corporate and foreign support, as well as large individual donations..."

Commentators are divided on the merits and demerits of obtaining donations from foreign countries. Those who are opposed to foreign funding argue that it opens the country to influence from external forces. It cannot be denied that opening the political system to external influence may be harmful to stability, in so far as certain funds solicited from outside the country may serve subversive activities. There are those who argue that to allow foreign sources to sponsor political parties is to legalise foreign interference in the internal affairs of other countries.34 These foreign sources may pressurise the recipients of their funds to pursue the interests of sponsors and not necessarily those of the electorates.

No country has a right to interfere in the electoral process of other countries. There are scholars who argue that those who are not members of a particular society should not be allowed to actively influence the political process by which members of the society choose their political leaders.

History is replete with examples of the harmful effects of foreign interference, through funding of political parties. Fernandez cites among others the example of the funding of the anti-Allende opposition forces in the 1960s and 1970s in Chile by the United States government. In the United States itself, subsequent to the Watergate scandal, investigations revealed that foreign donors who hoped to benefit from the victory of President Nixon poured a lot of money into his campaign.

In international law, the legality of foreign funding is not settled. Some authorities have argued that there is nothing in the UN Charter that prohibits foreign funding of political parties. Damrosch advances the view that a state that recognises universally acclaimed civil and political rights such as the right of participation and freedom of association should not allow foreign funding of political parties. Indeed, in several major Western democracies foreign donations are banned. This is so in the US, Germany, Greece, UK and Japan. In Germany, parties are not allowed to accept the following donations, (i) donations from outside the area of application of the Law on Political Parties (Party Law) 2002, unless these donations accrue to a party directly from the assets of a German citizen as defined by the Basic law, a citizen of the European Union or a business enterprise more than 50 percent of whose shares are owned by Germans as defined by the basic law.

Proponents of foreign funding have defended it on the basis of market principles. According to this view, foreign donors who feel that the policies of a particular party are likely to benefit their companies are at liberty to support such a party.

Perhaps it shouldn't matter whether donations to political parties come from an internal or external source as long as there is disclosure. Further, it may well be prudent to leave it to individual countries to determine whether their circumstances would permit foreign funding of parties.

Most of the central and eastern European countries do not allow foreign funding principally because of political disputes concerning territorial boundaries and/or differences concerning who has the right to citizenship in a particular state. Regulations concerning foreign donations are mostly restrictive and prohibitive. This is particularly true in countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Maldova. The Russian Federation also prohibits foreign contributions to political parties. However, there are exceptions where foreign donations are not prohibited like Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It may well be that the important role of international assistance in post-war restructuring of Bosnia and Herzegovina explains this exception.